Illini Journal of International Security

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Letter from the Editor

Dear reader,

On behalf of the IJOIS Editorial Board, the Program in Arms Control & Domestic and International Security, the University Library, and the supportive academic community of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, we would like to thank you for reading the third issue of Illini Journal of International Security (IJOIS)! IJOIS is a peer-reviewed academic journal that was founded in September 2015 by undergraduate students at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. We publish exceptional papers on topics within international security or foreign affairs.

For our fifth issue of the journal, we are excited to publish outstanding undergraduate papers that explore some of the most pressing issues within international security and foreign affairs, covering a wide range of topic areas and geographical regions. In "The People's Republic of China's Security Dependence on Semi-Autonomous Territories," Kathleen Richardson explores how the People's Republic of China's recent policies have negatively affected their grand strategy in East Asia. Traveling west, we focus in on the Middle East with "A Case of Mistaken Identities: The Real Friends and Foes in the War in Afghanistan" and "A Return to Insurgency in Iraq: The Islamic State's transition to insurgency and the Iraqi mistakes that have aided it."

In "A Case of Mistaken Identities: The Real Friends and Foes in the War in Afghanistan," Siddharth Singh Chaudhari gives insight into why Pakistan supports the Afghan Taliban and the implications for the United States and Afghan governments. In Zachary Cleary's "A Return to Insurgency in Iraq: The Islamic State's transition to insurgency and the Iraqi mistakes that have aided it," he explores the how the Islamic State transitioned to Iraq after the destruction of their caliphate and the what this means for the Iraqi government.

Moving northeast, we look into how the annexation of Crimea and Russian aggression along Ukraine's eastern boarder goes against the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and explore the view that Ukraine is in a better position than that if they had not agreed to the memorandum in "Empty Promises: The Denuclearization of Ukraine and its Effects Twenty Years Later" from Paisley Ann Meyer.

Zooming out to see a more global perspective, Madison Johnston reviews the evolution of intelligence gathering methods between the 1800's to the Cold War era and what this means for concerns and arguments of these methods in "The Paradigm Shifts in Intelligence: From 1800 to Present."

These exceptional undergraduate papers present novel arguments on a wide array of issues within international security and foreign affairs. We hope that these papers will challenge and inform our readers, spark discussion, and encourage undergraduate students to explore these pressing issues or pursue international studies further. We hope you enjoy reading!

Christopher Szul

About the Illini Journal of International Security

The Illini Journal of International Security (IJOIS) is a peer-reviewed undergraduate academic journal that was founded in September 2015 by undergraduate students at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. IJOIS is published biannually through the University of Illinois Library with the support of the Program of Arms Control & Domestic and International Security (ACDIS) and is comprised of exceptional undergraduate and graduate papers on topics related to international security or foreign affairs. IJOIS utilizes a cross-disciplinary approach and accepts papers from students studying the social sciences, STEM fields, business and the humanities that analyze international security issues from innovative perspectives. While IJOIS is run by students at UIUC, the Journal accepts submissions from students at all University of Illinois campuses (Urbana-Champaign, Chicago, and Springfield).

The People's Republic of China's Security Dependence on Semi-Autonomous Territories

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Abstract

This paper explores how the People's Republic of China's (PRC) recent domestic and foreign policies have weakened the PRC's national security and undermined their grand strategy in the East Asian region. The presented analysis does so by dissecting the PRC's interference in Hong Kong's election law since 1997 and the effect this interference has on independence movements in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Likewise, it scrutinizes the shift in diplomatic communiqué since the 2012 elections and how this shift has escalated tensions both domestically and regionally. Finally, the presented analysis addresses potential physical security issues for the PRC in the South China Sea if the quasi-state of Taiwan were to declare formal independence and align itself with other East Asian actors. By the end of this paper, it should be clear how it is imperative for the PRC to shift their grand strategy from a hard power approach to a soft power approach in order to secure their influence in East Asia. If the PRC cannot counterbalance the need for state security with the need for human security, then their growing hegemony in the East Asian region may be significantly diminished in the years to come.

The People's Republic of China's Security Dependence on Semi-Autonomous Territories
Kathleen Richardson

Historical Overview of Chinese Territories

Following the exploitation associated with the "century of humiliation" and the trauma of the Chinese Civil War, the unification of the Chinese state became a matter of national pride and honor for the People's Republic of China (PRC). However, the PRC's claim to sovereignty in several territories has been heavily debated since the PRC's founding in 1949. All throughout the republic there are regions that have a fractured loyalty to the PRC due to their political and cultural heritage. This fractured loyalty has caused sustained hostility within the Chinese state as the PRC continues to consolidate their power within these regions—often at the expense of the people.

In Macau and Hong Kong, the development of their governance systems under foreign rule is the main cause of tension with the PRC. Until the late 1990s Macau and Hong Kong remained under the colonial rule of Portugal and the United Kingdom, respectively. Although democratization was slow to materialize under both colonial governments, progress was made through proposals such as the Green Paper: A Pattern of District Administration in Hong Kong. Through the Green Paper and other similar documents, the citizens of Macau and Hong Kong were able to achieve constitutional reform to promote local representation in the government. By the time Macau and Hong Kong were returned to the PRC, many democratic values had already flourished in the collective consciousness of citizens as non-negotiable rights—such as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and universal suffrage. This was taken in consideration as negotiations in 1980s between the colonial governments and the PRC commenced.

These negotiations over the transfer of power led to the development of the "one China, two systems" philosophy and when negotiations were completed both Macau and Hong Kong were transformed into Chinese special administrative regions. This special administrative status was a compromise between the colonial governments and the PRC that granted the PRC sovereignty over both territories as part of a unified China (one China) while guaranteeing the right for Hong Kong and Macau to maintain certain administrative, economic, and democratic rights that are not found in other parts of the PRC (two systems). Since then both territories have sought to bolster their autonomy under the PRC's watchful eye—though Macau often seeks much less autonomy than Hong Kong (*Why Macau is less demanding of democracy than Hong Kong*, 2017; Yick, 2014). The precarious equilibrium of "one China, two systems" has led to the rise of pro-independence movements in both regions as critics claim that the PRC has progressively interfered with the democratic processes guaranteed under basic law (*Hong Kong profile*, 2018; Yick, 2014).

Similarly, in Taiwan the precedent of a separate government as the Republic of China (ROC) has led to disaccord with the PRC. This conflict can be traced back to the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949 when the Kuomintang (KMT) fled to the island of Taiwan and established the ROC as the official government of China. While Taiwan originally developed as a province under the autocratic rule of Chiang Kai-shek, after his death in the 1970s Taiwan began to transition into a self-governing democracy. However, while democratization was taking place, Taiwan's sovereignty began to falter as the PRC gained international influence. During

this time foreign states began to recognize the PRC as the official government of China in the place of the ROC, reducing Taiwan's international status (*Timeline: Taiwan's road to democracy*, 2011). Since then the PRC has sought to further constrain Taiwan's diplomatic relations with foreign states and international organizations in order to inhibit Taiwan's capability to establish formal independence and declare itself a fully sovereign state (Kuo, 2018). Currently Taiwan functions as a quasi-state that is neither entirely separate from China nor completely unified with China (Romberg, 2016; Everington, 2019). Even though Taiwan still has its own government as the ROC and regularly attempts to re-legitimize its sovereignty as a state, Taiwan faces constant pressure from the PRC to unify with Mainland China. As a result, tensions between the governments of the PRC and the ROC have continued to escalate

The provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang are also in conflict with the PRC. However, their clashes with the PRC stem from religious and cultural repression. In Tibet the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1913 led the Buddhist Tibetan government to act as its own de facto independent state for several decades (Bajora, 2008). Thus, when the PRC invaded in 1950 to reclaim the region, it was met with a strong resistance by the people of Tibet. While a year later the Tibetan government signed an agreement to grant sovereignty of the region to the PRC, the subsequent banishment of the Dalai Lama in 1959 and the repression of the Tibetan people has led to a pro-independence movement that still thrives in the present (*Tibet Profile*, 2017; Bajora, 2008).

Likewise, the attempts by the PRC to subjugate the Uighurs—a Muslim ethnic group composed of around 12 million people—has led to extremist groups and pro-independence movements to develop in the PRC's Xinjiang province (Fish, 2014; Buckley, 2018). After a series of violent anti-government attacks took place in China between 2013 to 2014, President Xi Jinping ordered Xinjiang authorities to "strike hard" and "strike first" in a campaign to survey and detain Uighurs for suspected extremist activity (Shih, 2017; Buckley, 2018). Since the start of this campaign the United Nations estimates that up to a million Uighurs have been sent to "education centers" by Xinjiang police (Leigh, 2019). At these centers it is reported that Uighurs are forced into indoctrination programs that can last up to two years. In these programs, the detainees are forced to renounce their religion and praise the Communist Party of China (CCP) (Leigh, 2019; Shih, 2017; Buckley, 2018). Meanwhile the PRC claims that these centers merely offer job training and that no one is forced to stay within these centers (Buckley, 2018).

Many Beijing officials view the suppression of independence movements in their territories as a necessary step to ensure the PRC's national security. However, as this paper will show, the tactics used by the PRC only serve to estrange citizens and decrease the faith in the "one country, two systems" philosophy. This in turn fuels rather than inhibits independence movements. Consequently, the PRC's national security is currently threatened more from consolidation efforts than it would be if the PRC truly offered these regions the autonomy to self-govern.

The Disillusionment of Chinese Citizens

When the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed in 1984 by Margaret Thatcher and Deng Xiaoping, a document entitled Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China was also created to outline the governance of Hong Kong after the transfer of power. This document served three important objectives for the negotiators: (1) to embody the "one country, two systems" concept conceived by Deng Xiaoping during negotiations, (2) to ease the mind of investors who were anxious about the stability and future of Hong Kong under communist rule, and (3) to serve as a constitution to Hong Kong until least 2047 (Yahuda, 1993).

However, Basic Law is far from perfect. Per Chinese law, "basic statutes" –-which the Basic Law falls under—come second to the Chinese Constitution in legal matters (Palumbo, 1990). This means that the PRC can use the Chinese Constitution to undermine or circumvent Basic Law without breaking the Sino-British Joint Declaration or violating international treaty law. When the PRC denied Hong Kong the right to sit at the table in the Sino-British Joint Declaration negotiation in the 1980s, it set a clear precedent about the way the PRC would view power relations going forward with all their contentious territories: desire for autonomy would be secondary to the PRC's demand for consolidation.

Since Hong Kong's return to the PRC's governance canopy in 1997, Sino-Hong Kong relations have been embroiled in controversy. Beijing appointed Tung Chee-Hwa to be Executive Chief to Hong Kong, but this appointment was met with disapproval as Tung Chee-Hwa was "a Shanghai-born former shipping tycoon with no political experience" (*Hong Kong profile*, 2018, para. 20). However—from Beijing's perspective—what Tung lacked in political savvy, he made up in loyalty to the Mainland (Siu-Kai & Hsin-Chi, 2002).

Tung would prove this loyalty in 2002, when his administration introduced an attempt to legislate Article 23 of the Basic Law. Article 23 states that "Hong Kong should enact laws on its own that prohibit treason, secession, sedition, subversion, theft of state secrets, and linkage with foreign political organizations" (Ngok, 2017, p. 20). This effort to create legislation on Article 23 was met with intense criticism from the Hong Kong public and political elite because of the potential for Article 23 to reduce the individual rights of citizens—such as the right to peaceful protest and freedom of speech (Kellogg, 2003). By 2003, when the new Article 23 legislation was close to being passed, "an estimated 500,000 people marched through the streets of Hong Kong in order to voice their disapproval" (Kellogg, 2003, p. 310). The outcry of the public led Tung to withdraw the proposed amendments only a few months later (Kellogg, 2003).

Since 2004 no renewed attempts to pass legislation based around Article 23 was pursued. However, during this time the issue of universal suffrage (the right of Hong Kong citizens to elect leaders through general elections without interference from the Beijing) would become the new point of contention. In 2005, Donald Tsang—a civil servant elected to Chief Executive after Tung was forced to resign among controversy—attempted to bridge the gap between Hong Kong's democratic needs and Beijing's desire for consolidation by pursuing amendments to Articles 7 and Article 3 of Basic Law via the 5th Report (Chen, 2005). The goal of the 5th Report

was to pave the way for universal suffrage within Hong Kong, but due to pressure from Beijing, the 5th Report lacked a clear timeline of when the reforms for universal suffrage be initiated (Chen, 2005). It wasn't until 2007, after years of protest and pressure from Hong Kong, that Beijing finally relented and announced plans to allow for universal suffrage by 2020 (*Hong Kong profile, 2018*).

From 2007 to 2014 universal suffrage continued to be a contentious issue between Hong Kong and Beijing, but universal suffrage didn't gain a large international public forum again until 2014, when several protests, referred to as the Umbrella Movement, took place throughout Hong Kong (Kaiman, 2014; *Hong Kong profile*, 2018). This movement was an act of civil disobedience against Beijing inspired "after China announced that Beijing would vet candidates to run in the 2017 elections, thus regulating the race to be Hong Kong chief executive" (*Hong Kong profile, 2018*; McCarthy, 2014, para. 3). The protests lasted 79 days and involved around 100,000 protesters total (Wong, 2016). Despite the mostly peaceful nature of these protests, Beijing censored the news coverage of the protests in Mainland China and publicly condemned the demonstrators (Wong, 2016).

Since the transfer of power in 1997, the PRC has used the Basic Law loophole to implement officious tactics to sway Hong Kong election law in favor of politicians with pro-Beijing stances (Siu-Kai & Hsin-Chi, 2002). However, these tactics have done little to increase the control the PRC has over the governance of Hong Kong. Instead, it has mostly caused harm to consolidation efforts by causing disillusionment among the youth of Hong Kong to the "one country, two systems" ideal as well as pro-independence groups in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang who watch the tension in Hong Kong with wary apprehension.

This disillusionment can be best understood through the gradual change in identification from the national title of 'Chinese' to the regional title of 'Hongkonger' or 'Taiwanese.' The University of Hong Kong's Public Opinion Programme found that "between 2008 and 2016, those who see themselves as Hongkonger or a Hongkonger in China rose from 47.4 percent to 63.7 percent while those who identified as Chinese fell from 47 percent to 33.9 percent" (Zhang, Yau & Tsui, 2017, para. 5). Comparable statistics can be found in Taiwan that state "in 1992, when democracy just began in Taiwan, only 20 percent of the respondents to an annual poll held by Taiwan's National Chengchi University called themselves "Taiwanese only." In 2018, more than 50 percent did so. And those identified solely as Chinese dropped from a quarter of those asked in 1992 to less than 3 percent" (Pomfret, 2019, para. 7). As the youth of China began to identify more with their region than they do with the PRC, it will be more difficult for the PRC to push the idea of a unified China under the strict leadership of Beijing, especially if the promise of "one China, two systems" continues to fail in the eyes of those that are supposed to trust in it.

The growing connection between territories since the 2014 protests within the China may also prove to be a hurdle for the PRC's consolidation efforts. In the news analysis *Under the Shadow of China* by Samson Yuen, Yuen points to the increase in partnership between Hong Kong and Taiwanese activists in 2013: "the organizers of Hong Kong's budding pro-democracy campaign, Occupy Central, travelled to Taiwan to give public talks about the election reform

movement in the hope of borrowing insights from Taiwan's social movements" (2014, p. 75). As part of the insight offered by Taiwanese activists, Hong Kong organizers learned invaluable skills such as how to coordinate supplies and quickly spread information on the internet (Sui, 2014). This cooperation eventually led to further collaboration between Hong Kong activists and Taiwanese activists a year later during several different protests in both regions. This includes the Taiwanese Sunflower Student Movement, which was a "protest against the attempt by the Kuomintang (KMT) to pass a service trade pact with China" (Yuen, 2014, p. 69). Though the PRC has since attempted to blacklist known activists to prevent travel between the two regions, Taiwanese activists stated that they will continue to offer assistance to Hong Kong activists as "supporting each other will help both sides" (Sui, 2014, para. 25).

Even within Mainland China, support for the protests during 2014 could be found on the social media platforms WeChat and Weibo—though Chinese citizens condemning the protesters were also easily found on these platforms (Werime, 2014). Despite lacking the same amount of freedom of expression within Tibet and Xinjiang, independence leaders from these regions also emphasized how important the connections were between Hong Kong, Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan activists towards struggle for more autonomy from the PRC. Uighur leader Rebiya Kadeer expressed that the protests had taken place in other territories—particularly in Hong Kong—were an inspiration to the international Uighur independence movement, which at the time was concerned about the discrimination towards the practice of fasting in the month of Ramadan in the Xinjiang province (Fish, 2014; *Why is there tension between China and the Uighurs*, 2014). Similarly, Tibetan activist Tenzin Jigdal stated that "what we have in common with the people in Hong Kong is that we are all fighting for freedom and justice against an authoritarian regime that has broken its promises again and again" (Jacobs, 2014, para. 17). Activists like Jigdal hoped that the international attention brought to the PRC's handling of Hong Kong and Taiwanese protesters would also help bring attention to the less press-friendly regions of Tibet and Xinjiang (Jacobs, 2014, para. 3).

