

Undergraduate History Journal at
Illinois

Fall 2022: Volume 2, Issue 1



Contents

Contents	2
About the Journal	3
Acknowledgements	3
Note on Editorials	4
The Executive Board	4
Make Room for the “Americans”: The Role of Race and Ethnicity in Mexican Repatriation William Crimmins (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign).....	5
Kisho Kurokawa and the Metabolists, Paving the Way of Tokyo’s Post-War Architecture Max Masquelier (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign).....	26
Governmental Failure to Prepare American Culture for Vietnam Michael Lok (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign).....	44
<i>Editorial: The Imperial Themes of Alexander Borodin’s Prince Igor</i> Justin Wytmar (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign).....	59
<i>Editorial: Revisionism and Revanchism: An Evaluation of Smolensk and Putin’s Motives</i> Camryn Reschke (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign).....	69

About the Journal

The *Undergraduate History Journal at Illinois* is a peer-reviewed, double blind, history research publication, run by students at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, that strives to provide undergraduate students with the opportunity to share their research and gain exposure for their writing. The journal is committed to high standards of writing, a broad sampling of areas of research, and the integrity of academic research.

The journal is double-blind peer reviewed by a group of student editors. Once submissions are chosen, they are reviewed multiple times by our teams of editors, before being published in one of our biannual issues.

Acknowledgements

The journal would like to thank its authors for their work, our hardworking editors for their tireless efforts to continue to push the journal towards higher standards of quality and output, the University of Illinois history professors and faculty for their advice and dedication to academic study, our undergraduate advisor Stefan Djordjevic for his plentiful advice and support, and librarian and professor Merinda Hensley for her enthusiasm towards the journal and her efforts to support the journal's publication.

Note on Editorials

The *Undergraduate History Journal at Illinois* is committed to showcasing the hard work of our editors who may not have time to publish elsewhere with their commitments to the journal and other academic pursuits. Thus, at the end of the issue, the journal will include two articles of shorter length by its editors which were reviewed in a single-blind fashion. They should be differentiated from the articles submitted, which are double-blind and peer-reviewed by journal editors.

The Executive Board

Connor Barnes - *President*

Tara Leininger - *Vice President*

Justin Wytmar - *Publishing Director*

Zion Trinidad - *Secretary*

Michael Shirley - *Social Media Director*

Katelyn Barbour - *Membership Director*

Make Room for the “Americans”: The Role of Race and Ethnicity in Mexican Repatriation

William Crimmins - University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

In 2011, Esteban Torres remembered: “At about that time, as you will recall in history, the repatriation of Mexicans came about and one day they came to the mine and rounded up all the Mexican miners, and they shipped my dad back to Mexico. That was in 1933. I was three years old. My brother [Hugo Torres] was two years old, and I never saw my father again. Never saw him again.”¹ Esteban Torres was a natural-born U.S. citizen. His father worked in the local mine in Miami, Arizona where the whole Torres family lived. Esteban’s mother and brother were also U.S. citizens. This experience was by no means unique to the Torres family. Mr. Torres refers to the “repatriation of Mexicans” that saw the forced removal of hundreds of thousands of Mexicans and Mexican Americans through formal processes of deportation, repatriation, and expatriation from the United States in the 1930s. I make a semantic distinction between these three processes of removal because repatriation, the term used most often to describe this period, refers to the return to one’s homeland. Expatriation, on the other hand, refers to a departure from one’s homeland, and deportation is distinguished as a legal process of expulsion. All three of these removal processes took place during the period known as Mexican repatriation.

This repatriation was in part a reaction to the harsh difficulties faced during the Great Depression; however, the Great Depression alone does not account for what took place. While the true number of Mexicans and Mexican Americans repatriated during the Depression is

¹ Esteban Torres, interview by Virginia Espino, January 19, 2011, in Covina, California, Transcript, University of California Los Angeles Library Center for Oral History Research, Los Angeles, CA, <https://oralhistory.library.ucla.edu/catalog/21198-zz002cds25?counter=1&q=repatriation>.

historically contested, some historians place the number around one million.² Repatriation occurred in every corner of the United States, but the Southwest, with its high Mexican and Mexican American population, bore the brunt of these repatriations. Los Angeles, in particular, found itself as the primary object of early repatriation efforts. For this reason, I will center Los Angeles in the context of the national repatriation. Repatriation of Mexicans and Mexican Americans from Los Angeles has received critically important scholarly attention, which I will highlight throughout the paper, but I also seek to connect the uniquely urban experience in Los Angeles to the broader social, political, and economic implications of this forceful expulsion.

The period of Mexican repatriation has largely slipped out of the American collective memory. For repatriates and their loved ones, however, this period would be impossible to forget. The hardships endured through this nativist exclusion have been etched into repatriates' family histories. Periods of nativist exclusion in the United States have been all but infrequent. Political policies have put a target on the backs of various racial and ethnic groups, but the sentiments remain the same. American immigration policy has always been an unresolved issue, at times rather arbitrary, but consistently exclusionary. The period of Mexican repatriation was no deviation from this practice. Mexican repatriation exemplifies the way American immigration policy was used as an ad hoc exclusionary tool to maintain America's racial hierarchy.