If the PRC cannot find a way to temper their consolidation policy within these regions, the materialization of one of the PRC's largest fears may arise—the mismanagement of one territory and its subsequent secession leading to support for secession throughout other Chinese territories. Unlike citizens in Taiwan where there is a very clear lack of enthusiasm for unification with the PRC (below 3.0% in 2012), many citizens in Hong Kong don't seek complete independence from the PRC (Magcamit, 2014). Rather, they simply desire the unfettered autonomy that was promised to them in spirit of the Basic Law such as the freedom of press or the freedom to protest. In the same way, various activists in the Tibetan independence movement have supported the "middle-way approach" rather than complete independence as way appease both sides of the conflict. This includes endorsement of the plan from the Dalai Lama (Bajoria, 2008). Therefore, if the leadership in Beijing would step away from the hard power approach it has traditionally used in these territories, it might find more success. However, since 2012 evidence has grown that the PRC is headed in the opposite direction.

2012 Elections: A Watershed Moment to PRC Grand Strategy and Rhetoric

When Deng Xiaoping took over as the head of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1978, he changed the trajectory of the PRC from an ideological Maoist state to "socialism with Chinese characteristics" driven market-economy (Guo, 2009). Not only would this change lead to the liberalization of Chinese markets, it would also eventually form the PRC's economic integration strategy in domestic and foreign policy (McGuire, 2017).

As the Chinese economy has grown since the 1980s, so has the international trade relations between the PRC and other countries (Guo, 2009). In 2014 the PRC replaced the United States as the world's top trading partner; 43 countries reported China as their top export partner compared to the 31 countries that reported the United States as their top export partner (Holodny, 2015). Throughout East Asia the PRC has sought to use this top export partner status to their advantage. By enacting economic sanctions and other methods of coercion, the PRC has hoped to discourage East Asian states from straying away from Chinese grand strategy—such as the PRC's attempt to reduce U.S. influence in East Asia (McGuire, 2017). However, the PRC has had limited success with economic integration strategy as a deterrent because no East Asian state desires full dependency on the PRC. South Korea proved this when it agreed to the install the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system on the Korean Peninsula. This is despite repeated threats from the PRC that is would impose sanctions on South Korea if South Korea agreed to host the missile system (McGuire, 2017).

Correspondingly, the PRC's lack of success in using economic integration strategy as tool of coercion can also be observed via bilateral relations between the PRC and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN). For nine years the PRC has been the largest trading partner of ASEAN. By 2009 the PRC accounted for "11.6% of ASEAN's total trade of $1.54 trillion" (Raine, 2011, p. 82). Despite this economic dependence, most of the disputes between ASEAN and the PRC in the South China Sea remain unresolved. To further delegitimize the Chinese economic integration strategy, there is an argument put forth by Avila & Goldman that the PRC's aggressive maneuvers against other East Asian states is likely what has led to more interregional cooperation outside of the Chinese scope (2015).

The inability to limit the countervailing domestic and international interests to Chinese grand strategy has led the central government in Beijing to increase the use of militaristic approaches in East Asian relations. According to several analysts, this militarized policy serves several purposes for the central government. The first is that it channels the rising nationalism among the country's *fenqing* ('angry young men') into a more manageable space by directing it towards non-domestic issues, such as the disputes in the South China Sea (Raine, 2011, p. 81). Along the same vein, the militarized rhetoric shifts the public spotlight away from widespread national issues such as faltering GDP to more on regionally-focused issues—like the unification of Taiwan to Mainland China (Haass, 2019).

In 2012 internal speeches surfaced from the newly elected President Xi to senior military personal that declared "The Central Military Commission's 'first requirement'… was to forge a military that could 'fight and win' a modern war" (Lewis & Litai, 2016, p. 216). While this

announcement by itself isn't far from past Beijing rhetoric, this hardened approach signaled the central government's attitude towards language in diplomatic communiqué moving forward both domestically and internationally. For example, in the release of the 2018 EU policy paper, the PRC set clear redlines by shifting the use of language from a suggestive lexicon to an absolutist lexicon regarding how the EU should address Chinese governance issues in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Tibet (Chan, 2019).

The language that President Xi has used in public speeches has also taken a more militarized or aggressive approach. In 2017 Xi delivered a pointed speech at the end of his 3-day visit to Hong Kong on the 20th anniversary of the handover. In it he said:

> "…making everything political or deliberately creating differences (will) severely hinder Hong Kong's economic and social development… any attempt to endanger China's sovereignty and security, challenge the power of the central government… (or) use Hong Kong to carry out infiltration and sabotage against the mainland is an act that crosses the red line and is absolutely impermissible" (Ramzy, 2017, para. 5-6).

This universal declaration of redlines is disconcerting, as pointed out by political analyst Willy Lam, because "this is the first time Xi Jinping or anyone in the leadership has mentioned a 'red line.' It's a warning to the pro-independence or other so-called anti-China elements to not challenge the authority of the central government" (Ramzy, 2017, para. 8).

The tough rhetoric from President Xi would reach crescendo in January 2019 when Xi delivered a controversial speech aimed directly at Taiwanese leadership (Van der Wees, 2019). In his speech President Xi "warned that the Taiwan 'problem' could not be put off for another generation" (Pomfret, 2019, para. 8). As pointed out by Van de Wees, "while he (Xi) did call for peaceful unification, in the next breath Xi warned that China reserved the option of using force if Taiwan didn't go along" (2019, para. 3). This firm stance on the use of force if Taiwan doesn't consent to unification quickly set off alarm bells in the international community. Xi's speech shifted the dialogue away from the globally-supported maintenance of the status quo in the cross-strait conflict to instead a call for action from the Taiwanese leadership to choose between unification or war.

Since the 2016 elections in the Taiwan that resulted in the majority win for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Tsai Ing-Wen and her party, the tension in the Sino-Taiwanese conflict has persistently escalated. For example, immediately after the election the PRC broadened economic sanctions as on the quasi-state in retaliation to the pro-independence party's win (Stewart, 2019). Before President Xi's speech to Taiwan, President Tsai attempted to maintain a moderate approach in cross-strait relations through the promotion of both peaceful diplomatic resolutions and the democratic rights of the Taiwanese people (Romberg, 2016). However, President Tsai's rhetoric changed drastically after President Xi's speech to Taiwan.

In response to President Xi's speech, President Tsai Ing-Wen stepped away from her moderate platform to firmly reject President Xi's position. Tsai stated that the Taiwanese government "would not accept a 'one country, two systems' political arrangement with the China" (Lee, 2019, para. 1). Furthermore, President Tsai has gone on to say that "It is impossible for me or, in my view, any responsible politician in Taiwan to accept President Xi Jinping's recent remarks without betraying the trust and the will of the people of Taiwan" (Horton, 2019, para. 2). By clearly opposing President Xi, it has been theorized that President Tsai hoped to garner more steadfast support from international allies (Horton, 2019). However, thus far most actors such as the U.S., the EU, or Japan have only continued to reiterate the importance of peaceful cross-strait negotiations while covertly supporting Taiwan through other means. If tensions continue to rise in the cross-strait conflict, many international actors will be forced step away from the status-quo and officially declare a side.

The PRC's National Security Dilemma in the South China Sea

Maintenance of the PRC's presence in the South China Sea is vital to the national security of China for two major reasons: physical security and economic security. The issue of physical security is predominantly due to the proximity of the numerous island states within the South China Sea in relation to the southern coast of the PRC—including Taiwan and Hong Kong. However, these physical security problems can also be tied to the economic security of the PRC. For example, as the Chinese economy grows more dependent on imported oil to fuel energy demands, the PRC has been forced to rely on ships that carry petroleum from the Middle East to pass through the Spratly Islands quickly and uncontested (Lewis & Litai, 2016). This dependency has led the PRC to use hard power tactics such as land reclamation and military aggression to strengthen their presence in the territory (Przystup & Saunders, 2017). Though these tactics help promote the might of the PRC, they have also often served to exacerbate hostilities within the region.

Due to the PRC's reliance on trade and limited success with coercion, the PRC has also attempted to use soft power in South China Sea relations. The PRC has accomplished this through the promotion of maritime cooperation with ASEAN on issues related to security, environment, and public health (Rain, 2011; Yee, 2017). In 2002 the PRC also used soft power to advance the non-binding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. The goal this agreement signed with ASEAN was to "work towards adopting a legally binding code of conduct whilst exercising 'self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes'" (Raine, 2011, p. 70).

Though Southeast Asia has been responsive to this soft power approach conducted by the PRC, the overall success of diplomacy in the South China Sea has been hampered by the hard power the PRC still applies to the region. Even China's Foreign Ministry has expressed frustration at what it has called the "counterproductive effect" from the central leadership's "more assertive statements of Chinese rights in the South China Sea" (Rain, 2011, p. 82). Amid these bellicose relations between the PRC and other Asian states, Taiwan has taken the

opportunity to advocate its soft power and influence within East and Southeast Asia. As a result, there are several states that look more favorably on Taiwan than they do the PRC.

Taiwanese and East Asian Alliances

Since the demotion of Taiwan into a quasi-state status in the 1970s, the island has attempted to recreate global diplomatic ties through security alliances and trade agreements. As of 2014 Taiwan has formed free trade agreements (FTAs) with Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and Singapore (Magcamit & Tan, 2014). Overall, the PRC has supported these FTAs Taiwan has developed with other East Asian states, but the PRC has adamantly objected to the command Taiwan has used a quasi-state to forge security alliances throughout East Asia.

In the eyes of the Beijing leadership, Taiwanese security alliances not only delay the unification of their "defiant province" with Mainland China, but these alliances also decrease the capacity for the People's Liberation Army's to use military force against Taiwan. For instance, if Japan or the U.S. were to provide a theater missile defense system to Taiwan through current security alliances, the PRC will lose the ability to credibly threaten the use of ballistic missile attacks (Christensen, 1999). The PRC is aware that any diplomatic or security alliances could weaken the PRC's ability to politically coerce Taiwan into accepting unification. As a result, the PRC has sought to limit the ability of Taiwan to form diplomatic or security ties. Despite this Taiwan and other East Asian states have continued to build up their bilateral relations—albeit through subtle means. Japan is an excellent example of this.

Over the last several decades bilateral relations between Japan and Taiwan have continued to improve through various initiatives such as the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement in 2013 (Chen, 2017; Thim & Matsuko, 2014; Leng & Chang Liao, 2016, p. 370). As a result of these trust-building measures between Japan and Taiwan, the positive views between the two nations' citizens have continued to solidify. In 2008, 60 percent of Taiwanese people were found to have friendly views regarding Japan while "the proportion of Japanese who felt 'close' to Taiwan rose from 56.1% in 2009 to 66.9% in 2011" (Leng & Chang Liao, 2016 p. 370). This means that while Japan may not yet publicly acknowledge the diplomatic ties it has with Taiwan, the support from the Japanese public is strong. Japanese politicians have taken this public support into consideration when dealing with Taiwan. In 2013 Japan released white papers that "included a PRC attack on Taiwan as one of the scenarios that could prompt a Japanese conflict with China" (Thim & Matsuoka, 2014, para. 2). These white papers confirmed the PRC's fear that even unofficial diplomatic relations could boost Taiwan's claim to independence. However, Japan is far from the only state with alliances to Taiwan. The U.S.'s relationship with Taiwan also poses a risk to the PRC's claim over the quasi-state.

Since the end of WWII, the United States has maintained a strong security presence in East Asia. Through security alliances created via bilateral treaties—such as the Mutual Defense Treaty signed with the Philippines in 1951, the Mutual Security Agreement signed with South Korea in 1954, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation signed with Japan in 1960, or the Taiwan Relations Act signed in 1979—the U.S. has create a strong interconnected network within East

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Asia that has often overcome regional conflict to cooperate with their ally. For example, Japan and South Korea put aside the historical tension stemming from WWII to join the U.S. in their first trilateral ballistic missile tracking drill in 2016 (McGuire, 2017).

The U.S. also has sought to strengthen ties within Southeast Asia and one of the strongest security alliances the U.S. has within the region is with the Philippines. Currently the PRC and the Philippines have a contentious relationship due to their dispute over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. If the Philippines were to join a U.S.-backed security alliance against the PRC, it would be a hard blow the presence of the PRC's freedom to navigate within the South China Sea. This is because as of 2016 the Philippines has eight outposts in the Spratly Island region. Therefore, if the Philippines was incentivized by a security alliance, it could make passage through the region difficult for China and threaten their physical and economic security (Lewis & Litai, 2016).

Before the Trump Administration, the U.S.'s previous approach to cross-strait relations had been to promote the status quo. However, ever since President Trump's phone call to President Tsai in 2016, there has arguably been a shift in strategy from the U.S. government. Since then there has been a visible uptick in U.S. military operations in the Taiwan Strait. This uptick has raised concerns in the PRC and hope in Taiwan that the U.S. has changed its official stance towards the "one China" policy in cross-strait relations (Stewart, 2019). While there is no guarantee that East Asian states or the United States would choose to support Taiwan if it declared formal independence, many of these actors have economic, diplomatic, and security interests that support the concept of a completely sovereign Taiwan. Japan's unofficial diplomatic ties with Taiwan and the Philippines' security interest in securing the Spratly Islands are examples of this. Furthermore, if the U.S. does choose to side with Taiwan, it is likely that other East Asian states with U.S. security alliances will follow suit as they have in other U.S.-led East Asian initiatives. Therefore, it is in the PRC's national security interest to placate tensions with Taiwan rather to continue with its hard power approach that has been escalating cross-strait relations since 2012.

Conclusion

It is difficult to decipher whether Xi Jinping or other Beijing officials recognize the risks associated with their insistence on a unified China regardless of the cost. However, what is clear is that the harder the PRC pushes their territories or the quasi-state of Taiwan to fall in the line, the harder these territories push back. The growing disillusionment of the youth in China has created a generation that identifies more with their territory, religion, or ethnic group than they do as citizens of China. The more this disillusionment grows, the more difficult it will be for the PRC to push for a unified China without consideration of the democratic rights of those that it governs.

While the toughening of rhetoric since 2012 has solidified Beijing's power domestically among nationalists and other Mainlanders, internationally this rhetoric has left bilateral and multilateral relationships frayed. Correspondingly, the push from Beijing to consolidate their

power in the territories of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang has fueled pro-independence movements throughout these regions. If any of these movements were to officially declare independence from the PRC and gain steady internal and external support, the unity that has grown between these regions could be a catalyst for the other regions to follow suit with their own declarations of independence. For Taiwan and Hong Kong in particular, the PRC faces unique physical security threats because of the location of these two territories in the South China Sea.

Furthermore, the hard power coercion tactics that the PRC uses through military strength, aggressive rhetoric, or economic sanctions has proven to have limited the overall success in the promotion of Chinese dominance within East Asia. Instead, where Chinese hegemonic strength has gained momentum is through soft power diplomatic avenues like the treaties and agreements negotiated with ASEAN in the South China Sea. Yet diplomatic treaties or agreements themselves are not enough. It has also proven critical for the PRC to follow the spirit of the agreements and participate in trust-building measures with their allies lest tensions continue to escalate—like they have in Hong Kong over the PRC's exploitation of Basic Law.

Going forward, the Beijing leadership faces a difficult decision on how to approach domestic and international relations. If the PRC wishes to once again see a unified China that acts as a global leader then it must recognize the growing importance of soft power. Once the PRC is able to do this, their hegemonic power in East Asia will only continue to grow.

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A Case of Mistaken Identities:

The Real Friends and Foes in the War in Afghanistan

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Abstract

This article explains why Pakistan supports the Afghan Taliban. It contends that Pakistan has extensive systematic incentives to do so. Furthermore, internal Pakistani dynamics enable and encourage support for the Taliban. The article considers the implications for the United States and the Afghan government. This work extends the existing literature and presents novel arguments.

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Introduction

"Give your enemy a thousand chances to become your friend, but do not give your friend a single chance to become your enemy." – Imam Ali

On the 30th of November 2016, roughly three weeks after his scarcely believable triumph in the United States' presidential election, President-elect Donald J. Trump spoke with the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, over the phone. As various news organizations have since reported, the conversation between the two leaders did not go according to plan. Having elected to eschew the State Department's guidance altogether, the President-elect instead chose to compliment the Pakistani Prime Minister's terrific character and remarkable performance and praise Pakistan's exceptional people and boundless opportunities. While the President's ringing endorsement of Pakistan and its leader may be described as exaggerated, his statements are somewhat in keeping with the United States' foreign policy towards the South Asian giant. The U.S. government, after all, intended to contribute over $742 million in foreign assistance to Pakistan over the course of 2017 (Foreign Assistance – Pakistan).