Historical Trajectory of Mexican Repatriation

To build an analytical foundation, it is necessary to contextualize the events that took place by tracing the trajectory of Mexican repatriation. This context does not begin with the onset of the Great Depression in 1929, nor does it end at the Rio Grande. It is absolutely

² Francisco E. Balderrama and Raymond Rodríguez, *Decade of Betrayal: Mexican Repatriation in the 1930s*, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995), 121-122.

imperative to adopt a long view of Mexican repatriation to successfully analyze its broader implications. This long view is situated first and foremost with the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo. The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo brought an end to the formal conflict of the Mexican-American War (1846-1848). With its signing in February of 1848, the treaty granted ethnic Mexicans formal access to U.S. citizenship. Access to citizenship hinged on the fact that with the annexation of vast southwestern territory, the U.S. now had a significant number of Mexican nationals living within its borders. These Mexican nationals had the option to remain on U.S. soil and adopt American citizenship status within one year of the treaty’s signing.³ This came at a time when existing immigration policies excluded many other minority groups from formal U.S. citizenship on the basis of race and ethnicity. This placed Mexicans in a unique but ambiguous place that would become a defining feature of their American experience.

Beginning in the 20th century, the number of Mexican nationals in the U.S. began to swell. The growing trend can be seen in the compilation of U.S. Census of Population and Housing data in Figure 1.⁴ The 1930 Census was also the first to count the Mexican-origin population as a separate nonwhite racial group.⁵

Year	Mexican-Born Population
1900	103,393
1910	221,915
1920	486,418
1930	641,462

³ “Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo [Exchange-Copy],” signed February 2, 1848, *General Records of the United States Government, 1778-2006*, ARC Identifier: 299809, <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/299809>.

⁴ U.S. Census Bureau, *Census of Population and Housing, 1900*, <https://www.census.gov/prod/www/decennial.html>; U.S. Census Bureau, *Census of Population and Housing, 1910*, <https://www.census.gov/prod/www/decennial.html>; U.S. Census Bureau, *Census of Population and Housing, 1920*, <https://www.census.gov/prod/www/decennial.html>; U.S. Census Bureau, *Census of Population and Housing, 1930*, <https://www.census.gov/prod/www/decennial.html>

⁵ U.S. Census Bureau, *Census of Population and Housing, 1930*.

Multiple factors gave rise to this surge in Mexican migration to the U.S. Primarily, the prospect of higher wages in Southwestern industries drew many Mexican immigrants to the U.S. There, Mexican immigrants found jobs in railroad construction, agriculture, and metalliferous mining and smelting. Many historians argue that the construction of western railroad extensions produced the region's economic boom. Now connected to the national economy, developers could market and transport their goods across the country. Along with railroads came the irrigation projects that transformed the formerly arid land into an agricultural hotbed.⁶ These new developers looked for an affordable workforce willing to do the arduous labor in the extreme climate of the Southwest. Landowners, rail companies, and smelters increasingly relied on Mexican labor at very low wages. The Dillingham Commission Reports of 1911 concluded that Mexican workers consistently received the lowest wage of any racial group across most industries in the Southwest. The report also painted Mexican immigrants as ambitionless and content with their wage relationship, making them further desirable as a labor force.⁷ In response to the growing market for Mexican labor, agencies began to form in the border region looking to profit by matching Mexican immigrants with rail companies and landowners. In a 1908 U.S. Bureau of Labor bulletin, consultant Victor S. Clark noted:

Along the Texas border, and even in the larger centers are men who secure laborers in small numbers for cotton and beet planters and other minor employers. Some of these recruiters are themselves hardly above the laboring class, and several are Mexicans or Spanish-speaking Americans.⁸

⁶ David Montejano, *Anglos and Mexicans in the Making of Texas, 1836-1986*. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987) 106-107; and David G. Gutiérrez, *Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the Politics of Ethnicity*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995) 41.

⁷ U.S. Congress, Senate, The Immigration Commission, *Abstracts of Reports of the Immigration Commission: With Conclusions and Recommendations and Views of the Minority*, 61st Cong., 3rd sess., 1910, S. Doc. 747, <https://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951p00832719i>.

⁸ U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor, *Mexican Labor in the United States*, by Victor S. Clark. Bureau of Labor Bulletin, (Washington: September 1908), 476, https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/bls/bls_v17_0078_1908.pdf.

These labor agencies helped form larger recruitment networks that promised Mexican immigrants higher wages and helped employers fill out their workforce. Presented with few alternatives upon arrival across the border, the labor recruitment networks reveal how Mexican immigrants were actively siloed into industries deemed too menial for white laborers.

For many Mexican immigrants, labor prospects alone were not enough to uproot their lives in Mexico. Economic downturn and the social upheaval in early 20th century Mexico forced many Mexicans north of the border. The growing unrest associated with a widening socioeconomic gap, stagnant wages, and the nearly continuous dictatorial regime of the last thirty years culminated in the Mexican Revolution of 1910. The effort to remove President Porfirio Díaz, who had stymied attempts at democracy since 1876, turned into years of violence and jockeying for political power amid a factionalized Mexico. The violence and uncertainty associated with the Revolution caused many Mexicans to turn north.⁹

The growing Mexican population in the U.S. coincided with the socially constructed “Mexican problem.” As the 20th century progressed, the Mexican population came to be seen as unassimilable and burdensome on public relief. White Americans increasingly saw Mexican laborers as backwards and un-American. This narrative gained traction in the 1920s, and social workers were instrumental in its creation. Citing selective statistics on Mexican usage of public relief rolls and ignoring external factors (ability to naturalize, work opportunities, and discrimination), these social workers framed the Mexican presence in the United States as a “dependency problem.”¹⁰

⁹ Gilbert M. Joseph and Jürgen Buchenau, *Mexico's Once and Future Revolution: Social Upheaval and the Challenge of Rule Since the Late Nineteenth Century*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 74.