That figure is, by no means, an anomaly. Former President Obama acknowledged the complicated nature of his country's relationship with Pakistan and even refused to visit the latter during his time in office. The U.S. government, however, granted more than $2.6 billion in foreign assistance to Pakistan between 2011-2016 (Foreign Assistance – Pakistan). In recent years, the nature of the relationship between the two countries has come under intense strain. Mounting evidence of systematic collaboration between elements of the Pakistani government and security establishment on the one hand and members of the Afghan Taliban on the other has repeatedly undermined the United States' counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan. But as Pakistan remains hostile to the United States vis-a-vis the Afghan War, the U.S. government continues to acknowledge the nation as a Major non-NATO ally (MNNA), placing it in an elite group alongside other stalwart supporters like Australia, Japan, and South Korea. As I hope to illustrate over the course of this essay, this constitutes a major strategic error on the part of the United States.

This essay analyzes the Pakistani government's position pertaining to the United States' efforts to defeat the Afghan Taliban. Highlighting territorial sovereignty and financial considerations, I argue that Pakistan is likely to continue to support the Afghan Taliban covertly, as an ongoing rivalry with India, an unresolved border dispute with Afghanistan, and an avaricious security establishment leave an unstable Afghanistan in the nation's strategic interest. My overarching aim, then, is to offer a response to the following question:

➢ Why is Pakistan undermining the United States' anti-Taliban strategy in Afghanistan?

Key Contentions

This essay has been divided into seven sections. I begin with an overview of the scholarly literature on the role played by Pakistan in the War in Afghanistan. I, then, provide a brief history of the Afghan War. The third section dwells on the rationale behind the Pakistani government's actions in Afghanistan from a realist perspective. The subsequent section contains

a discussion on Pakistan's centrality within and contributions (both positive and negative) to the War in Afghanistan. The fifth section highlights Pakistan's territorial sovereignty considerations. Here, I argue that Pakistan's constant fear of a growing Indian influence within the Afghan government and the re-litigation of the Durand Line dispute by that government compels it to lend its support to the Afghan Taliban. Finally, I emphasize the role that greed has played in the Pakistani security establishment's decision to enforce its government's policy of siding with the Afghan Taliban. I conclude with a brief discussion of the policy implications of my arguments.

Literature Review

The scholarly community's views on Pakistan's involvement in the War in Afghanistan have evolved considerably since the U.S.-led invasion in 2001. Early assessments were cautiously optimistic. Akhtar, for instance, argued that while Pakistan's attitude towards Afghanistan had been wolfish in the past, the events of 9/11 changed the nation's calculus significantly (2008, 50). Electing to partner with the United States, Pakistan seemingly consigned age-old rivalries to the dustbin of history and invested itself in the quest for a stable Afghanistan, free from the shackles of Taliban rule (Akhtar 2008, 61-62). Others also emphasized this post-9/11 shift in Pakistan's foreign policy behaviour and expressed renewed hope for cooperation with the United States (Kux 2001; Khan 2007; Khattak et al 2014).

Recent contributions, however, have been far more critical. Several scholars have pointed out Pakistan's involvement in a dangerous game in Afghanistan. A common criticism pertains to the incongruous nature of Pakistan's strategy in the war-torn nation. Scholars observe that while the Pakistani government continues to identify itself as an ally of the United States in the fight against the Afghan Taliban, the country provides a safe haven for some of the terrorist group's most influential leaders and military commanders within its own territory (Kruys 2009; Rashid 2012; McGovern 2013; Nadiri 2014). Others have drawn attention to the material and logistical support – recruits, military training, funding, and weaponry – that Pakistan's security forces have contributed towards the Afghan Taliban's cause in the past decade (Constable 2007; Jones 2007; Mitton 2007). However, while Pakistan's underhanded actions in Afghanistan have been criticized repeatedly in the scholarly literature, few scholars have studied the Afghan conflict from Pakistan's perspective and reflected on the country's motivations. The handful of accounts that do exist tend to over-emphasize Pakistan's enmity with India while ignoring other important factors (Akbarzadeh 2003; Khan 2010; Mezard 2010). This essay, then, assesses the U.S.-led war against the Afghan Taliban from a Pakistani standpoint and attempts to build a holistic picture by highlighting the role an ongoing border dispute and avaricious security apparatus play in determining the South Asian nation's strategy in Afghanistan.

A Brief History of the War in Afghanistan

While the current Afghan War began in 2001 with the invasion of Afghanistan by a coalition of forty nations led by the United States, the country has suffered from political turmoil and conflict for decades. As Rubin and Armstrong point out, "For much of the modern era,

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Afghanistan might credibly be defined as a large body of rocky land surrounded by neighbors who export their own conflicts onto its territory" (2003, 31).

Trouble began in September 1979, when disagreements and internal rivalries between the leaders of the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) led to the ouster of President Nur Muhammad Taraki, one of the founding members of the party and a Soviet Union loyalist, by Hafizullah Amin. Educated in the United States and eager to strengthen his country's relationship with Pakistan (a member of the Western Alliance at the time), Amin was immediately identified as a threat by the Soviet Union. Wary of its loosening grip over the PDPA and the increasing influence of the mujahideen (and, by extension, of the Pakistanis and Americans that financed and trained them) in various parts of the country, the USSR found itself under considerable pressure. Unwilling to surrender an important ally and neighboring country to Pakistani and American control, the USSR intervened militarily in December 1979, capturing and assassinating Amin within a matter of days. This, in turn, triggered a nearly ten-year long war that led to the loss of somewhere between 500,000 to 2 million civilian lives and destroyed each and every pillar of the Afghan state (Khan 2012, 212-213).

In the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, factional infighting between the mujahideen (who had only recently united to thwart the Soviets) became the norm. A political vacuum emerged that permitted opportunistic states like Pakistan to construct their spheres of influence in the country (Rubin and Armstrong 2003, 31). By extending its support to the burgeoning Taliban movement, Pakistan invested its efforts in attempting to install a friendly authority in its neighboring country. The Taliban movement comprised of a loosely affiliated group of Afghan teachers and students from conservative religious academies (madrasas) in Afghanistan and Pakistan that intended to restore order in the country through the enforcement of Sharia law and tribal traditions (Rubin and Armstrong 2003, 31). Pakistan had been "intimately associated" with the group since its establishment in the early 1990s (Riedel 2013). Indeed, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had trained Mullah Omar, the eventual supreme commander of the Afghan Taliban, at one of its training camps in the 1980s to fight against the Soviet Union (Riedel 2013). When the time came, then, the Pakistanis turned to their old ally and helped Omar establish the Taliban as a powerful organization in Kandahar. With considerable Pakistani support to rely on, Omar and the Taliban captured the Afghan capital of Kabul in 1996 and cemented their rule in the country, establishing the so-called Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. As the Taliban graduated from insurgency to governance and secured their monopoly over the use of force, Pakistan became one of only three countries (the others being the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) to recognize the terrorist outfit as the rightful and legitimate government of the nation (Riedel 2013).

By 2001, the Pakistani government had made itself indispensable to the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan supplied the Taliban regime with "hundreds of advisers and experts to run its tanks, aircraft and artillery, thousands of Pakistani Pashtuns to man its infantry and small units of its Special Services Group commandos to help in combat" with rival authorities (Riedel 2013). Simply put, "Pakistan provided the oil needed to run the Taliban's war machine" (Riedel 2013).

A landmark event in the United States, however, altered this arrangement considerably.

While the Western world was still reeling from the events of September 11, 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) quickly identified each of the nineteen hijackers responsible for the horrific attacks. For his part, Osama bin Laden, the founder of al-Qaeda, vehemently denied that his organization had recruited, trained, and financed the terrorists. Having returned to Afghanistan a few years earlier to avoid arrest, bin Laden had established a strong relationship with Mullah Omar and leveraged his connections with the Afghan Taliban to expand al-Qaeda's operations across the world (Anderson 2015). As it became clear to the rest of the world that al-Qaeda had been using Afghanistan as its head office, bin Laden continued to plot, secure in the knowledge that he would never be extradited to the United States by the Taliban government.

Within days of the September 11 attacks, the United States government demanded that the Taliban surrender bin Laden over to them and dismantle the al-Qaeda training camps that had sprung up across their territory. The Afghan Taliban refused to accept these demands and taunted the U.S., compelling the latter to initiate Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001. The United States led operation dismantled the Taliban government in less than a week. By December 2001, large parts of the Afghan territory were under American control. Facing complete annihilation, the defeated Taliban fighters were ordered by Omar to retreat and flee from armed confrontation with their far superior enemy (Reidel 2013). While several militants returned home, others fled to Pakistan and found shelter in the city of Quetta, where Omar himself settled (Reidel 2013). After a few years of hiding and ignominy, Omar identified an opportune moment. As the U.S. became embroiled in the War in Iraq, Omar gathered his recovering troops and launched the now infamous Taliban insurgency. By 2004, Afghanistan had once again become a theatre of war.

A North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) report containing data procured from 27,000 interrogations with over 4,000 Taliban and al-Qaeda militants was leaked in 2012. The report claimed that the Pakistani security establishment had proved crucial to the survival and resurgence of the Afghan Taliban in the immediate aftermath of the 2001 invasion. The Pakistani intelligence agency, the ISI, offered shelter, training, tactical know-how, and funding to the organization while keeping information pertaining to the location of the group's leaders hidden (Maqbool 2012). The Pakistani government and security establishment have repeatedly cast aspersions about the findings of this report. However, the fact that the Taliban re-emerged to snatch back what they regard as their territory cannot be disputed. Indeed, the Taliban also released a report entitled, "Percent of Country under the control of the Mujahideen," in March 2017. The report assesses the ongoing power-struggle between the Taliban, local warlords, and the U.S. backed Afghan government of President Ashraf Ghani in 349 of the 400 known districts in Afghanistan. According to the report, the Afghan Taliban "fully controls 34 districts, including the district centers, and contests another 167 districts (these are districts where the Taliban claims it controls between 40 to 99 percent of the territory)" (Roggio 2017). Furthermore, the terrorist outfit claims that it maintains a considerable presence (10 to 39

percent) in another 52 districts and a minor presence in six districts (1 to 9 percent) (Roggio 2017). These numbers have been largely verified by several news organizations and do not differ significantly from those provided by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in a recent report.

There are many reasons that account for the Afghan Taliban's dramatic return to power in several regions of the war-torn nation. Numerous mistakes by U.S. authorities, including a considerable reduction in the number of American troops left behind in Afghanistan since 2014 and a shift towards addressing the threat posed by the Islamic State have no doubt contributed to the Taliban's recent string of successes. As I argue in subsequent sections, however, the United States government's over-reliance on the Pakistanis lays at the core of the Afghanistan imbroglio.

A Realist Perspective on the Rationale behind the Pakistani Position

In order to appreciate the Pakistani position vis-à-vis the Afghan Taliban, it is important to understand the countries' relationship with the Afghan government (the terrorist group's greatest enemy). Here, I turn to the principles of realism.

The realist doctrine is built on the assumption that the international arena is characterized by the lack of an established authority figure or anarchy. In the absence of an established authority figure to monitor, outline objectives for, and resolve conflicts between states, individual states' foreign policies are governed by a combination of internal and external factors. The size, location, capacity, and historical trajectory of a state, along with its system of governance and leadership, play a significant role in determining each state's foreign policy behaviour in the international arena. But while states receive different scores on the aforementioned parameters, realists argue that all states pursue a common objective: survival. In an anarchic international system, "the survival of the state can never be guaranteed, because the threat or use of force culminating in war is a legitimate instrument of statecraft and foreign policy behaviour" (Ahmed 2010, 314). As a result, a state must do whatever it may take to ensure its survival.

Survival is an abstract concept. From the Pakistani government's perspective, survival (in the context of the War in Afghanistan) involves preserving its territorial sovereignty in the face of existential threats from India and Afghanistan. Territorial sovereignty refers to the Pakistani government's right and power to preside over its territorial affairs without the threat of foreign interference or intervention. As I go onto discuss in a forthcoming section, the Pakistani government remains of the view that its right and power to conduct the country's business is constantly compromised by its Indian and Afghan counterparts. This, in turn, prompts the government to attempt to weaken its adversaries by extending support to the Afghan Taliban and embroiling the Indian and Afghan governments in a frustrating and endless conflict.

TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY

PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT   PAKISTANI SECURITY
                                                       ESTABLISHMENT

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

While the Pakistani government remains convinced that its right to rule is constantly jeopardized by its neighbors, it cannot maintain its sovereignty on its own. To secure this objective, the civilian government has had no choice but to engage in a symbiotic relationship with the Pakistani security establishment, comprised primarily of the Pakistani armed forces and the ISI. Members of the security establishment, however, have an agenda of their own that is independent of their interest in protecting the government's territorial sovereignty. As I go onto argue in a subsequent section, Pakistan's security apparatus has benefited tremendously from the United States' foreign assistance to Pakistan and retained a financial incentive to keep the threat of a resurgent Afghan Taliban alive. It has secured this generous flow of capital by taking advantage of the civilian government's credibility in the eyes of the American authorities. The Pakistani government and its quasi-independent security establishment, then, have both used the threat of a strong Afghan Taliban for their own ends.

Pakistan's Contributions to the Afghan War
Before delving into the reasons behind Pakistan's decision to continue to support the Afghan Taliban, it is worth reflecting on some of the contributions the country has made to the U.S-led War in Afghanistan.
The events of September 11 left the Pakistani government in a quandary. Their previous support for the Afghan Taliban had been well documented. Indeed, Pakistan was the last nation to rescind the diplomatic recognition it granted to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The 9/11 attacks gave the United States the moral high ground and widespread sympathy across the world. The United Nations Security Council's decision to unanimously adopt Resolution 1368 granted an additional veneer of legality to the United States' counterterrorism agenda in Afghanistan. Cognizant of the significant outcry that would result from them dragging their feet on what many at the time viewed as a black-and-white issue, the Pakistani government attempted to thread the proverbial needle. With contradictory interests at stake, Pakistan chose to "cooperate where its national security interests converged with those of the USA and avoid where they diverged" (Khattak et al 2014, 86). As the former Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Abdul Sattar once explained, his country's policy vis-à-vis the War in Afghanistan now involved a "[y]es-but approach," wherein the Pakistani government would unequivocally accept each of the United States' demands in public, before expressing its reservations and disagreeing with key details in private (Nadiri 2014, 140).

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Disagreements aside, Pakistan has aided the United States' counterterrorism agenda in several ways since the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001. The country has granted members of the coalition access to its military bases for reconnaissance and rescue operations, provided logistical support, and contributed intelligence resources and airspace for targeted strikes against Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives (Akhtar 2008, 62). The Pakistanis also helped the U.S. establish a joint patrol along the Afghan-Pakistan border and deployed soldiers in certain areas of the tribal belt near the contested border for the first time in their history (Akhtar 2008, 62). These efforts have directly contributed to the capture of dozens of al-Qaeda militants. Additionally, the Pakistani security establishment has also assisted in the search for and apprehension of a limited number of terrorists hiding within its own borders. A majority of these, however, have been low-level, rank-and-file targets, and few have served as members of the Afghan Taliban.

Pakistan's attempts to aid the United States in its anti-Taliban efforts have been undermined by an unwillingness to quash the Afghan Taliban within its own territory. The terrorist group remains highly active in Pakistan's more accessible urban and peri-urban areas, generating funds and attracting recruits in some of the country's major cities (Nadiri 2014, 142). Senior Taliban officials have repeatedly claimed in interrogations that they travel freely between the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Quetta, and Haripur, under the guaranteed protection of the Pakistani government and security establishment (Nadiri 2014, 142). Indeed, several of these officials continue to maintain stable residences in these regions and lead comfortable lives, in full view of the Pakistani authorities. It is a poorly kept secret that the Pakistani government and security establishment are "thoroughly aware of Taliban activities and the whereabouts of all senior Taliban personnel" (Riedel 2013). The authorities in question, however, have done little with this information and largely turned a blind eye to the terrorist group's operations both within and across the border.

The Ongoing Indo-Pak Rivalry

The Pakistani government's ongoing rivalry with its Indian counterpart lies at the forefront of its decision to support the Afghan Taliban. A rivalry is loosely defined as a competitive relationship between two (or more) actors striving to achieve a common goal or preponderance over the other. The relationship between the Pakistani and Indian governments, however, is more than merely competitive. The arrangement between the South Asian giants "is included on virtually every comprehensive list of international rivalries. It is, in other words, an exemplary (and therefore troubling) case" (Mitton 2014, 361). The countries have engaged in four wars (in 1947-48, 1965, 1971, and 1999) since the partition of India took place in 1947. Frequent outbursts of violence have ensured that relations between the two nations remains defined by a lack of trust. Key figures on both sides of the unending conflict are convinced that the opponent will seize any opportunity to destroy them. Most recently, widespread outrage and protests in Indian-administered Kashmir in the aftermath of the killing of a prominent Mujahideen leader by Indian soldiers on July 8, 2016, have rekindled tensions between the

eternally distrustful neighbors.