¹⁰ Cybelle Fox, *Three Worlds of Relief: Race, Immigration, and the American Welfare State from the Progressive Era to the New Deal*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 74.

The “Mexican Problem” narrative was not confined to those in the field of social work. Government officials and academics alike perpetuated this belief. To those in public office, immigration restriction came to be seen as a solution to the problem. In May of 1924, President Coolidge signed the Immigration Act of 1924 which set up a quota system for admission into the U.S. The quota system limited immigration to 2% of each nation’s foreign-born population according to the 1890 U.S. census. Congress also added a \$10.00 visa fee in addition to the existing \$8.00 head tax.¹¹ The increased fees made legal migration to the U.S. difficult for many Mexicans, though formally the Act omitted Mexico and other nations in the western hemisphere from its quota provisions. For many restrictionists, including U.S. Representative John C. Box, the 1924 Act did not go far enough. Congressman Box served as a representative for Texas beginning in 1919, and he made immigration restriction his main conviction throughout much of the 1920s. In response to the omission of Mexico and other nations in the western hemisphere, Congressman Box introduced H.R. 11072 in December of 1924. The proposed resolution would amend the 1924 Immigration Act to include Mexico, Canada, Cuba, and other nations on the American continents.¹² Although the resolution did not pass, Congressman Box proposed similar legislation during each session of Congress through 1930.

As government officials discussed a potential immigration restriction, the “Mexican problem” became increasingly racialized in the academic sphere. In a 1929 paper, University of California professor of Zoology, Samuel J. Holmes asserted this racialized view of Mexican immigrants, stating: “A Mexican may be anything from a descendant of pure Castilian stock to

¹¹ *An Act To limit the immigration of aliens into the United States, and for other purposes*, Public Law 139, *U.S. Statutes at Large* 43 (1925): 153-169, https://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t41.d42.68_pl_139?accountid=14553.

¹² U.S. Congress. House. *A Bill: To amend the Immigration Act of 1924 by making the quota provisions thereof applicable to Mexico, Cuba, Canada, and the countries of continental America and adjacent lands*. HR 11072. 68th Cong., 2nd sess. Introduced in House on December 29, 1924. https://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t01.d02.68_hr_11072_ih_19241229?accountid=14553.

an Indian Peon without a trace of Caucasian blood.” According to Holmes, the “Indian Peon” accounted for much of the recent migrant population, a population which he described as “ignorant, tractable, moderately industrious, and content to endure wretched conditions of life which most white laborers would not tolerate.”¹³ In his argument, Holmes classifies Mexicans as a separate and distinct nonwhite racial group, a sentiment which would be echoed by the U.S. Census of Population and Housing the following year.

It’s important to note Holmes’ focus on “white laborers” in his argument. Holmes sets up a dichotomy of “Mexican labor” and “white labor” which reflected the growing belief that the low wages paid to Mexicans could supplant white workers. Agricultural interests who relied on cheap Mexican labor directly opposed this view and many other immigration restriction efforts. In fact, the anti-restrictionist efforts predated Congressman Box’s numerous restriction proposals. In the early months of 1920, Texas farmer John H. Davis spoke on behalf of the agricultural community before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. During a hearing on a potential literacy test moratorium for Mexican immigrants, Davis told the committee: “If your minds are on that proposition, if you are thinking that this Mexican is a vicious man, it is because the committee is misinformed. He is the best workman and the most docile citizen that has ever been in our country.”¹⁴ Interestingly, John Davis and Professor Holmes adopted very similar rhetoric despite their opposite viewpoints on the restriction debate. Both proponents and opponents of immigration restriction espoused racialized views of the Mexican population. Under each view, Mexicans were reduced to docility and backwardness. The only meaningful difference being that opponents of restriction saw the Mexican population

¹³ Samuel J Holmes, "The Perils of the Mexican Invasion," *The North American Review* 227, no. 5 (1929): 617, accessed October 24, 2021, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25110755>.

¹⁴ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, *Temporary Admission of Illiterate Mexican Laborers: Hearing on H.J. Res. 271*. 66th Cong., 2nd sess., 1920, <https://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:FHCL:1183575>, 85.

as a cheap labor source to benefit their agricultural interests. The restriction debate and the “Mexican problem” would finally reach a tipping point during the Great Depression.

The stock market crash in October of 1929 sent shockwaves through the nation, and the effects of the Great Depression hit every facet of American life. For Mexicans and Mexican Americans, this moment marked the beginning of their forced removal. As unemployment skyrocketed from 3.2 percent in 1929 to 23.6 percent 1932, millions of Americans were out of work and the Hoover administration began searching for solutions.¹⁵ President Hoover tasked his recently appointed Secretary of Labor, William N. Doak to address the growing unemployment problem. Doak’s plan resolved to shrink the labor supply through the federal power of deportation. Less than one month after his appointment in December of 1930, Secretary Doak claimed that 400,000 illegal aliens lived in the United States and later declared that up to 100,000 of these illegal aliens could be deported under federal immigration provisions.¹⁶ Secretary Doak’s claims launched official removal efforts focused on deportation. While this effort began at the federal level against all aliens, this did not remain the case. The deportation campaign trickled down to state and local levels where it was filtered through local politics. For Los Angeles, this meant zeroing in on Mexican “aliens” for both deportation and coerced repatriation to maintain the city’s racial hierarchy.