While the decades-old dispute over the future of Indian-administered Kashmir has often dominated the headlines, Pakistan and India have also found themselves on opposing sides in Afghanistan. Wedged in between Afghanistan in the west and India in the east, Pakistan is a narrow country that has long been wary of India's relationship with its conflict-ridden neighbor. From the Pakistani government's viewpoint, India has aligned itself with the U.S.-backed Afghan government, a spiritual successor to the Northern Alliance that fought the Pakistan-backed Afghan Taliban in the 1990s (Mitton 2014, 362). After years of hostile relations with a Taliban regime partial to Pakistan, then, the Indian government has made friends of its own in Afghanistan. The Indians have gone to great lengths to consolidate these gains, offering foreign aid and investments as incentives. The Indian government has spent over $1 billion in development funds to "provide an array of benefits including health, education, energy, communication, and general infrastructure support" for their Afghan counterparts, with the promise of even more aid in the future (Mitton 2014, 362-363). India also contributed to the construction of the country's new parliament building, incurring a cost of around $25 million and "linking the site of Afghanistan's nascent democracy to India and the Indian people" (Mitton 2014, 363). Even more worryingly, the Indian

MAP EXHIBITING PAKISTAN'S POSITION BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND INDIA

government has gradually ramped up its military involvement in Afghanistan. India has been providing comprehensive training services to Afghan military personnel and supplying defensive military equipment, including armored checkpoints and watchtowers to the growing Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) (Mitton 2014, 363). The Indian government has also set up four new consulates in Afghanistan to complement the work already being done by its embassy in Kabul (Khan 2010, 179). The Pakistani security establishment has repeatedly claimed that

these consulates "are, at best, intelligence gathering sites and more likely bases for carrying out operations inside Pakistan" (Khan 2010, 179). The Pakistani government has also formally accused the Indian intelligence services of relying on these locations to recruit Afghans to carry out terrorist operations in Pakistan (Khan 2010, 179).

The Pakistani government is fully aware of the benefits India is hoping to accrue from ingratiating itself with the Afghan government. A closer relationship between the two nations, for instance, will grant its biggest rival consistent "access to energy-rich Central Asia, with Afghanistan serving as a conduit and corridor" (Mitton 2014, 364). India is also likely to leverage any relationship with the Afghans to strengthen its security apparatus in their country and reduce its vulnerability to attacks from terrorist organizations operating out of Afghanistan. Most importantly, however, India may eventually see Afghanistan as a springboard to ratchet up the pressure on Pakistan's western border. This, in turn, would leave the latter exposed to attacks from the east and the west and cement India's hegemony in the Indian subcontinent.

Throughout the course of its existence, Pakistan has been involved in a relentless race to achieve military deterrence with respect to its significantly larger neighbor to the east. The country currently maintains one of the world's largest active militaries and boasts a defense budget that amounted to approximately 3.4% of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) in 2016 (Gady 2017). That budget was increased by roughly 7% for 2017-2018 fiscal year (Gady 2017). In addition, Pakistan has maintained a fully-functioning nuclear arsenal, with most experts in agreement that the country is in possession of somewhere between 100-130 nuclear warheads. From the government's point of view, however, the country's military might will offer scarce comfort if India continues to make significant gains in its relationship with the Afghan government. Pakistan's distrust for India has captured its government's psyche for decades. The Pakistanis are convinced that "India's intentions are to squeeze Pakistan by giving it two hostile borders" (Khan 2010, 181). India's provision of aid and investment to Afghanistan belie its strategic interest in weakening Pakistan's security on the western front and constitute a "direct affront to Pakistan's sense of propriety in a country it has historically treated… as a client state" (Chaudhari 2011, 85). Given its simply extraordinary defensive commitments and frail economy, "Pakistan cannot afford the military establishment it has, much less a far larger one to prepare for a possible 'second front' against Afghanistan" (Khan 2010, 181). A growing Indian presence in Afghanistan, then, represents an existential threat in Pakistan's backyard. It leaves the Pakistani government with the unenviable task of having to protect its territorial sovereignty from attacks hailing from the west and the east in the event of an Indian invasion. Consequently, the Pakistani government is likely to continue to offer support to the Afghan Taliban in the foreseeable future. The terrorist organization also views India as an enemy, given the latter's support for the erstwhile Northern Alliance and current partnership with President Ashraf Ghani's "illegitimate" government in Kabul. Short of invading Afghanistan and systematically dismantling its enemy's infrastructure in the country, the Pakistani government's only option is to continue to cooperate with the Afghan Taliban, an organization that is unlikely to turn against its old patron and provides a resilient barrier against Indian expansionism in the region.

The Durand Line Dispute

Pakistan shares an approximately 2400-kilometer-long border with Afghanistan referred to as the Durand Line. Established via an agreement between imperial Britain and the erstwhile Emirate of Afghanistan in 1893, the border is the subject of a long-standing dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The nineteenth century witnessed the British and Russian empires, two of the world's most powerful actors at the time, engage in what historians have since referred to as "the Great Game." As Russia methodically conquered its neighbors and expanded its influence in Central and Southern Asia, Britain was alerted. Worried that the Russians would eventually set their sights on the wealthy colony of India, the British elected to invade Afghanistan with the hopes of using the Emirate as a barrier. Each of the Britain's attempts to forcefully bring Afghanistan into its sphere of influence, however, failed miserably. With time running out, the British turned to Sir Mortimer Durand, the Foreign Secretary to India. An accomplished diplomat, Sir Durand reached an agreement with the Emir on November 12, 1893. The final, one-page long treaty, "resulted in a frontier that ran from the Karakoram Range in the northeast running south through the Spin Ghar mountains… before turning west along the Chagai Hills to the border with Iran" (Micallef 2017).

The agreement was plagued by controversies from the outset. The new border established by the treaty divided the Pashtun tribal lands, a region colloquially referred to as Pashtunistan in two, with half of the area now part of British India (modern-day Pakistan) and the balance remaining a part of Afghanistan (Micallef 2017). The division also led to the loss of the province of Baluchistan to British India (modern-day Pakistan), stripping the Emirate of its historic access to the Arabian Sea (Micallef 2017). Furthermore, while the original agreement was drafted in English, Dari, and Pashto, Sir Durand insisted that the English version must be treated as "the definitive copy" (Micallef 2017). This left the Emir at a disadvantage, given that he neither read nor understood the English language. The demarcation surveys that began in 1894, then, may have commenced without the informed consent of Afghanistan's leader. The division was, nonetheless, completed by May of 1896.

The legitimacy of the Durand Line has been questioned by the Afghans ever since. Successive generations of Afghan governments, for instance, have claimed that the

MAP EXHIBITING THE DURAND LINE

terms laid out in the Dari and Pashto versions of the November 1893 agreement state, "the legality of the Afghan-Pakistan border should have lapsed in 1993, 100 years after the signing of the agreement" (Qassem 2007, 66). No documents, however, have ever been unearthed to justify these claims. Previous Afghan governments have also claimed that the British confiscated the original copies of the Dari and Pashto versions. These allegations have been strongly and repeatedly refuted by the British government. As things stand, then, there "is absolutely nothing in the Durand Line agreement or in subsequent documents between the British and Afghan Boundary Commissions which completed border demarcations until 1896, to indicate that the border was determined only for 100 years" (Qassem 2007, 66). Indeed, the original agreement has been ratified both formally and informally on numerous occasions, including in 1922 and 1930.

Questions regarding the legitimacy of their claims have not prevented Afghan governments from reviving the Durand Line debate from time-to-time. In the 1940s, for instance, as Pakistan became an independent nation, "the Afghan rulers refused to recognize the treaty and played the nationalist card of 'Greater Pashtunistan', laying claim to Dir, Swat, Chitral and Amb, Baluchistan and the princely states of Kalat, Kharan, Makran, and Las Bela" (Wagner and Khan 2013, 73). In the 1960s, governments in Kabul continued to observe a Pashtunistan Day and even brought the Durand Line issue to the attention of the International Islamic Economic Conference and the United Nations (Wagner and Khan 2013, 75). More recently, former President Hamid Karzai stated unequivocally that Pakistan has "no legal authority to dictate terms on the Durand Line," and that the Afghan government and people would never acknowledge the legitimacy of the arbitrary Afghan-Pakistan border (Siddiqui 2017).

From the Pakistani government's perspective, the Durand Line debate represents a zero-

sum situation. Any meaningful attempts by the Afghan government to relitigate the issue pose an existential threat to the Pakistani government's territorial sovereignty. The humiliation of 1971, when East Pakistan (modern-day People's Republic of Bangladesh) declared its independence and separated from the homeland with the assistance of the Indian government and armed forces, still looms large in the memories of Pakistan's elites. The areas that the Afghan government seeks to repatriate amount to approximately two-thirds of Pakistan's territory as a nation (Micallef 2017). The loss of these areas, then, would lead the total collapse of the Pakistani state and cannot be tolerated by the government under any circumstances.

In this instance, however, the Pakistani government's reliance on the Afghan Taliban for support is complicated by the fact that the latter has also refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Afghan-Pakistan border. While he depended on Pakistani assistance throughout his time as the supreme commander of the Afghan Taliban, Mullah Omar refused to recognize the Durand Line and argued that Muslims ought not to be divided by worldly barriers. The Pakistani government, then, has had to weigh its options carefully in recent years. Trapped between the proverbial rock (an Afghan government that is forever unwilling to recognize the Durand Line) and a hard place (an Afghan Taliban that shares the government's disregard), the Pakistani government has had to bank on a cynical balancing game. Aware of the fact that President Ghani's elected government has the recognition and support of the United States and the international community, Pakistan has hedged its bets and continued to provide aid to the Afghan Taliban. The Pakistani government's calculus here is simple: a perpetual stalemate is preferable to a decisive outcome. If the Afghan Taliban is provided with sufficient resources to persist as a constant thorn in the side of the Afghan government, but not enough to overthrow the government altogether, the two parties will remain locked in an endless stalemate. This, in turn, will prevent both sides from finding the time and energy to revisit the Durand Line debate in any meaningful way. While such a strategy has risks associated with it, it has served the Pakistani government well so far. Unable to dismiss the other from the playing field, neither the Afghan Taliban nor President Ghani's government have found themselves able to challenge the Afghan-Pakistan border concertedly. Consequently, it is unlikely that the Pakistani government will abandon its support for the Afghan Taliban while the Durand Line debate remains unresolved. A stable Afghanistan, as things stand, runs contrary to the Pakistani government's interest in preserving its territorial sovereignty.

The Greed of the Pakistani Security Establishment

While the Pakistani government's aim to preserve its territorial sovereignty offers a concrete purpose for the country's security establishment to pursue, greed has also played an important role in its decision-making. To explain the effect of avarice on the Pakistani security establishment's decision to implement its government's policy and cooperate with the Afghan Taliban, I begin by analyzing the country's military expenditure.

Pakistan's military expenditure, i.e. the total amount that the Pakistani government spends on maintaining the country's security establishment (which is made up of the country's

armed forces and intelligence agencies), has been consistently high in recent decades. The nation spent roughly 6.8% of its GDP on military expenses in 1988 (SIPRI 2016). While this figure had been halved by 2016, the economy had grown considerably (SIPRI 2016). As a result, the military's budget doubled from roughly $4.5 billion in 1988 to over $9 billion in 2016.

The security establishment's demand for resources, however, has also increased. Consequently, in recent years, it has received a generous amount of foreign assistance from the United States in return for its cooperation in the War on Terror. In 2013, for instance, the U.S planned to provide $348 million in foreign aid to the Pakistani security establishment (Foreign Assistance - Pakistan). That figure equates to roughly 4% of Pakistan's military budget for the same year. Similarly, the U.S. planned to contribute $328 million in aid in 2016, which amounts to approximately 3.6% of the Pakistani military budget for that year (Foreign Assistance – Pakistan). The United States' generous financial aid, then, has added to the Pakistani security establishment's already lavish budget. Indeed, it has helped senior officials of the Pakistani armed forces to engage in widespread corruption in recent years. Senior officers have invested heavily in dozens of highly profitable local businesses, ranging from marriage halls and dairy farms to factories, banks, and insurance firms (Shams 2016). As Siddiqa observes, "Today the Pakistani military's internal economy is extensive, and has turned the armed forces into one of the [country's] dominant economic players" (2007, 18).

To secure this steady supply of foreign aid from the United States (and other countries), the Pakistani security establishment has had to focus on two interrelated objectives. First, as I stated earlier, the armed forces and ISI have extended their consistent support to the Afghan Taliban, thereby ensuring that the terrorist group remains an ever-present threat to the Afghan government and the U.S. remains fully-committed to an expensive and long-term counterterrorism strategy in the region. Indeed, the Pakistani armed forces have had a long history of supporting religious extremists in Afghanistan for their own ends (Siddiqa 2007, 86). Secondly, the Pakistani armed forces have had to retain the faith of the United States and convince the latter that they can be relied upon in the fight against the Afghan Taliban. To achieve this aim, the armed forces have taken advantage of their considerable influence in the Pakistani government.

The Pakistani armed forces occupy a unique and prestigious position at the heart of the country's security establishment. The Constitution of Pakistan grants the country's armed forces the ability to "subject to law, act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so" (Pakistani.org). In practice, this has allowed the Army to reserve "the right to abandon its declared political aloofness and intervene in governmental affairs whenever the high command determines that the civilian government is not acting properly, and that its actions or performance are undermining political stability, military institutional autonomy, and national security" (Shah 2014, 221). As a result, the Army has used its constitutional leverage to overturn elected governments and implement martial law on several occasions and even stage coups to establish its own rule at other times. In times of civilian rule, the Pakistani armed forces' influence in government has ensured that the country's Ministry of Defense remains organized in a manner that allows serving and retired military officials to "occupy central positions in the ministry… [thereby making] it possible for them to control and monitor the work according to the desires of the military establishment" (Anwar and Rafique 2012, 381). The armed forces' pervasive presence in the halls of Pakistan's government, then, has allowed its members to take advantage of any credibility that the civilian government has accrued with the United States and use it to guarantee

a steady stream of foreign aid. Indeed, the Army has routinely tightened the screws on government officials, pressuring them to reassure the U.S. government of its "commitment" to implementing the latter's counterterrorism agenda in Afghanistan.

The Pakistani security apparatus, then, has established and maintained a symbiotic relationship with the country's government. In exchange for preserving the government's territorial sovereignty (which is also in the security establishment's best interests), the armed forces have utilized the civilian government's connections and credibility to placate the Americans and guarantee a regular flow of foreign aid for their various initiatives and personal enrichment. While the lion's share of the security establishment's funding stems directly from the Pakistani government, the United States' generous foreign assistance continues to offer an additional incentive for the Pakistani security establishment to support its government's decision to keep the Afghan Taliban afloat.

Policy Implications for the U.S. and Directions for Future Research

As I have outlined in previous sections, the Pakistani government's (and security establishment's) interests in Afghanistan are fundamentally contrary to those of the United States at this moment in time. Here, I discuss the policy implications for the U.S government.

- Pakistan's rivalry with India began shortly after the creation of the two nations in 1947. The relationship between the two countries has had its ebbs and flows ever since. Mutual suspicion and fear, however, prevent any major rapprochement from taking place between the two countries in the foreseeable future. Consequently, the Pakistanis will continue to support the Afghan Taliban, given that the terror outfit offers a resilient barrier against its enemy's growing influence in Afghanistan. The U.S. government, then, ought to consider forging a stronger alliance with India instead. The two countries share a common interest in overcoming the Afghan Taliban. Moreover, India's increasing investments in and trade with Afghanistan are likely to strengthen the hold of the latter's U.S.-backed government and bring prosperity to the war-torn nation. This, in turn, will reduce support for the Taliban among everyday Afghans.

- The Durand Line debate represents an existential threat to the Pakistani state. The U.S. must acknowledge this fact and realize that until the dispute is resolved conclusively, the Pakistanis will support the Afghan Taliban and foment instability in Afghanistan. Supporting the Pakistani or Afghan position will only serve to alienate the scorned party and create further problems in the conflict-ridden region. Consequently, the United States government should remain neutral on the subject and allow the governments in question (as well as tribal leaders) to arrive at an agreement at their own pace and on their own volition.

- The U.S. government's foreign aid to the Pakistani security establishment continues to stoke the fires of greed. The former ought to consider either reducing the amount of aid its provides to the latter significantly or attaching stricter conditions to its contributions.

This may prompt the Pakistani armed forces to make at least a nominal effort to curb the Afghan Taliban, if only to regain the Americans' trust and continue to fill their coffers.

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A Return to Insurgency in Iraq:
The Islamic State's transition to insurgency and the Iraqi mistakes that have aided it
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Abstract

In response to the inevitable destruction of its territorial caliphate, the Islamic State (IS) has transitioned to an insurgency in Iraq. This insurgency is active and increasingly well entrenched. The Iraqi government has made a series of problematic decisions which have enabled IS and bolstered its narrative. However, if the Iraqi government were to rectify these mistakes it has an opportunity to significantly decrease support for the Islamic State.