Los Angeles: The City at the Center of Mexican Repatriation

On March 28, 1928, California Governor C. C. Young commissioned the Mexican Fact-Finding Committee, which was charged with preparing and presenting a report containing

¹⁵ U.S. Census Bureau. Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957, 1960, https://www.census.gov/library/publications/1960/compendia/hist_stats_colonial-1957.html.

¹⁶ “SAYS 400,000 ALIENS ARE HERE ILLEGALLY: Doak Tells the Senate That 100,000 Are Deportable, and Urges Stricter Law,” *New York Times*, Jan. 6, 1931, <https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/docview/99550469/54FF21D54C2148D9PQ/1?accountid=14553>.

“only *facts* relating to the industrial, social and agricultural aspects of the problem of Mexican immigration into California.”¹⁷ According to the report, the number of Mexican-born individuals in the city of Los Angeles increased from 5,611 in 1910 to 21,598 in 1920.¹⁸ These numbers were likely higher as differing immigrant statuses and fluid labor opportunities would have made it difficult to account for all Mexican-born individuals in Los Angeles. These numbers also did not include Los Angeles’ Mexican American population.

For many of these migrants, however, Los Angeles was not their initial destination. As noted earlier, rural labor opportunities served as the main “pull” factor for Mexican migration to the U.S. during the first few decades of the 20th century. Much of this work was in Texas and Arizona. According to Governor Young’s Mexican Fact-Finding Committee, 80.6% of Mexican immigrants between 1909 and 1927 listed Arizona or Texas as their intended destination.¹⁹ These rural labor opportunities were not particularly stable, making it difficult for Mexican workers to establish a permanent location. In response to this instability, George J. Sánchez argues:

After several years’ experience in America’s migratory labor market, punctuated by occasional trips to Mexico to rejoin family, those immigrants searching for more stability, greater opportunities for employment, and a more congenial atmosphere increasingly looked to urban areas in the Southwest and, to a lesser extent, the cities in the Midwest. After World War I, Los Angeles appeared to offer migrants much of what they desired.²⁰

The 1924 Immigration Act also limited Mexican immigrants’ ability to see their time in the U.S. as temporary. For an immigrant to return to their home country temporarily, the Act now required an application along with a \$3.00 fee.²¹ For some, this requirement wholly prevented returning to Mexico. In turn, some Mexican immigrants sought more permanent spaces, and cities offered

¹⁷ Will J. French, *Mexicans in California; Report of Governor C. C. Young’s Mexican Fact-Finding Committee*, (San Francisco: R and E Research Associates, 1970), 14.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 57.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 35.

²⁰ George J. Sánchez, *Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture, and Identity in Chicano Los Angeles, 1900-1945*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 67-68.

²¹ *An Act To limit the immigration of aliens into the United States, and for other purposes*, 158-159.

that higher degree of stability. Los Angeles seemed to be a logical destination for many based on geographic location, industrial and agricultural labor opportunities, and an existing Mexican community. The results of the 1930 census largely support this notion as it put Los Angeles' Mexican-born population at 97,116.²²

Los Angeles' high Mexican population allowed the "Mexican problem" narrative to gain relative prominence within the city. The significant increase in the Mexican-born population from 1920 to 1930 amplified the sentiments. These factors among others made Los Angeles a particularly fertile ground for deportation and repatriation. Working in partnership, the Federal government and local Los Angeles officials not only conducted a deportation campaign, but also sought to prey on the fears of the city's immigrant population. This intentional fear mongering campaign targeted Mexican and Mexican Americans causing large-scale coerced repatriation to Mexico.

With Secretary of Labor William N. Doak's claim of 100,000 deportable aliens in the country, local officials in Los Angeles took it upon themselves to take action. Using diligent archival research, historian Abraham Hoffman argues that the newly commissioned Los Angeles Citizens Committee on Coordination of Unemployment Relief used federal assistance to create a "scareheading" campaign against local aliens. By arousing deportation fears, the committee believed illegal aliens would simply repatriate themselves, saving the federal government time and monies needed to conduct thousands of deportation proceedings.²³ Hoffman's work is particularly principled in the sense that it does not posit one simple repatriation narrative in Los Angeles. While the collaboration between federal and local authorities offers deep insights into official policies leading to repatriation, the lived experience for many Los Angeles Mexicans and

²² U.S. Census Bureau, *Census of Population and Housing*, 1930.

²³ Abraham Hoffman, *Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great Depression*, (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1974), 51.

Mexican Americans was more complex. As is typically the case, one dimension does not offer us the complete picture.