Introduction

Claims of the Islamic State's demise have been greatly exaggerated. While IS's territorial caliphate has been dismantled, it survives in its affiliate network and as an insurgency. In Iraq IS has successfully transitioned back to an insurgency. It is conducting attacks on a regular basis in several providences. The Iraqi insurgency is well established, and the Islamic State is prepared for a long war of attrition. The Iraqi government has enabled the Islamic State's survival and recovery through four problematic decisions. The Iraqi government has pursued a policy of retributive justice and security forces have engaged in unpunished extrajudicial violence. The Iraqi government has created large internally displaced persons (IDP) camps and detention camps that are prime IS recruiting grounds. The Iraqi government has failed to provide adequate infrastructure and services to citizens. Finally, the Iraqi government has not invested in local security forces. If the Iraqi government continues these behaviors it is unlikely that it will be able to successfully destroy or contain IS.

Return to Insurgency

The Islamic State's conventional defeats have substantially weakened it. The organization has lost leaders, resources, fighters, and prestige. Waging open warfare exposed IS to the superior conventional forces of its foes. The loss of territory has reduced IS's revenue streams and its ability to present itself as a state. At its peak IS commanded approximately 45,000 fighters in Iraq and Syria (Mitchell, 2018). A report from the summer of 2018 stated that the US Department of Defense estimated that IS had 15,000-17,100 fighters in Iraq (Lead Inspector General). IS's fighting force may have atrophied further but what remains still represents a significant threat due to IS's decision to revert to insurgency. Insurgent warfare is an inherently asymmetric strategy and does not require IS to achieve military preponderance. It is important to remember that IS's predecessor organization the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was once reduced to less than 700 fighters (Callimachi, 2019). Failure to capitalize on this weakness allowed ISI to regroup and lead directly to the rise of the Islamic State. The same mistake must not be repeated; IS cannot be allowed to recuperate and re-entrench itself.

In 2017 the Prime Minister of Iraq proclaimed victory over the Islamic State (Coker & Hassan). Although his statement was inaccurate, he was correct in asserting that IS's ability to hold territory conventionally was at an end. However, IS had already begun to transition back to an insurgency. Islamic State leadership had long prepared for the inevitable destruction of its physical caliphate. Hassan (2018) argues that the group was discussing a desert-based insurgency as early as summer 2016. Evidence for this can be found in how IS moved to adjust its propaganda and prepare followers for the transition to insurgency. In a May 2016 address, the spokesman at the time Abu Muhammad al-Adnani publicly announced the organization's expectation that it would lose all cities and its plan to return to insurgency (Hassan, 2018). This adjustment can also be seen in military behavior. After the fall of Mosul, the organization became significantly less willing to fight conventionally and repeatedly ceded territory. As IS demonstrated at Baghouz it still could mount significant defensive efforts when it chose to.

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Instead, the leadership prioritized conserving men and material for insurgent operations (Hassan, 2018). The Islamic State has also been preparing financially for insurgency. It smuggled up $400 million out of Iraq and has transitioned to revenue streams which do not require territorial control such as kidnapping for ransom, smuggling, and extortion (Clarke, 2018). Extortion is a particularly important source of revenue for IS as it also serves to assert a level of control over the local population. These extensive preparations indicate that the transition to insurgency was part of a planned decision and not purely due to degraded capability.

Today the Islamic State today has fully transitioned back to insurgency. By the end of October 2018 IS had launched at least 1,270 attacks (Knights, 2018). The organization has established itself in the rural areas of Iraq and the ungoverned zones near the Syrian border (Hassan, 2018). IS generally avoids hardened targets such as police stations instead choosing to strike unguarded targets (Knights, 2018). Even if IS cannot conventionally contest security forces it still exerts a significant degree of control over the regions it operates in. Night time checkpoints are common as well as targeted assassinations of problematic local leaders (Hassan, 2018). Killing prominent opposition leaders is an essential element in IS's attempt to reestablish itself as an insurgency. By doing so IS seeks to intimidate rural communities into compliance and deter cooperation with security forces. IS focuses such operations in the areas it seeks to establish strongholds in. According to Knight (2018) "In southern Nineveh, rural Kirkuk, and northern Diyala, there were 103 targeted assassinations in the first 10 months of 2018 (75% of all Islamic State assassinations during that period)." Furthermore, as an insurgency IS reach is greater than as a conventional force (Hassan, 2018). IS never conquered the Diyala Governorate but it is now one of the centers of the new insurgency (Knights, 2018). The Islamic State no longer seeks decisive confrontations but an extended war of attrition. The Iraqi government and its security forces must adapt to this new phase of the conflict.

Counterproductive Iraqi Decisions

The Iraqi government has made several decisions which have aided the Islamic State. If these policies remain unchanged, they will significantly hinder anti-IS efforts. The Islamic State presents itself as the sole champion of the Iraqi Sunni population in a hostile world. According to this narrative, the central Iraqi government is a sectarian Shia intuition which conspires with dark foreign forces to keep the Sunni populace oppressed and powerless. Cooperation with the Iraqi government is impossible as it is fundamentally hostile to Sunnis and thus violent resistance is the only option. The problems described below each benefit IS in their own unique way, but the common link is that they strengthen IS's narrative. The Iraqi government must not allow IS to brand it as a hostile out-group actor for that is the path to mass radicalization (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008).

According to Munqith al-Dagher, one of Iraq's premier pollsters, dissatisfaction and distrust of the central government have always been the Islamic State's greatest sources of support in Iraq, not religious fervor (2015). This is fortunate as it means that it is within the Iraqi government's ability to reduce IS's domestic appeal. If IS's support was truly religious in nature

the problem would be significantly more difficult to resolve. Instead, the Iraqi government has the ability and responsibility to restrict IS's support base by resolving locals' grievances. By addressing the problematic behaviors described below the Iraqi government can make significant progress in its struggle against IS.

Cycle of Revenge

Iraqi military and paramilitary forces have engaged in widespread extrajudicial violence. Systematic executions of suspected IS members were especially common during the fall of Mosul. Human Rights Watch's June 4, 2017 article reporting that the bodies of 26 blindfolded and handcuffed men had been found and that security forces had been implicated was typical for the period. According to a 2018 report from the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial summary or arbitrary executions many of these extrajudicial executions were conducted by popular mobilization forces (PMF). The popular mobilization forces are a paramilitary organization aligned with the Iraqi government comprised of numerous militias. Many of the PMF militias explicitly identify as Shia. Thus, their excesses are particularly inflammatory and likely to inflame sectarian tensions. Security forces have also "disappeared" large numbers of people (OHCHR, 2017). Some are released, often alleging abuses during their detentions, but many remain missing. Iraq currently has the largest number of missing persons in the world due largely to forced disappearances (Human Rights Council, 2018).

Extrajudicial violence creates a backlash effect that strengthens the Islamic State. There is a significant and expanding literature that supports the backlash thesis which holds that overly harsh counterterrorism policies can strengthen terrorist groups (Faria & Arce, 2012). Extrajudicial violence is extreme enough to provoke this effect as well as trigger more conventional routes of radicalization. Prior work has identified personal victimhood and political grievance as causes for individual radicalization in addition to mass radicalization due to conflict with an outgroup (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Extrajudicial violence by state forces facilitates all these paths to radicalization. When the relatives of those slain seek vengeance it is the Islamic State that they will turn to. Furthermore, every death widens the perceived gap between the local population and the central government. How can people trust the government that stood by as their relatives were killed by its security forces? Ultimately, in an insurgency the objective is the support of the local population. Abuses by the security forces alienate the contested population decreasing intelligence flow and increasing insurgent support. The massacres during and after the fall of Mosul are particularly problematic as research indicates that mass killings are strongly associated with increased terrorist violence (Avdan & Uzonyi, 2017). These events polarize society and become a rallying cry for anti-government forces.

The Iraqi judicial system has also been the scene of significant abuses. The Iraqi government's determination to hold members of IS accountable is laudable but its current course of action is not. Trials are perfunctory, evidence is optional and death by hanging common (Human Rights Watch, 2017a). The scale of the problem is daunting. From February to late August of 2017 the Nineveh counterterrorism court alone initiated the trials of 5,500 ISIS

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suspects (Human Rights Watch, 2017a). The individuals brought to trial are frequently arrested in dragnet operations or due to unsubstantiated accusations. For instance, PMF forces separated out approximately 1,300 men and boys from a refugee caravan fleeing Falluja in June 2016 (Human Rights Council, 2018). Of that number approximately half were later found to have been transferred to government custody and the other half remain missing (Human Rights Council, 2018). The accused rarely have proper legal counsel, in part because the Iraqi government has harassed defense lawyers and threatened to charge them as terrorists (Human Rights Watch, 2018).

Treatment of detainees is also problematic. Due to the policy of mass internment the Iraqi judicial and detainment systems are overloaded. Even those found innocent frequently spend months in overcrowded prisons (Human Rights Watch, 2017a). There is evidence of widespread torture of detainees (Human Rights Watch, 2017a). There is also the potential prison radicalization issue. It is true that the prison radicalization threat is often overstated (Jones, 2014). However, the way Iraq is managing prisoners seems designed to facilitate prison radicalization. Large numbers of low threat detainees (those arrested in mass operations and those arrested for nonviolent crimes) are being held alongside hardened jihadis (Human Rights Watch, 2017a). The terrorist population is not so diluted as to be ineffective. The trauma of prison is amplified by the poor treatment of prisoners encouraging group bonding amongst prisoners as a support and coping mechanism. This increased cohesion due to isolation and external threats facilitates radicalization (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). The torture of prisoners is liable to accelerate this process as it creates clear group grievances against the state and its security forces that IS adherents can exploit.

The wanton abuse of the Iraqi judicial system is perhaps even more dangerous than extrajudicial violence. It clearly establishes the central government as an enemy of the Sunni population. There is no deniability or separation as with the instances of extrajudicial violence. The formal institutions of the central government are clearly unfairly executing Sunnis. Furthermore, the arbitrary nature of the judicial process clearly signals that innocence is no protection. This disincentives loyalty to the central government as it is not rewarded and reduces the perceived price of supporting IS. The Sunni population was already primed to be distrustful of the Iraqi government before the latest excesses (al-Dagher, 2015). A populace that distrusts the judicial system is unlikely to cooperate with security services. Which means that counterinsurgency operations will lack crucial intelligence. In response, the Iraqi security forces may choose to utilize less discriminant methods which will only advance the cycle of distrust.

The Iraqi government must restore faith in the legitimacy of its judicial institutions. Trials of suspected IS members should continue but with proper rule of law and standards of evidence. Moreover, the Iraqi government should prosecute those responsible for some of the most extreme extrajudicial violence. Doing so may be costly politically but it demonstrates that the government is not a purely sectarian actor and is truly committed to achieving justice. If handled properly trials of IS members could be a potent weapon against the organization. The government should take the opportunity to publicize IS's abuses of the community it claims to protect and drive a

wedge between the two. Additionally, credible trials present the Iraqi government to brand IS as criminals instead of martyrs.

Displaced and Detained Populations

The devastation of the campaign against IS left many internally displaced. The internally displaced Sunni population could be fertile IS recruiting ground. During the battle of Mosul IS was already recruiting from displaced civilian populations (Hassan, 2018). Displaced persons camps are particularly attractive to IS recruiters as they provide a concentrated audience with few ties. Furthermore, conditions in the camps are often poor which leads to dissatisfaction with the central government. More problematic still are allegations that security forces are abusing the civilian populace in IDP camps (Mosul Eye, 2017). Such behavior guarantees that the populace sees security forces as enemies and jailors instead of liberators and protectors. The central government must prioritize getting displaced citizens back to their homes. If they fail to do so they present IS with concentrations of increasingly dissatisfied potential recruits with few ties that would prevent them from joining.

The Iraqi government has also established large-scale internment for supposedly Islamic State affiliated families. Although not officially imprisoned the families are forcibly relocated into IDP camps which security forces prevent them from leaving (Wille, 2018). Doing so creates a permanent support base for IS by inhibiting individuals' ability to rejoin Iraqi society. Many of those detained in these camps are guilty only by association or of being in the wrong place at the wrong time (Wille, 2018). Furthermore, it is likely that these camps are vectors for large-scale radicalization. Just as Camp Bucca served to radicalize much of IS's current leadership the new detention camps may create the next generation of insurgent leadership. This is especially likely as the Iraqi government has chosen to detain children in these camps (Wille, 2018). The decision to hold these families in IDP camps facilitates the radicalization of actually displaced individuals in addition to the families being detained. The Iraqi government has created a dilemma for itself. It must either indefinitely keep a large population detained on little evidence or it must release a population that it has alienated and radicalized. The only way to minimize the damage is to selectively release as many detainees as possible and leave only those whom the government is certain are clear danger. In particular, the children must be brought out of the camps before IS gains a new generation of aggrieved supporters.

Failure to Provide Services

The Islamic State and its predecessor organizations have long exploited the central government's failure to provide reliable infrastructure and civil services. Prior research indicates that low state capacity and weak civil institutions correlate with increased terrorist activity (Hendrix & Young, 2014). Iraqi infrastructure has historically been poor as sanctions, economic mismanagement and wars have left lasting damage. In the 1980s Iraq was one of the most developed Middle East countries in terms of infrastructure and social services (Beeher, 2006). However, by 2006 the once proud nation was in disrepair. That year A US report found that only

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a quarter of the Iraqi population had access to potable water (Beeher, 2006). Failure to provide reliable infrastructure and services reduces local faith in government, making IS a more attractive alternative.

The Islamic State spent a significant amount of effort and money providing services to areas under their control. IS organized a DMV, ran a garbage collection system, and provided utilities (Callimachi, 2018). This behavior is not unique to the Islamic State criminal and insurgent organizations often fill the void when states fail to provide services. Doing so signals that the group is more capable than the government and allows it to co-opt locals. Since the Iraqi government has historically underperformed it is easier for IS to surpass it.

IS often intentionally worsens problems seeking to further discredit the government. Supply of electricity provides an illustrative example. Iraq regularly experiences protests, of an often-violent nature, when insufficient electrical infrastructure leaves many without any cooling during Iraq's brutally hot summer (Barnard 2015; Mohammed, 2018). The Islamic State has repeatedly attacked power plants and parts of the power distribution system (Al Jazeera, 2017; Ali, 2018). The IS attacks are focused on sections of the electricity infrastructure that supply Sunni communities. Although Shia communities also see similar issues and protests, IS has not sought to systematically attack their power infrastructure. This indicates that the attacks on the power infrastructure are not intended as a means of punishing the local population, but to further exploit an existing local grievance with the government. After these attacks IS can point the lack of power as proof of the government's inability to provide basic services. More importantly, such attacks increase general discontent with the central government. It is this general feeling that the central government does not care for the local population that IS exploits.

Of the problems listed this is the hardest to resolve. The Iraqi government claims that reconstruction will cost $88 billion, an already significant figure (Chmaytelli & Hagagy, 2018). However, others assert that actual cost is more likely around $198 billion (Gunter, 2018). Furthermore, the Iraqi government relies heavily on oil revenue to finance the rebuilding and oil prices are low (Gunter, 2018). Thus, a slow and difficult rebuilding process is inevitable. However, the Iraqi government can make positive changes. Firstly, it must increase infrastructure security in areas of IS activity. This signals commitment to the local populace and will reduce the Islamic States ability to worsen the situation. For IS the key is not that the infrastructure situation is poor but that the populace blames the government for the situation and believes IS can do better. Thus, the government should seek to invert IS's narrative and position itself as the defender of infrastructure. Secondly, the Iraqi government must quickly make tangible improvements to citizens lives in contested areas. The liberation of IS held territory is an opportunity for the Iraqi government to reinvent itself as a positive force. Since this opportunity is fleeting speed is more important than scale. Finally, the Iraqi government should not let the rebuilding crisis go to waste. Rebuilding will require a great deal of unskilled labor. The Iraqi government would be wise to use this opportunity to employ idle youth who might otherwise be recruited by IS.

Failure to Rebuild Local Security Institutions

The Iraqi government has not significantly invested in rebuilding local security forces. Instead, it has preferred to use PMF paramilitaries as a holding force (Knights, 2016). This is a two-fold mistake. First, as previously mentioned IS greatest fear is local Sunnis joining the security forces. Security forces have been most successful when they have cooperated with and integrated the local Sunni population. Islamic State leadership largely attributes the defeat of its predecessor organization ISI in 2008-2009 to the Sahwat (Hassan, 2018). The Sahwat were Sunni tribal paramilitary forces that assisted in the struggle against the Islamic State of Iraq. In many ways the story of Sahwat is prophetic. Incredibly successful against ISI forces they were ultimately disbanded by the Maliki government which refused to integrate them into the national security forces. This inevitably led to the security vacuum which IS exploited in its rise to power. Secondly relying upon non-local security forces creates a clear division between the populace and the security forces. Instead of the situation being the central government and locals fighting together against IS it becomes the central government sending its forces to police the locals. In this second narrative, it is easy for IS to insert itself as the representative of the local population and the vehicle of liberation. Using PMF fighters to provide security in contested territory is particularly problematic due to their tainted reputation.

The central government does not have enough security resources to fully control the rural areas which IS now bases itself. There are large ungoverned zones in Iraq that provide the Islamic State with a secure area to rest, train and store equipment (Hassan, 2018). Areas such as the Diyala delta are characterized by rough terrain, rural nature and potentially supportive Sunni populations (Knights, 2016). By refusing to build up local security forces the central Iraqi government only worsens its manpower deficiency. Building local security forces engages locals in the security process and enhances their ability to defend themselves. IS's insurgency is primarily rural in nature which means that targets are geographically dispersed. Equally dispersed local security forces are necessary to provide comprehensive security and compliment the more concentrated central government forces. IS has made targeting village leaders who do not support the group a priority (Knights, 2018). So far IS has been successful in this campaign of terror. Local security units would degrade IS's ability to conduct such attacks and thus their ability to exert control over rural communities.

Conclusion

The Islamic State has been injured but not destroyed. In Iraq it has successfully transitioned to insurgency and is rapidly re-establishing itself. The Iraqi government has enabled this by feeding the IS narrative that the central government is intrinsically hostile to the Sunni population and only IS can protect and care for them. Domestic Iraqi support for IS generally stems from the populace's disappointment in and distrust of the central government and its security forces. Therefore, if the Iraqi government were to address the populace's grievances it could significantly degrade IS support base. It is essential that foreign partners understand that the struggle against IS has not ended and provide the Iraqi government with the support it

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requires. Further research on how IS's international affiliates interact with the Iraqi insurgency could help guide further suggestions.

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Empty Promises: The Denuclearization of Ukraine and its Effects Twenty Years Later

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Abstract

The annexation of Crimea and continued Russian aggression into Ukraine's eastern border directly defied the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. Under this agreement, Ukraine was given sovereignty and territorial assurances, and in return, it gave back its nuclear arsenal to Russia. This paper explores why this decision was made and explains how this action benefited Ukraine. It explores Ukrainian relations with Russia and Western democracies in the early 1990s, and it shows how Ukraine was economically dependent on the continued support of these states. The purpose of this paper is to counter the argument some Ukrainian politicians and numerous journalists began making following Crimea's annexation, stating that Ukraine would have been better off relying on nuclear deterrence than international agreements.

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In 1991, Ukraine became independent from Russia and inherited thousands of nuclear warheads. In 1994, Ukraine signed the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear state, and by 1996, it had returned the last of those warheads to Russia, upholding its commitments to the NPT (Nuclear weapons timeline, 2017). The state with the third largest stockpile of nuclear weapons at the time had been convinced to completely disarm in just five years. Ukraine giving up strategically advantageous technology like nuclear weapons suggests that, in some circumstances, the benefits of becoming a non-nuclear state must outweigh the security benefits of keeping its stockpile. In this paper, I explore why Ukraine decided to become a nuclear-free state and how these "benefits" now relate to Ukraine's territorial integrity. Because Russian actions have violated the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, many Ukrainians now believe the decision to disarm ultimately proved counterproductive to maintaining Ukrainian security; however, the belief that nuclear deterrence instead of disarmament would have protected the state from military incursion is misguided and flawed.

A Brief Historical Overview of Early Nuclear Treaties relating to Ukraine
Ukrainian relations with Russia have been complicated since Ukraine declared its independence. When the Soviet Union collapsed, 15% of its nuclear arsenal was in the hands of the newly-formed Ukrainian state, enabling it to become a nuclear power if Ukraine created new launch codes. Despite arguments that the weapons were necessary to protect Ukrainian sovereignty, the government was persuaded to return them to Russia (Umland, 2016). Ironically, Ukraine continued to find itself subjected to Russia's dominating presence. Russia's belief that they are responsible for protecting Russian speakers outside their border conflicts with Ukraine's assertions that as a sovereign state it alone holds a responsibility for people within its borders. These conflicting policies meant the Budapest Memorandum was ultimately too little support for this ideological issue (Turbokav, 2001).

Relations between Russia and Ukraine had to be clarified by extending some of the former treaties between the USSR and the US to cover issues that involved former bloc states. The Budapest Memorandum came from negotiations with Ukraine for the Lisbon Protocol to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in 1992. START was an arms reduction treaty originally signed in 1991 by the United States and the Soviet Union (USSR). After the USSR collapsed, an addition to this treaty (the Lisbon Protocol) was needed to extend this treaty to the new states of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The Lisbon Protocol called for them to give up the nuclear weapons in their possession "in the shortest possible time and shall begin immediately to take all necessary action to this end" (Protocol to the Treaty, 1992). These nuclear weapons were to be returned to Russia, the successor state of the USSR. By signing the Lisbon Protocol, these states were also agreeing to become non-nuclear states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

However, Ukraine hesitated to ratify the treaty without reassurances that it would maintain its national sovereignty. According to Turbokav (2001), Senior Fellow and expert on Russia, Ukraine, and European relations at Uppsala Universität in Sweden, the concept of independence was almost brand new to Ukrainians when the Soviet Union fell, but the issue of sovereignty quickly became the focal point. The 1994 Budapest Memorandum was created to address these concerns and provided Ukraine with the assurance it needed to sign onto the Lisbon Protocol. The memorandum gave Ukraine guarantees from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia that they would uphold the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of

Ukraine, only using weapons against the state in matters of self-defense. With these promises, Ukraine followed through with becoming a denuclearized state and signed as a non-nuclear weapons state to the NPT (Memorandum on Security Assurances, 1994).

Adding Ukraine as a party to the NPT was a victory for diplomacy and international cooperation. Created in 1968 and extended indefinitely in 1995, the NPT separates the world into nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapons states, making the development and procurement of nuclear weapons outside of the US, the UK, France, China, and Russia illegal under international law (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968). Despite the illegality, several states have refused to sign the treaty and developed their nuclear weapons programs. Given the fact that some states have openly defied international law to obtain the perceived security benefits of nuclear deterrence, Ukraine's willingness to disarm despite tensions with its nuclear neighbor, Russia, was no small diplomatic victory.

The original premise of the NPT was to stop both the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, ending the development of new nuclear weapons programs and limiting the growth of existing stockpiles. The nuclear weapon counts from 1968 to the present day give credibility that the treaty has reduced the global nuclear threat. In 1968, there were just over 39,000 nuclear weapons in the world between six states. As of 2010, this number was estimated to be around 18,000 across eight states. Since the signing of the treaty, nuclear weapon counts have been halved, but the total number of nuclear weapons in 1968 was far from the peak. Weapons counts peaked at 70,000 in 1986, but by the time Ukraine became independent from Russia, the total number of nuclear weapons was starting to finally see significant declines (between 1991-1994 total counts dropped from 55,000 to 41,000). The Cold War had ended, and the nuclear era seemed to be ending (Norris & Kristensen, 2010).

Security Strategies: Nuclear Deterrence or Nuclear Free
Applying Game Theory to Nuclear Disarmament

As the Stag Hunt model (see Jervis 1978 for full explanation of the model) demonstrates, the preferred course of action for Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine was for them to cooperate and to sign on to the NPT, rather than independently developing their own nuclear programs. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the last thing the world wanted was for these states to keep their nuclear stockpiles. Nuclear weapons and disarmament are a classic example of a security dilemma and a breakdown of the Stag Hunt concept. In an ideal world, all states would sign the NPT and work towards being nuclear weapons free. A nuclear-free world (the stag) would provide all states with the benefit of not needing to expand their nuclear stockpiles in competition with other states. However, diversion (the rabbits) from this objective by some states leads to nuclear arms races (the US and USSR during the Cold War). Those who chose to cooperate and work towards a nuclear-free world are left with the commitment to never develop an entire class of weapons (Jervis, 1978). Partial cooperation is not enough for the Stag Hunt to succeed, and if deviations from the NPT's original objective of reducing nuclear stockpiles persists, non-nuclear and nuclear weapons states will continue to operate under the threat of nuclear war.

Stag Hunt (Jervis, 1978)

Actor A:

	Agree to NPT and Disarmament	Reject NPT and Disarmament
Agree to NPT and Disarmament	Stag: Nuclear-Free World (Gradual/ Eventual Disarmament)	Rabbits: Nuclear Arms Race (Vertical Proliferation)
Reject NPT and Disarmament	Rabbits: Nuclear Arms Race (Vertical Proliferation)	Nothing: Development of New Nuclear Weapons States (Horizontal Proliferation)

Actor B:

Ukrainian Economy and European Dependence

At the time of its independence, Ukraine was one of the poorest Soviet bloc countries, with a GDP per capita of $1307 and a shrinking economy according to Sutela (2012), a senior associate for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Until 1996, the country was facing negative growth rates of around ten to twenty-two percent, causing hyperinflation and halving the total GDP by 1994. It was not until 2001 that Ukraine's economy began to show improvement. This growth could be attributed to rising global metal prices, a major export for Ukraine, and continued cheap oil prices from Russia (Sutela, 2012).

Unlike some former Soviet bloc countries, Ukraine did not cut ties with Russia, and Ukraine's debt grew tremendously as it continued to rely on Russian gas and oil. This dependency was used by Russia as political leverage against the state. Needing to separate itself, Ukraine began "walking the line" between Western democracies and Russia, creating relations with both camps was viewed politically in Ukraine's national interests (Turbokav, 2001). Ukraine's dependence on Russian exports and its desire to integrate with Western European countries—noting that that European Union was created in 1993—meant that the inherited nuclear arsenal could not be kept if interstate relations were to be created.

The more realistic reality is that if Ukraine had chosen to keep its nuclear weapons, it would have likely faced economic sanctioning from rather than expanded trade with, the West. If it had refused to give the nuclear weapons back to Russia, it likely would have faced serious economic sanctions, facing consequences like those faced by India, Pakistan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the Republic of Korea (ROK), and others. In the case of the ROK, economic sanctioning was successful in stopping further nuclear weapons developments. For India and Pakistan, sanctions were lifted respectively for the following

reasons: becoming a major economic power and aiding in the fight against terrorist organizations. The DPRK has been operating under extremely harsh sanctions as it continues to develop its nuclear program, a choice that has led to a crippled economy that relies heavily on domestic production (Ichimasa, 2017). The notable exception to this pattern was that Israel obtained nuclear weapons in 1967, making it the sixth nuclear power and the first to not be recognized by the NPT. However, it did not face economic retaliation. This can most aptly attribute to two things: the NPT was still being acceded by many countries in this year, and Israel pledge to the US not to use the weapons as a diplomatic tool. With the acceptance of the US and their very early development, economic retaliation from major world powers never occurred, though many Middle Eastern countries today use Israel's nuclear arsenal as reasoning for their own economic restrictions on Israel and her citizens (Johnson, 2010). By the 1990s, the NPT had been in place for decades, and no major power at the time was willing to turn a blind eye to Ukraine's keeping a third of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal. The pressure from the international community to sign the NPT and return those weapons would have been too strong.

As seen in the analysis of its economic health in the early nineties, Ukraine was not in a position of power economically. Had economic sanctions been applied to Ukraine, the state likely would have fallen to the same pressures the ROK did in the 1970s. Ukraine did not have any political or economic leverage that would encourage sanctions to be lifted. It also was also too economically dependent on Russia for energy; cutting off economic ties with Russia would mean cutting off 90% of its oil and gas usage (Sutela, 2012). For a state that was aspiring to one day become further integrated with the West and seeking an end to the hyperinflation and economic declines of the early 90s, maintaining the nuclear arsenal would have been a politically and economically suicidal move.

Effectiveness of Deterrence

Ukrainian disarmament is an instance used to illustrate that international cooperation towards nuclear disarmament is possible, but deterrence rather than disarmament continues to be the strategy held by nuclear weapons states. Some would argue that the practice of nuclear deterrence has saved the world from WWIII, but Meyer and Sauer (2018) counter that this is not provable and can be more justifiably attributed to global economic interdependence and the memory of the horrors brought on by WWI and WWII. In 2014, some Ukrainian politicians began to call into question Ukraine's decision to disarm. These politicians and numerous new sources questioned the empty promises in the Budapest Memorandum rather than utilizing the fear of nuclear retaliation to deter future Russian incursion. One politician and his supporters believe that had Ukraine kept its nuclear weapons, Russia would have never been able to take Crimea or promote rebels in the Donbas region (Zurcher, 2014). What is largely ignored in this argument is that deterrence does not guarantee the protection and stability it implies, and to some it appears to promote destabilizing and suicidal philosophies like Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), which could harm the conflicting states in conflict and the rest of the world (Zurcher, 2014). An escalation of nuclear-level tensions can result in the destruction of the world, and deterrence only works for so long. When deterrence between states fail, it will be the people who suffer the most.

To further discredit the idea that maintaining a nuclear arsenal would have guaranteed Ukrainian security, Meyer and Sauer's (2018) point to conflicts like the Yom Kippur War, the Gulf War, and Pakistan's Kargil incursion as instances when having nuclear weapons technology

did not automatically protect states from conflict. In each of these instances, states involved had nuclear weapons, but deterrence did not protect them from conventional warfare. This calls into question whether deterrence is an entirely effective means of protecting a country.

One area where nuclear deterrence has shown little benefit is in the digital realm, with Russia being an international threat regarding Information Warfare. Research conducted by the Center for Research Analyses explained that Ukraine represents one of the first major areas where Russia used strategic cyber and information warfare to undermine state's authority and communications abilities within both the political and military sphere. Beginning with smaller cyber-attacks through phishing, distributed denial of service (DDoS), or malware, Russia was able to disrupt Ukrainian telecommunication, and the state's critical infrastructure has been further undermined by cyber-attacks to the power grids (Connell and Vogler, 2017). These attacks have allowed for Russia to create confusion and disorder within Ukraine without the use of conventional military operations. These kinds of attacks also make it difficult for deterrence to effectively protect Ukraine if it had maintained the nuclear weapons arsenal. Even major nuclear weapons states recognized by the NPT, like the United States, have been subject to Information Warfare tactics. The controversy over the extent Russia's disinformation campaign aided US President Donald Trump in winning the 2016 election is still a major point of concern. Having used Ukraine as a testing ground, Russia has been able to utilize its experiences to target major, more powerful international players like the US (Polyakova and Boyer, 2018). If these methods of disruption were able to potentially undermine a nuclear power like the US, then deterrence plays little to no role in protecting a state in the cyber sphere. With cyber and information warfare being the primary aspects of Russia's strategy in creating divisions in Ukraine, a nuclear arsenal would not have been an effective safeguard.

Ukraine's Decision with 20+ Years of Hindsight

The illusion that the Budapest Memorandum would protect Ukraine broke in twenty years. Russia showed it had no intention of respecting any of those promises as it annexed Crimea in 2014. By breaking this treaty and taking aggressive actions that directly violate the memorandum, Russia has hurt the likelihood of diplomatic nuclear disarmament being used successfully in the future. Non-nuclear states are not, however, ready to back down. The world is moving away from an era of accepting nuclear weapons as a form of security for a few states. Ukraine would not have been more secure if it kept its nuclear weapons, but looking at past treaties and the timing, one can understand that disarming was the more attractive option. As a new state, Ukraine needed international support to combat Russian influence, and the NPT is an attractive treaty in theory. However, Russian actions against Ukraine will continue to destroy the complacency states' have historically held towards the status quo on nuclear weapons, and this event will be used by other states to call into question why they should not only start a nuclear weapons program, but to ignore diplomatic solutions that may result in empty promises. The crucial take away from the violations to the Budapest Memorandum should not be that states would be better off with nuclear weapons to deter aggression, but that states should be held accountable when in violation of international agreements.

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The Paradigm Shifts in Intelligence:

From 1800 to Present

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Abstract

This article reviews the evolution of intelligence gathering methods from the late 1800's to the Cold War. While the changes in these methods can be directly connected to the development of improved technology and changing ideology, the concerns and arguments around these methods have remained the same. The progress of time blurred the lines between foreign and domestic actions. At the same time, perceived threats to nations moved from external to internal as information and communicating became easier to access. Through the years, the field of intelligence has gotten more complex as ideology, institutions, and technology have become increasingly interconnected and diverse.

Introduction

While the methods of gathering information used for intelligence purposes have changed drastically over the past few centuries, some of the concerns and arguments surrounding these methods remain the same. The changes that have occurred are directly related to the evolution and development in technology and ideology. What remains the same is directly related to the relationship between a populace and its government. As the world becomes more and more interconnected, the lines between foreign and domestic are becoming blurrier. From eras of Western imperialism and autocracy to decolonization and democratization, intelligence has remained a constant effort in order for governments maintaining control domestically as well as understanding how allies and foes are operating abroad. Mark Lowenthal describes intelligence as a process, a product, and an organization (2017). This definition of intelligence still rings true today and has been true throughout all of history as governments have put institutions in place which gather information of value either diplomatically or during a period of war. Carl Von Clausewitz of the 19th century said, "war… is merely the continuation of diplomacy by other means (Clausewitz, 1962)." In Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, he argues that knowledge is power on the battlefield and in order to defeat your enemy, deception is necessary (Tzu, 2006). These ideas of war and diplomacy are considered to be timeless by some and outdated by others. One thing has not changed: gathering information about other actors whether in war time or time of negotiation are crucial for advancing a nation's interests.