The media in Los Angeles played an inextricable role in the eventual repatriation of thousands of Mexican and Mexican Americans. Through selective reporting, the media exacerbated community confusion and fear. Charles P. Visel, director of the Los Angeles Citizens Committee on Coordination of Unemployment Relief, was often at the center of this reporting. On January 26th, 1931, the *Los Angeles Times* quoted Visel as stating: “Statistics here indicate thousands of illegal aliens... their elimination will give many jobs they are occupying to natives of this country and aliens who have made legal entry.”²⁴ Visel’s initial press release aroused suspicions that the efforts may be targeted at Mexican aliens specifically. The confusion created by the initial publicity statement led to the following clarification on February 4th: “It is true that strenuous efforts are being made to round up deportable aliens. It is also true that most aliens living in this district are not deportable, that the activities of the immigration authorities are not directed toward any one race of people.”²⁵ Despite this clarification, two weeks later, the *Los Angeles Times* reported on a deportation raid that took place just west of Los Angeles in El Monte. During the raid, authorities took thirteen illegal aliens into custody. Los Angeles County officials took eight of these detainees to the county jail, and the paper reported the names and ages of all eight. The newspaper then went on to state that all detainees were Mexican. The

²⁴ “Unified Effort to Oust Aliens Being Evolved,” *Los Angeles Times*, Jan. 26, 1931, <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/unified-effort-oust-aliens-being-evolved/docview/162518882/se-2?accountid=14553>.

²⁵ “CAMPAIGN ON ALIENS OUTLINED: Statement Issued After Conferences Here of Immigration Officials,” *Los Angeles Times*, Feb. 4, 1931, <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/campaign-on-aliens-outlined/docview/162419791/se-2?accountid=14553>.

immigration status of the five detainees taken into Federal custody was reportedly ascertained through employment applications.²⁶

The choice by the *Los Angeles Times*, intentional or not, to report the racial and ethnic identity of those arrested had deep effects on the city's Mexican and Mexican American population. While it is difficult to estimate the true extent of these effects, the message created by this type of reporting could have only served to engender anxiety.

Spanish-language newspapers in the city also reported on the deportation efforts quite regularly. On February 27, 1931, *La Opinión*, carried a front page story on a roundup of potential "aliens" that took place in Los Angeles City Plaza the previous day. During the roundup, Los Angeles policemen and federal immigration officials stopped those in the Plaza to conduct immigration questioning. According to the report, Mexicans and Mexican Americans constituted the majority of those questioned. Ultimately, authorities took eleven Mexicans, five Chinese individuals and a Japanese individual into custody. Despite internal discrepancies in the reporting, the piece offers insights into information provided to the Mexican and Mexican Americans.²⁷ Mexican communities interpreted these reports of deportation raids in the preexisting atmosphere of nativist sentiments and anti-Mexican restriction movements. The reporting in Spanish-language newspapers and other informal communication networks led many Mexican and Mexican Americans in Los Angeles to question their own safety in the U.S. and weigh their options. Formal deportation would have prevented future return to the U.S., but repatriation implied the possibility for return.

²⁶ "FUGITIVE ALIENS SEIZED IN DRIVE: Thirteen Taken in First of Raid Series; Illegal Entrants to Be Held for Deportation; Employment Seekers Step Into Trap," *Los Angeles Times*, Feb. 15, 1931, <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/fugitive-aliens-seized-drive/docview/162408133/se-2?accountid=14553>.

²⁷ "11 MEXICANOS PRESOS EN UN APARATOSO RAID A LA PLACITA," *La Opinión*, Feb 27, 1931, https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=A8NefVh_EAoC&dat=19310227&printsec=frontpage&hl=en; and Abraham Hoffman, *Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great Depression*, (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1974), 59-63.

This fear led to what can be categorized as coerced repatriation. For some, this constituted coerced expatriation. American-born children of Mexican immigrants had every privilege and immunity of American citizenship, yet many departed with their families for an entirely new country. Families uprooted their entire lives to board trains bound for Mexico. In many cases the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, the Mexican Consulate, or other charitable organizations sponsored these repatriates, covering their train fares and other costs. Conventional news sources typically portrayed these repatriations as entirely voluntary and an overall positive development.²⁸ These trains continued to take repatriates to Mexico through much of the early 1930s and began to wane in the second half of the decade. With each train full of Mexicans and Mexican Americans, Los Angeles slowly became more “white.”

Economic and Social Implications of Urban Mexican Repatriation

As the rollout of New Deal programs provided relief to certain Americans, it became difficult for government officials to continue painting the deportation of illegal “aliens” as a panacea to the ails of the Great Depression. However, thousands of Mexicans had already been formally deported, and hundreds of thousands of Mexicans and Mexican Americans had already been repatriated and expatriated. A group that seemingly gained a form of “white” status in 1848 and served as the lynchpin of economic growth in the Southwest suddenly became the target of one of the most viscous and consequential nativist programs in American history. The reality is that Mexican repatriation was not so sudden. The long view of Mexican repatriation reveals the way that the period cannot be reduced to a simple reaction to the Great Depression. In fact,

²⁸ Abraham Hoffman, *Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great Depression*, 86-90; and “JOBLESS MEXICANS GO HOME: 1,150 Adults and Children Are First of 15,000 to Leave California.” *New York Times*, Apr. 25, 1931. <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/jobless-mexicans-go-home/docview/99423724/se-2?accountid=14553>.

interviews conducted by agricultural economist Paul S. Taylor indicate that Mexican immigrants began to fear deportation as early as the spring of 1929, over a year before Secretary of Labor Doak's announcement of 400,000 deportable aliens in the country.²⁹ To understand Mexican repatriation, it is imperative to critically analyze the racial and urban implications behind the construction of the "Mexican problem" that ultimately produced deportation and repatriation efforts.