Throughout the 1800's, perceived threats to sovereign states began to shift from external to internal as a result of increased access to information and communication during the Industrial Revolution. Not only were nations worried about their enemies abroad, but they were also worried about potential threats on their own soil. A similarity can be found in the wake of the rise of the internet and how domestic surveillance has increased dramatically. Today information and intelligence are shared between nations through organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Five Eyes (FVEY). The organizations which have gathered and analyzed information have evolved from the cryptographers and code breakers in the "Black Cabinets" of 18th century Europe, to the secret agents operating in Britain's colonies post World War II, to the creation of multi-national intelligence organizations and Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (J-ISR) efforts in NATO and the European Union (EU) (Gottemoeller, 2018).

These overarching themes of technological development, ideology, and structural organization have remained consistent over the past two centuries, but some of the overarching questions of intelligence ethics remain. How vital is the truth to good intelligence? What is considered ethical and not ethical in intelligence operations? Where is the line drawn for surveillance? How can a government ensure privacy and security for their citizens while monitoring for internal threats? What are the relationships between the intelligence community and policy makers? How has cybersecurity introduced a new threat to intelligence? These uncompromising questions have not disappeared, nor will they disappear for some time. Looking back into the history of intelligence, we can understand how these questions formed and changed over time. We will find that they have grown more complex as technology, ideology, and institutions have evolved to be more interconnected and diverse than ever before.

Industrial Revolution

The first half of the 19th century held many changes in technology, ideology, and the

organization of governments and therefore intelligence services. The Industrial Revolution was in full swing and that meant advancements in communication, transportation, information, manufacturing, health, and war. Notable inventions include the telegraph in the 1830s, the telephone in the 1870s, an undersea cable between Europe and North America by 1866, and the radio in 1895. Along with these new methods of communication came new methods of documenting information and record keeping. The typewriter allowed for information to be copied quickly onto index cards and then organized into steel filing cabinets (Warner, 2014). But for the autocratic rulers in Europe in the early 1800's, these advancements resulted in the questioning of their powers and citizens called for a greater representation in their governments.

The revolutions across Europe in 1848 were a direct response to the oppression populations had lived under for so long at the hand of monarchies that ideas of Liberalism quickly spread with the help of new technologies. This marked the end of the Medieval era "Black Cabinets" that had existed in Europe previously. These intelligence offices relied upon intercepted information of other powers and then had professional code breakers and deciphering specialists who worked for the European monarchs (Tulard, 1991). But these technological advances of the Industrial Revolution did not come without consequences for the average person and low-wage worker. The rise in manufacturing lowered the number of jobs and devalued the skills of the common urban worker. Many skilled laborers saw their trades overrun by machines and new inventions which created a sense of loss in society. Economically, these advancements isolated money to the high echelons of society resulting in monopolies and oligarchies that abused working class citizens and did not adequately provide for them (Warner, 2014). The fight for liberal ideals continued throughout the century on both the domestic and foreign fronts.

Advancements in technology also includes advancements in design of weapons. Warner writes, "If liberal ideals of property rights, trade, and the rule of law had gained wide influence in the West, the prosperity they helped to create ensured that the introduction to such ideas in the rest of the world was often announced by cannon fire" (Warner, 2014). In the 1860's, the United States was ravaged by Civil War. Union soldiers employed the use of heavier than air balloons to scout out where Confederate forces were hiding. Warner gives the example of Union allegiant Captain Custer who would send his reconnaissance balloon into the air before sunrise in order to scout Confederate campfires locations (Warner, 2014). These balloons seemed like a crucial and competitive technology at the time, but overtime the heavier than air reconnaissance vessels were seen as slow and vulnerable.

Meanwhile in Europe, leaders were more concerned with putting the industrialization of war to good use by quelling uprisings and revolutionaries on their mainland and abroad. The British Empire was full force in asserting their power and influence over central and southern Asia in India, Persia, and Afghanistan. However, the Russian Empire was also expanding their affairs into the region. The feud between the two empires became known as the "Great Game" and British foreign dignitaries gathered intelligence on Russia's dealings with tribal leaders in Afghanistan. This was an old pastime of British spies in their colonies.

Late 1800's

By 1873, the Topographical and Statistics Department of the War Office had been renamed to the Intelligence Branch (later the Intelligence Department) and worked to gather useful intelligence on foreign militaries, maps, and developments in their colonies around the world. In India, British intelligence efforts were much more intrusive to the native populations than in Afghanistan. India had a history of established communications and government as seen

in the Mughal and Hindu systems and were very well organized. When the British East India Trading Company arrived and set out to exploit the land and people, they did so ineffectively with little ability to understand the indigenous systems even though they attempted to manipulate these systems.

The British strategy of gathering intelligence about the native population was to implement their own postal service and replace the one that had previously existed. The service that was already in place used the working of well educated *harkaras* or 'do-alls' that worked as runners to spread information and acted as the 'human intelligence' informants of the time. Indian leaders did not want to allow the British to use their postal runners because they feared what the British might do with the intelligence they gathered, but the British would recruit them for their service. These leaders were not keen on sharing their power with the British (Bayly, 1996). Other ways the British would attempt to gather information was in the Indian courts and the Persian newsletter. The courts were filled with people who were reporting information back to their allies or were sharing information for a bit of money. The newsletter was unfiltered information about different ruling families in court or important merchants and gave the British very useful intelligence about the native population. Bayly refers to it as a "tolerated espionage system" (1996). However, the British lacked the perspective of their indigenous counterparts and were unable to infiltrate and destroy the patrimonial Indian society. The intelligence failures as a result came to fruition in the rebellion of 1857. The British were too concerned with the statistics and economics of the native populace and knew nothing of their "sentiments, politics, or beliefs" (Bayly, 1996). The British Empire knew very little of the people and land they had colonized, and this put them at a huge disadvantage.

In Europe, police forces grew and special branches were created to deal with and spy on violent extremists within their own borders. These branches spied on the populace because new ideologies were running rampant through societies came as a violent reaction to liberal ideals and "came in many stripes: traditionalist, religious, socialist, anarchist, nationalist, ethnic, and racial" (Warner, 2014). In Ireland, the Fenians were becoming increasingly more violent in their nationalist sentiments in the 1880s, so the London police force created its Special Irish Branch in 1883. By 1888, the office had been renamed to the Special Branch and dealt with several other domestic unrests through surveillance and intelligence gathering. Similar police reforms took place in Europe around the same time period with the Sûreté Nationale in France and the Department for Protecting the Public Security and Order or *Okhrana* in Russia. The Okhrana eventually began operations abroad in Paris in 1883 and shared information with French authorities while keeping tabs on their own expatriates. The Okhrana were even known to deploy *agents provocateurs* who would stir unrest amongst French revolutionaries (Warner, 2014).

While the different interpretations of intelligence in society, government, economics, and foreign affairs remained at the forefront of political discussions, critics of the ethics of intelligence did not remain silent. In 1895, British General George Furse publishes *Information in War* and voices his opinion of the ethics of intelligence processes:

> "The very term spy conveys to our mind something dishonourable and disloyal. A spy, in the general acception of the term, is a low sneak who, from unworthy motives, dodges the actions of his fellow beings, to turn the knowledge he acquires to his personal account" (Warner, 2014).

By 1900, American usage of the telegraph and telegram in the Civil War had resulted in privacy

concerns surrounding the new technology. The sparring soldiers would intercept the other's messages so enciphering was a way to maintain the secrecy of their movements. Some of the questions asked throughout history are still being asked today with the introduction of new technologies. "Who owned the information transmitted along a wire strung by someone else? Who had a right to hear it or view it? For the purpose of law enforcement, was it public speech, or private" (Warner, 2014)?

The turn of the century brought about a new outlook on intelligence in Western Europe along with a surge in spy-fiction literature. The industry of war had brought about a new appreciation for what spies do for their nations, and how effectively they do it. Many of the stories written foreshadowed the war to come, but nothing would compare to the Great War. Spy mania had the effect of facilitating the acceptance of spying as a part of war and it widely became recognized as a profession. In 1910, MI5 was created in Britain as the formal domestic intelligence service and the Secret Intelligence Service for foreign intelligence. Both replaced the short-lived Secret Service Bureau that set the precedent of design for British intelligence services. The world was set for global war and "the needs of governments and militaries to gather and concentrate information by all available means were beginning to transform spycraft into intelligence" (Warner, 2014).

World War I

The Great War polarized to the Triple Entente (Russia, France, and Britain) and the Triple Alliance (included Italy who later joined the Triple Entente) or Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire). Sabotage agents were used early on in the war, particularly by Germans in America. Because the US was relatively neutral at the outset of the war, American banks were loaning huge sums of money to the Europeans in conflict. German sabotage agents set fire to a facility full of arms in New York harbor that were meant to aid the Triple Entente. Germany's secret agents were less effective on the tactical level in Britain because MI5 was very effective at arresting suspected spies (Warner, 2014). The most effective methods of intelligence proved to be by monitoring and intercepting enemy signals like radio transmissions. While human saboteurs were effective on the tactical level, radio intercepts aided in understanding the tactical and strategic operations of your enemy. This often took decoding and deciphering your enemy's messages. In 1917, the Zimmerman telegram was intercepted by British "Room 40" - a code breaking task force that focused on diplomatic correspondence across the Atlantic (Warner, 2014). It was the German Foreign Minister George Zimmerman who was making an offer to the Mexican president at the time to wage war on the United States together. It ultimately brought the US into the war which quickly exposed how American intelligence efforts had a lot of catching up to do. The Military Intelligence Division (MID) was created quickly in 1917 as a matter of necessity and Warner argues is an example of changes in the organization and intelligence doctrine for all powers during the war, just on a much shorter timeline than their European counterparts (Warner, 2014).

Also in 1917, the US passed the Espionage Act that empowered the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), created in 1908, to serve as a federal counterintelligence agency. The technological advancements were amazing in the four years of war and one key weapon that changed warfare forever was the airplane. It not only operated as a weapon, but also for reconnaissance and intelligence gathering. But it was ultimately signals intelligence (SIGINT) that helped the Triple Entente win the war in 1918 with radio triangulation and transmission interception to know where German U-boats' locations (Warner, 2014).

Restructuring in the Interwar Era

The interwar period saw a regime change in Russia during the Bolshevik revolution which maintained power with the help of their intelligence service known as the "All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Profiteering and Corruption," otherwise called *Cheka*. The Cheka organization in Russia was a brutal force that hunted down and killed anyone who seemed like a potential threat to their revolution. It was described as a "loose organization and no standards but revolutionary fervor made them drunk with power and desperate to save the revolution-- and themselves" (Warner, 2014). Like in Germany and Italy, the economic downturn following WWI led to party extremism, totalitarianism, fascism, and Communism. These ideologies were not isolated to these countries. Britain too was seeing a rise in Communist and Socialist sentiment on their mainland. British intelligence services were keeping tabs on the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) in order to contain their operations. The creation of the Signals Intelligence Service (SIS) in 1929 was the beginning of several organization reforms. MI5 was renamed the Security Service (domestic) and the Secret Intelligence Service was confined to foreign operations (Warner, 2014).

The US on the other hand was undergoing a very harsh isolationist policy after WWI. Many American leaders were not keen on the idea of spying and espionage during peacetime and had ethical issues with the idea. The head of MID said in 1920, "Secret Service methods carried on by military agencies cannot be justified in time of peace." Although it is not confirmed, Herbert Hoover's Secretary of State, Henry Stimson, is believed to have said, "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail" (Warner, 2014). The American reforms of the time reigned in the power of investigators and attempted to keep the FBI out of the politics of Washington. The FBI was going to train their agents in "scientific standards of evidence gathering and professional ethics" (Warner, 2014). However, some officials warned of the abilities that the government had developed during the war. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis said of the government's relationship with technology, "The progress of science in furnishing the government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping" (Warner, 2014).

In the build up to World War II while American and Britain's intelligence agencies were weakening, intelligence institutions of Germany and Russia grew stronger. As a result of emergences of ideologies, power vacuums, and economic crises in both countries after WWI, intelligence efforts were intertwined in the political scene as the Bolshevik Communist Party took hold in Russia and the Nazi Party in Germany. The German *Abwehr* maintains it status of military intelligence and operates mainly as the foreign intelligence service while the Nazi *Schutzstaffel* (SS) gains power domestically, especially from its intelligence branch, the *Sicherheitsdienst* (SD) (Warner, 2014). The Russian institutional reforms included the NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) and GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence). All of these organizations shared a counterintelligence policy which was formed from their ideological beliefs. The German ideology of racial purity ended up being a huge limitation for them throughout the duration of the war.

World War II

Germans tried to infiltrate British government by dropping spies into the British countryside via airplane, but almost all were caught and turned into double agents. This became known as the Double Cross system. This counterintelligence move was a great victory of human

intelligence (HUMINT) for the British during the war. After the war however, the Soviet espionage efforts proved much more effective than that of the Germans. The "Magnificent Five" or "Cambridge Five" were Soviet informants who had reached the higher ranks within the British intelligence services including the Foreign Office, SIS, and MI5. The British Government Code & Cypher School (GC&CS) at Bletchley Park was created as an gigantic deciphering task force that used ground breaking technology at the time, the first computer known as *Colossus*. The technology was used to break German Enigma code in a top secret operation called Ultra which was kept very quiet (Warner, 2014). However, the success of the Soviet infiltration through the Cambridge Five is seen in their intelligence regarding the secretive Ultra operation at Bletchley Park. This gave the Soviets a full view of British code breaking abilities. The GC&CS was later renamed the Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) in 1945 (Walton, 2013).

After the war, intelligence did not stagnate as it did after WWI. It does quite the opposite. As the Soviet Union is enhancing their espionage capabilities and stealing secrets of American nuclear weapons development, the US begins to reform their own institutions. The Office of Strategic Studies (OSS) disbanded in 1945 and made way for the National Security Act of 1947 which created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The US Army Security Agency (ASA) becomes Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) in 1949, which eventually becomes the National Security Agency (NSA) in 1952. In Russia, the KGB appeared in 1954 (Warner, 2014).

Cold War

The Cold War brought about a new era of intelligence institutions and ideologies through huge technological advancements. The worlds' superpowers were the main intelligence powers because they were the only nations who had the money to put into the development of intelligence services and agents. However, colonies around the world were rebelling against their various imperial powers and the British and French Empires were granting certain areas the right to self-governance. This left open a power vacuum in these countries which were then vulnerable to fall into the Soviet sphere of influence. As seen in India after independence, V.N. Krishna Menon served as the High Commissioner of India in London and as an outspoken left-wing politician. It was obvious to Britain's MI5 (technically domestic service, except for former regions of the commonwealth) and India's Director of Intelligence Bureau (DIB) that Menon could have been receptive to the Communist cause. The KGB was very active in India in the 1950's which was strategic on the Soviet's part in an effort to turn former colonies against their imperial powers. Many methods of thought in communist circles saw imperialism as the evil product of capitalism. Walton writes that "Britain and its Western allies failed to prevent India from gravitating towards the Soviet Union in the Cold War" (Walton, 2013).

Since the Cold War, the US has seen its greatest reform in intelligence organizations in the post September 11 era. In 2004, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) was created in an effort to have all sixteen American intelligence agencies underneath one bureaucratic figure. The CIA saw major growth after the attack, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) grows along with the rest of the military intelligence services, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created. Nowadays, technology has evolved exponentially with drone surveillance, Robotic Process Automation (RPA) unmanned aircraft, worldwide GPS, and the democratization of the internet have completely revolutionized the industry of war, and therefore intelligence, yet again. For intelligence and technology are intrinsically connected. Ideologies have sparked another war on the concepts of religion, imperialism, and liberal ideals.

Privacy is a question now more than ever with the increased sharing of information online, mostly willingly, on social media. This has led to a heightened surveillance of all-American citizens. No matter the era, the balance between freedom and privacy remains an issue. Now it is even more complex a question with more methods of communication than ever before. Although the fact still remains according to Furse:

> "Necessity knows no laws, and means which we would disdain to use in ordinary life must be employed in the field, simply because we have no other that we can turn to profitable account. Information has sought through spies in all wars, and we can plead in our favor that the enemy will not scruple to employ them in his behalf."