Historian David Montejano argues that integration and assimilation were unrelated to the creation of the "Mexican problem" narrative. Instead, he argues the narrative was concerned with the need to locate another racial "other" into America's already complex racial and ethnic makeup.³⁰ While it is true that part of the "Mexican problem" revolved around the broader racial makeup of American society, this is perhaps an overly simplistic view. Montejano's argument posits that assimilation and integration were unrelated to the "Mexican problem." This assertion neglects the fact that multiple interpretations of the "Mexican problem" could have existed in American society. I would argue that there was an economic interpretation as well as a social interpretation of the "Mexican problem." Both of these interpretations, however, filtered Mexican immigration through a directly racist and nativist lens.

The economic reading of the "Mexican problem" was a reactionary movement spurred by the urbanization of Mexican immigrants. Initial acceptance of Mexican immigrants as a labor force hinged primarily on two conditions: impermanence and confinement. As Camille Guerin-Gonzalez argues:

As early as 1910, many U.S. employers had begun expressing their preference for Mexican workers over other immigrants, as well as over native-born workers, for seasonal jobs they classified as low skilled. They complained that other national groups made unreasonable demands

²⁹ Paul S. Taylor, "Mexican Labor in the United States: Dimmit County, Winter Gardens District South Texas," in *Mexican Labor in the United States*, (Berkeley: University of California Press 1930), 327.

³⁰ David Montejano, *Anglos and Mexicans in the Making of Texas*, 181.

for higher wages and better working conditions. Mexicans, they claimed, would work cheaply and were “birds of passage” who would not remain in the U.S. permanently.³¹

Consciously or not, many saw Mexican labor as a temporary fixture of Southwestern industrial and agricultural production. Employers hired Mexican labor to compete with other racial and ethnic minorities under the assumption that Mexican immigrants would not expand beyond low-skilled rural labor positions. This view is best characterized by the 1908 U.S. Bureau of Labor bulletin which concluded that a “lack of education and initiative confines most of these immigrants to the simpler forms of unskilled labor. They compete little, if at all, with what is called ‘white labor’ in the Southwest.”³²

Ultimately, neither of the two conditions needed for Mexican acceptance would persist. The Mexican immigrant population expanded rapidly during the first three decades of the twentieth century, and the 1924 Immigration Act made it more difficult for Mexicans in the U.S. to return to Mexico. As many Mexican immigrants began to see their residence in the U.S. as permanent, they sought out the stability offered by urban spaces. The urbanization of Mexicans and Mexican Americans allowed the “Mexican problem” to take root among politicians, academics, and the broader American public. The rural labor opportunities initially obscured the magnitude of this Mexican immigration as most of the immigrants were hidden by the nature of their work. However, the urbanization and geographic expansion of the Mexican immigrant population made the American public increasingly aware of the scale of this Mexican immigration movement.³³ The public not only became more aware of the Mexican immigrant’s presence in the U.S., but in urban spaces white workers found themselves competing with

³¹Camille Guerin-Gonzales, *Mexican Workers and American Dreams: Immigration, Repatriation, and California Farm Labor, 1900-1939*, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1994), 25.

³² U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor, *Mexican Labor in the United States*, 466.

³³ Mark Reisler, “Always the Laborer, Never the Citizen: Anglo Perceptions of the Mexican Immigrant during the 1920s,” *Pacific Historical Review* 45, no. 2 (1976): 232-233, Accessed December 13, 2021, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3638496>.

Mexican workers for industrial positions. Governor Young's Mexican Fact-Finding Committee devoted an entire section of their report to the presence of Mexican labor in non-agricultural and non-railroad positions. This section of the report concluded that "Mexican immigrants have gained a strong foothold in California industries, undoubtedly supplanting other immigrant races and native Americans."³⁴ Mexican labor was imported to compete with other racial minorities, but once Mexican immigrants began to compete with "white labor," Mexican immigration became a "Mexican problem" and the debate over restriction escalated.

The economic interpretation was not the only reading of the "Mexican problem" narrative. Contrary to Montejano's argument, assimilation and integration played a role in the construction of this narrative. First, the existence of a Mexican-American community as early as 1848 suggests that some Americans tolerated the presence of another racial "other" so long as that racial "other" was "Americanized" to a certain extent. The social interpretation is perhaps best summarized by Cybelle Fox's argument that prior to the 1920s, social workers in Los Angeles largely believed they could assimilate the Mexican population. However, as the 1920s progressed, citing low naturalization rates and low socioeconomic mobility, these social workers became convinced that Mexicans were "a dependent and diseased population" incapable of fitting into American society.³⁵ The social interpretation is also evidenced by the Mexican Fact-Finding Committee's report, which included an entire chapter dedicated to the rates of naturalization among Mexican immigrants in California. Specifically, the report compared the rates of Mexican naturalization to those of other foreign-born individuals in California,

³⁴ Will J. French, *Mexicans in California*, 95.

³⁵ Cybelle Fox, *Three Worlds of Relief*, 74

concluding that Mexicans were comparatively reluctant to naturalize.³⁶ The report largely ignored existing barriers to naturalization including various fees.³⁷

The Mexican Fact-Finding Committee inclusion of an entire section of their report to non-agricultural Mexican labor and another to naturalization suggests that both the economic and social interpretations of the “Mexican problem” existed. Despite the apparent difference between the two interpretations, they both racialized and otherized the Mexican population. Both interpretations portrayed the Mexican immigrant as unintelligent, backward, and only capable of rural wage labor. These interpretations turned into justifications for the restriction of Mexican immigrants. When the restriction efforts of the 1920s bore little to no fruit, restrictionists turned towards deportation and ultimately repatriation. To a certain extent, the Great Depression was only a pretext for ridding the nation of the already existing “Mexican problem.”

Conclusion

Aside from the most vehemently nativist bloc of society, many Americans initially tolerated Mexican immigration as long as these newcomers remained in the labor positions deemed fit for racial “others.” However, once Mexican immigrants expanded beyond these hidden labor positions, the white American public began to construct the “Mexican problem” narrative. Different segments of the population adopted different rationalizations for the “Mexican problem” narrative, but all hinged on the maintenance of America’s racial hierarchy. Many conflated the concept of an “American” or “native” worker with whiteness. This conflation demanded that Mexican immigrants remain in rural spaces performing backbreaking

³⁶ Will J. French, *Mexicans in California*, 74.

³⁷ “Halve Naturalization Fees to Encourage New Citizens.,” *New York Times*, Apr. 22, 1934, <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/halve-naturalization-fees-encourage-new-citizens/docview/101095124/se-2?accountid=14553>.

labor at exploitative wages. Those willing to accept a Mexican presence in urban spaces required the Mexican population to assimilate and “Americanize” so as not to disturb the American racial hierarchy with their perceived “otherness.” The construction of the “Mexican problem” would grow into the immigration restriction efforts of the 1920s. Both proponents and opponents of immigration restriction directly racialized the Mexican population, but much of the anti-restriction camp consisted of the individuals who directly profited from Mexican labor. The Great Depression ultimately offered the federal government and specific localities such as Los Angeles an opportunity to clear out its “Mexican problem.” Deportation and repatriation efforts forcefully expelled hundreds of thousands of Mexican and Mexican Americans and entirely ignored Mexicans’ cultural, social, and economic contributions to American society. The issues of race and ethnicity in American immigration engendered by Mexican repatriation remain unresolved and questions over who can access American space remain largely unanswered.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

“11 MEXICANOS PRESOS EN UN APARATOSO RAID A LA PLACITA.” *La Opinión*, Feb 27, 1931.

An Act To limit the immigration of aliens into the United States, and for other purposes. Public Law 139. *U.S. Statutes at Large* 43 (1925): 153-169.

“CAMPAIGN ON ALIENS OUTLINED: Statement Issued After Conferences Here of Immigration Officials.” *Los Angeles Times*, Feb. 4, 1931.

French, Will J. *Mexicans in California; Report of Governor C. C. Young's Mexican Fact-Finding Committee.* San Francisco: R and E Research Associates, 1970.

“FUGITIVE ALIENS SEIZED IN DRIVE: Thirteen Taken in First of Raid Series; Illegal Entrants to Be Held for Deportation; Employment Seekers Step Into Trap.” *Los Angeles Times*, Feb. 15, 1931.

“Halve Naturalization Fees to Encourage New Citizens.” *New York Times*, Apr. 22, 1934.

Holmes, Samuel J. "The Perils of the Mexican Invasion." *The North American Review* 227, no. 5 (1929): 615-623. Accessed October 24, 2021.

“JOBLESS MEXICANS GO HOME: 1,150 Adults and Children Are First of 15,000 to Leave California.” *New York Times*, Apr. 25, 1931.

“SAYS 400,000 ALIENS ARE HERE ILLEGALLY: Doak Tells the Senate That 100,000 Are Deportable, and Urges Stricter Law.” *New York Times*, Jan. 6, 1931.

Taylor, Paul S. “Mexican Labor in the United States: Dimmit County, Winter Gardens District South Texas.” In *Mexican Labor in the United States.* Berkeley: University of California Press 1930.

Torres, Esteban. Interview by Virginia Espino. January 19, 2011, in Covina, California. Transcript. University of California Los Angeles Library Center for Oral History Research, Los Angeles, CA.

“Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo” Signed February 2, 1848. *General Records of the United States Government, 1778-2006*

“Unified Effort to Oust Aliens Being Evolved.” *Los Angeles Times*, Jan. 26, 1931.

U.S. Census Bureau. *Census of Population and Housing, 1900.*

- U.S. Census Bureau. Census of Population and Housing, 1910.
- U.S. Census Bureau. Census of Population and Housing, 1920.
- U.S. Census Bureau. Census of Population and Housing, 1930.
- U.S. Census Bureau. Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957, 1960.
- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. *Temporary Admission of Illiterate Mexican Laborers: Hearing on H.J. Res. 271*. 66th Cong., 2nd sess., January 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, February 2, 1920.
- U.S. Congress. House. *A Bill: To amend the Immigration Act of 1924 by making the quota provisions thereof applicable to Mexico, Cuba, Canada, and the countries of continental America and adjacent lands*. HR 11072. 68th Cong., 2nd sess. Introduced in the House on December 29, 1924.
- U.S. Congress. Senate. The Immigration Commission. *Abstracts of Reports of the Immigration Commission: With Conclusions and Recommendations and Views of the Minority*. 61st Cong., 3rd sess., 1910. S. Doc. 747.
- U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor. *Mexican Labor in the United States*, by Victor S. Clark. Bureau of Labor Bulletin. Washington: September 1908.