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Human Trafficking as a National Security Issue

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Abstract

Human trafficking is an issue in almost every country across the world and yet it is often overlooked by those in the national security field. Funds from human trafficking are directly used to fund illicit activities like terrorism or organized crime syndicates while trafficking threatens human security by stealing the rights of individuals to their freedom. Furthermore, in the age of social media, the threat of human trafficking has spread online to vulnerable groups who normally would never have been exposed to this danger. Sadly, rather than tackle the threat head on, media companies have avoided taking precautions against human trafficking and opted to take no responsibility for the crimes committed on their sites. This, in combination with the overlooking of human trafficking as an issue of national security by those in power, has led to a network of over 25 million people being trafficked each year. In order to stop the cycle of trafficking, social media companies, government officials, and the general public must work together to raise awareness of the issues and to help rescue people from trafficking networks.

Human Trafficking as a National Security Issue
Chloe Tymoszenko

   Human trafficking is modern day slavery that has evolved at alarming rate in the age of technology. Globally, it is one of the largest organized crime operations that generates billions of dollars in revenue through the exploitation of others. The backgrounds of those who are trafficked and the fields to which they are forced into are varied, making it difficult for the international community to combat. In recent years, the rise of social media has generated new ways for traffickers to find and communicate with potential victims. Therefore, by understanding the issue of human trafficking and the role social media has played within it, policy makers can create new legislation and prioritize trafficking as a national security issue.

   Traditional scholars of national security have failed to adequately address human trafficking as a major security issue. According to the department of Homeland security, "Human trafficking involves the use of force, fraud, or coercion to obtain some type of labor or commercial sex act." When states ignore human trafficking as a national security issue in favor of other threats, they are overlooking a vital matter of human security. According to Roza Pati at the University of Miami, human security is, "people-centered and emphasizes the idea of shielding people from pervasive threats while empowering them to develop resilience to adversity" (Pati, 2014). Essentially, these are the issues that individuals are more likely to see as threats to their own security. They include: protection from hunger, crime, unemployment, disease, environmental hazards, and civil and political unrest. What the government and groups who study national security see as important to security, such as nuclear weapons or terrorism, are important, but are not something that people are likely to encounter in their daily lives. In most countries [terrorism accounts for less than 0.01% of deaths](#) and the last nuclear bomb ever dropped in combat was in 1945 (Ritchie, Hasell, Appel, & Roser, 2013). Overall, the likelihood of becoming victim to or interacting with someone being trafficked is much higher, yet these other threats are discussed more often by the news media and scholars. Therefore, human trafficking should be considered a major threat to national security because it is a more prevalent threat to human security and rights.

   There are many different types of trafficking to which a diverse range of people can become victims to. According to estimates, nearly 25 million people globally are under some form of trafficking. Victims of human trafficking spend an average of 20 months in forced labor with nearly 74% of victims working outside of their home country (HumanrightsFirst.org, 2017). In total, trafficking is an estimated $150 billion-dollar global business that encompasses about 25 different ways people can be trafficked (HumanrightsFirst.org, 2017). These include being trafficked into hospitality, construction, prostitution, food service, domestic work, manufacturing, or working in bars and strip clubs. Overall, these types of human trafficking can be broken up into two major sects which are labor trafficking and sex trafficking.

   According to the United States' Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 human labor trafficking is, "the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, debt bondage, or slavery" (Human Trafficking Laws and Regulations, 2017). The Department of State estimates that over four million people annually are trafficked

for labor in the United States into industries like agriculture, carnival work, commercial cleaning services, construction, factory work and more. The most common way for people to be recruited into labor trafficking is by in-person recruitment (Anthony, 2018). However, in recent years, some traffickers have moved to gaining new victims by posting brazen photos or videos showing large amounts of cash or falsified adverts for jobs on social media. Once a vulnerable person looking for a job is located, a trafficker will usually offer this person work in a different state or country where they will be dependent on their trafficker for support. These victims are oftentimes forced to work for little or no money with no way of escaping their situation (Anthony, 2018).

The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) reports that children are also major targets for the labor trafficking industry. A common way for this to happen is for teenagers to be recruited for street peddling. Most minors being trafficked have never worked before, so it is common for them to not understand the illegality of their "jobs." Minors are often tricked into working long hours, receiving little pay, and having no access to basic provisions while they are forced to work alone in unsafe locations. If they do not sell what they were supposed to, their traffickers will often abandon them in these dangerous situations. According to the DHHS, "many parents are also unaware of these dangers and believe they are allowing their children to work for respected and legitimate companies" (Clawson, Dutch, Solomon, & Grace, 2017).

The other major type of human trafficking is sex trafficking, which is the most profitable form of trafficking. Sex trafficking is defined by US law as, "when a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion." An estimate 4.8 million people are victims of sex trafficking, making up only 19% of the total amount of people trafficked, yet it accounts for 66% of the global profits (HumanRightsFirst.org, 2017). On average, a woman forced into the sex trade will make their trafficker about $100,000 a year, which is six times more than the average labor trafficking victim (HumanrightsFirst.org, 2017). Additionally, information from Equality Now, a nongovernmental organization that works to help advance the rights of women, says that nearly 96% of sex trafficking victims are women. Sex trafficking is typically the most difficult for people to escape from because victims are usually extremely vulnerable and have a hard time getting support. The DHHS attempted to find the commonalties among those who become sex trafficked and found that many of them came from disadvantaged communities where there were few economic opportunities (Clawson, Dutch, Solomon, & Grace, 2017). A very common scenario for sex trafficking is that the victims are promised economic incentives that usually involve moving, sometimes internationally, to more developed areas or nations like the United States. Once they arrive, their traffickers work to keep them in the business by destroying their legal paperwork, threatening their families or keeping them bound by debt while isolating them from their past lives.

In addition, many people being trafficked in the sex industry are minors. With nearly one in six minors being trafficking under the age of twelve (Bouché, 2018). These individuals usually come from broken homes where other family members were sexually abusive, addicted to drugs, or separated due to loss of a parent in death, divorce, or abandonment (Clawson, Dutch,

Solomon, & Grace, 2017). Another risk factor for minors becoming trafficked is if they are runaways. Minors who run away from their families, treatment centers, or foster homes are at a higher risk of being taken in by traffickers. Finally, people who are exploited in the sex trade are more likely to be people of color, especially those living below the poverty line (Lehman, 2017). For these reasons, it is important for policy makers to prioritize informing these high-risk groups about the dangers of human trafficking. People are much more likely to fall victim to a threat they do not see coming, so it is imperative that these groups are informed of the danger. Spreading awareness can be done through presentations in schools for young students as well as though media campaigns. In 2019, the Department of Homeland security added the Blue Campaign to its website, which has aimed to promote national awareness for human trafficking by working with law enforcement, the private sector and NGOs to teach people how to identify victims (Blue Campaign, 2019). The Blue Campaign, which started in 2010, has pushed for greater awareness and is working to help victims.

In recent years, the rise of social media has given traffickers new platforms such as Facebook, Snapchat, Instagram and Twitter to find and stalk potential victims. According to the Polaris study on how social media has affected human trafficking, "trafficking by an individual– generally a pimp or an intimate partner– often begins with the trafficker and potential victim building a relationship through social media" (Anthony, 2018). The trafficker is likely to start small by liking a person's photos and commenting on their posts. As time goes on, they will progress to direct messaging their victims and eventually into what they call boyfriending. In this phase, the trafficker will attempt to flatter their potential victim by faking a romantic attraction or offering them jobs in a field like modeling. Finally, they will offer to meet each other and that is when the person will often be taken and forced into labor or sex trafficking (Anthony, 2018).

This new way to find victims is making trafficking even more dangerous for human security. People who would never have encountered traffickers in their daily lives are unknowingly opening themselves up to becoming victims, which is especially worrisome when thought about in the context of minors. Lauren Hersh, an expert in sex trafficking, talked about the prevalence of targeting minors when trafficking via social media. "In pretty much every situation of trafficking I've seen unfold there's some element of social media, whether it's someone being recruited or advertised" (Lehman, 2017). She explains that young girls are more susceptible to trafficking because they are emotionally immature and are looking for someone to understand them. They are also more likely to allow people they do not know to follow them on social media because they want the validation and attention from a large following. Oftentimes, they will share online what is making them upset and traffickers will reach out to them to make an emotional connection that can lead to manipulation and eventually trafficking. Notably, some social media sites have features that include GPS (snapchat) or location sharing (Facebook & Instagram) that are supposed to be used to tell friends where they are (Anthony, 2018). However, if a child is followed by a trafficker then that predator can use this information to find and kidnap them.

Despite a popular belief that victims of trafficking are cut off from the internet and the

outside world, more than three quarters of survivors in Polaris's survey of victims of human trafficking stated they used internet platforms during their exploitation (Anthony, 2018). Platforms such as Snapchat or Wickr (a site that allows user to send encrypted text, audio, video or photo messages) can be used by victims because of their features that allow for messages to disappear. This can help those who are kept in captivity reach out to their families and try to escape, but traffickers are more likely to not allow their victims to use apps with disappearing message features.

Nonetheless, in most modern cases of human trafficking, victims are still allowed to use their social media accounts. The trafficker may want it to look as though the victim is happy and safe despite their situation and will therefore let them continue to post and message their family and friends. In the case of minors being trafficked, the amount of internet use is even larger. According to Thorn, a non-profit organization that works to protect children from sexual exploitation, 74% of victims we allowed to have personal phones. Of those with phones, 75% had access to the internet during the time they were trafficked and 90% with access to the internet used social media (Bouché, 2018). The study found that most calls and messages to family and friends were highly monitored, but many victims had less restricted access to social media. The reason behind this more open access was because victims were often forced to use websites and apps to help sell themselves. 75% of participants in the study said they were advertised online and 52% of them wrote their ads themselves. These ads included a variety of keywords provided by their traffickers to signal that they were underage (Bouché, 2018). A very common site used to post these ads was called Backpage. Backpage was a classified advertising website that had become the largest marketplace for buying and selling sex. In April of 2018, Backpage was seized by the FBI and essentially shutdown (Jarrett, 2018). Despite a progressive step forward, many of the sellers moved from Backpage onto different platforms like Craigslist or Facebook.

The study connected by Thorn also looked at which apps were being most commonly used by trafficked minors and found that 51% had a Facebook account and 23% had an Instagram (Bouché, 2018). Since these social media outlets are the top two most commonly used by victims, they could work with initiatives like the Blue Campaign to include features that would allow victims to signal to national hotlines that they need help. This kind of feature could pop up as an advertisement or be located on a Facebook page does not immediately signal to the trafficker that it is a hotline in order to protect the victim. From there, they could be directed to the Department of Homeland Security website or a non-profit anti-trafficking organization.

Even though technology and social media are making it easier for people to be trafficked, they can also be used to pinpoint traffickers and identify potential victims. The most innovative example of this is the development of PhotoDNA by Microsoft. This technology, "attempts to identify victims by scanning photos uploaded to the platform and to match them against a set of known child sex abuse images from illicit child pornography websites…" (Anthony, 2018). Thus, if victims can be identified, then the police can use the profiles on the websites that uploaded the material to track down the victims and help them escape. A recent example of

modern technology being used to locate a victim was in New York City. A trafficking victim was photographed on top of 100-dollar bills and using image enhancement, the police were able to read the serial numbers on the money. Investigators were able to track where this money was used and arrest a man who had been trafficking minors for over 10 years (Sex Trafficking moves…, 2016). Using technology to locate human traffickers is an important way to address this security issue, but social media outlets can be doing more than what they currently are. These platforms have the capability to build algorithms that could flag adults who are following and communicating with minors or help produce content that is intended to teach minors about the dangers of trafficking or how to spot someone who may be a trafficker online.

Legally, media companies have no direct responsibility for the content that is produced on their platforms. According to Polaris, "Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act protected… all web companies from liability for anything on their sites that is created by others" (Anthony, 2018). This bill eventually went under some revision with the implementation of the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act and changed the ruling to say that companies can be sued civilly and prosecuted at the state level if they knowingly facilitate sex trafficking. The loophole here is that if sites choose not to actively prevent trafficking then they can reasonably say that they did not know what was happening. Moreover, victims of trafficking are unlikely to have much money, so their chances of winning a civil lawsuit against a large media corporation are quite small. Although it is difficult to say what the government should do in response to this, the public should encourage social networking companies to be more accountable for the material and activities on their site regarding sex trafficking.

Importantly, social media sites are not the only ones responsible for combatting human trafficking. Globally, policy towards human trafficking is very diverse and ranges in its effectiveness across various countries and cultures. Each nation has different types of trafficking that are more prevalent and different laws for how to combat it. In the United States, the first federal law against human trafficking, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) was passed in 2000. The law, which has provisions for reauthorization and new amendments nearly every four years, works to prevent labor and sex trafficking while punishing offenders. Additions to the law in recent years have included a provision for the Department of Labor to release a list of products produced by forced and child labor, measures to add liability to government contractors using trafficked labor, and stricter punishments for those traveling for sex tourism (Jesionka, 2013).

Other countries have also taken a more active approaches to the threat of trafficking by passing more progressive legislation. In Sweden, Denmark, France, Iceland, and Ireland it is illegal to buy sex but not to sell it. Sweden, which was the first nation to adopt these laws, found sex trafficking decreased because, according to Equality Now, "criminalization of women and girls in the sex trade leaves them more vulnerable, while the possession of a criminal record can make it even harder to exit the trade" (The Equality Approach…, 2018). Sweden saw a nearly 50% decrease in men looking to purchase sex once these laws were enacted. Because of this, Sweden has become an undesirable place for sex traffickers to work and the instances of sex

trafficking have decreased significantly (The Equality Approach…, 2018).

However, these countries are in the minority, and human trafficking is still neglected as a national security issue in most places. In the most recent global reports, only 9,071 cases of human trafficking were tried and convicted in 2016, with the vast majority being in Southeast and Central Asia (HumanrightsFirst.org, 2017). Relative to the amount of trafficking victims each year, nearly 25 million, these numbers demonstrate a clear failure on the part of the international community to address human trafficking as a priority.

Still, many scholars are skeptical about labeling a human security threat as a national security problem. National security is a difficult concept to define and is what constitutes a part of security is largely determined by the government in power. In general, national security encompasses defense of citizens, economy, and institutions, which is regarded as a duty of government. In terms of defense of citizens, human trafficking is a clear violation of the human rights. Yet, the problem extends even further into the economic and institutional security. According to Roza Pati, "human trafficking is now a business of choice for well-organized and versatile crime syndicates" (Pati, 2014). Due to increased border security and tougher immigration laws, operations looking to smuggle people and drugs had to become more effective and organized. Many of these criminal organizations have learned how to evade international law enforcement, judicial systems and tax systems, in order to launder money and people. These large-scale crime operations use this knowledge to procure victims for labor or sex trafficking and use the money to fund more illicit activity.

Similarly, studies have shown that the profits made from human trafficking are also used to fund terrorism. The Salafi Network (Global Salafi Jihad) uses money from human trafficking as well as the notorious narcoterrorism group Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) (Pati, 2014). According to studies done in the United States, nearly 46% of respondents said they were worried about becoming a victim of terrorism and 10-20% were very worried about it (Ritchie, Hasell, Appel, & Roser, 2013). With a citizenry that is this concerned about terrorism, the government must work to prevent human trafficking which helps to fund it. If governments are unable to stop major crime networks working within their own boarders, then they are not adequately protecting their citizens. Therefore, because human trafficking is so intertwined with organized crime it threatens economies and institutions, and because it is a violation of human rights, it should be considered a major national security concern.

In general, there are three main paths that can be taken to stop trafficking by policymakers. The first is to decriminalize prostitution so more women can leave trafficking without being punished. Many trafficking victims are currently unwilling to cooperate out of fear of law enforcement and deportation, which makes identification and rehabilitation efforts difficult (Schoeberl & Nivens, 2018). This also leads to a gap in knowledge for scholars who have a hard time finding victims to study because of the fear of prosecution. As a result, few large-scale human trafficking prevalence studies have been able to be conducted, so the problem may be way worse than predicted. Like in Sweden, making punishments harsher for people looking to buy sex will raise the stakes for the purchaser, which can help decrease the market

within that country. The second path is to make social media sites more accountable and work closer with anti-trafficking initiatives. Requiring media companies to monitor adults who follow kids or who pretend to be children while implementing ways for victims to reach out through social media will help prevent human trafficking online. Finally, the third path is to increase awareness by having trafficking issues be taught in schools, especially low performing ones where kids are more likely to be victims. Educating people on the dangers of trafficking through initiatives like the Blue Campaign, will help minors understand the dangers and avoid becoming victims.

Overall, technology is a huge part of how human traffickers find their victims and customers in the 21st century. As a new generation of minors grow up in the age of social media it is important that policy makers and the general public push to educate young people on the dangers of trafficking. With that being said, there is not one simple answer to how human trafficking can be stopped and no matter what laws are passed individuals need to educate themselves of the warning signs of trafficking. People can work to help prevent trafficking by being informed about the types of trafficking and knowing the warning signs, while national governments can work harder to make trafficking more difficult and less appealing within their borders. If policy makers choose to make human trafficking a priority to national security, they will be able to better protect their citizens from the threat of modern-day slavery.

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