Secondary Sources

- Balderrama, Francisco E., and Raymond Rodríguez. *Decade of Betrayal: Mexican Repatriation in the 1930s*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995.
- Fox, Cybelle. *Three Worlds of Relief: Race, Immigration, and the American Welfare State from the Progressive Era to the New Deal*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012.
- Guerin-Gonzales, Camille. *Mexican Workers and American Dreams: Immigration, Repatriation, and California Farm Labor, 1900-1939*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1994.
- Gutiérrez, David G. *Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the Politics of Ethnicity*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.
- Hoffman, Abraham. *Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great Depression*. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1974.
- Joseph, Gilbert M., and Jürgen Buchenau. *Mexico's Once and Future Revolution: Social Upheaval and the Challenge of Rule since the Late Nineteenth Century*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2013.
- Montejano, David. *Anglos and Mexicans in the Making of Texas, 1836-1986*. Austin: University

of Texas Press, 1987.

Reisler, Mark. "Always the Laborer, Never the Citizen: Anglo Perceptions of the Mexican Immigrant during the 1920s." *Pacific Historical Review* 45, no. 2 (1976): 231-254. Accessed December 13, 2021. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3638496>.

Sánchez, George J. *Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture, and Identity in Chicano Los Angeles, 1900-1945*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Kisho Kurokawa and the Metabolists, Paving the Way of Tokyo's Post-War Architecture

Max Masquelier - University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

Tokyo's Nakagin Capsule Tower stands out among the surrounding buildings with its peculiar architectural style. The tower and its design were part of the Metabolist architecture movement. The unique design owes to hundreds of individual concrete capsules that are stacked on top of each other. Each capsule can house one person and the capsule itself is intended to be replaced after some time. This was part of the Metabolist idea of 'living' which can be associated with Tokyo's post-war emergence. After the completion of the tower in 1972, the condition of the building has declined. It now stands as a subtle reminder of the influential Metabolist Movement, which was a groundbreaking Japanese architecture movement during Tokyo's post-war era. As there are efforts to preserve the building, it brings forth notions of the importance of the movement as a whole and what it exactly represents for Tokyo. Kisho Kurokawa, the architect behind the tower, was part of the Metabolist group who were prominent in the 1960s and early 1970s. He played a large part in the movement and used many of the aspects throughout his lengthy career. After the Second World War, Tokyo was decimated, and the post-war years became a critical period in terms of rebuilding. It was exactly during this the time the Metabolists were active.

With the ongoing rebuilding of Tokyo between the 1950s and 1970s, there was a large opportunity to implement new styles and urban development. Kisho Kurokawa and the Metabolist Movement did just that as they took part in this essential era of Tokyo's architectural history. The philosophies of the Metabolist movement were very modern and represented visions

of futuristic development. Several Metabolist designed structures that still exist today stand out and represent something more than modern architecture to Tokyo. Kisho Kurokawa was one of Japan's most well-known architects who was part of the Metabolist architecture movement, which drew attention across the world to an emerging Tokyo from the ashes of the Second World War. Events such as the 1964 Tokyo Olympics brought international attention to this new movement in architecture. Kurokawa and the Metabolists were instrumental in constructing postwar Tokyo due to their futuristic philosophy and their symbolic structures. Scholars have written several pieces on the subject of postwar and Metabolism but have not fully expanded on Kurokawa's early work and Metabolism itself, specifically tied together and their deep connections to Tokyo's post-war urban development.¹ Metabolism's biological concept of urban development and Kurokawa's Nagakin Capsule Tower are just some examples of how philosophy and structures made the Metabolists are critical components to post-war designs.

Scholarly Works on Metabolism

Tokyo's introduction to Metabolist architecture has been the subject of several scholars' works. They have taken the Metabolism philosophies and ideals under a microscope to further analyze them. Kisho Kurokawa is one of the most studied architects along with Kenzo Tange, also a Metabolist. Besides the descriptive of architectural works, scholars have argued that the movement had utopic and mythic ideals. Zhongjie Lin's "Kenzo Tange and the Metabolist Movement" has extensive insight over the various Metabolist architects, their designs, and existing structures. He ties these subjects to Japan's post-war society but takes a broader approach to the ideals of post-war emergence and the connections to other cities across the

¹ Zhongjie Lin, *Kenzo Tange and the Metabolist Movement: Urban Utopias of Modern Japan* (New York: Routledge, 2010).

world. Metabolism has been only analyzed through physical properties of the architecture by previous scholars. Only recently have scholars focused more on the philosophies. This paper will specifically focus on Kurokawa and several designs of his along with existing structures while directly establishing a connection to Tokyo's postwar development.

Scholarly monographs in recent years have dedicated their work on exploring the Metabolist ideals. William Gardner writes in, "The Metabolist Imagination", on science fiction and the connection to the Metabolists. Gardner argues that besides the actual sketches, models, and finished projects, the Metabolists were centered around the processes of change, growth, and decay and imaginary architecture as a tool of comprehending and designing these evolving processes. In addition, Gardner argues that Metabolists built a bridge between architecture and science fiction.² Gardner also ties in the post-war period with the scientific fictional idea of an apocalyptic future. Agnes Nyilas' "Beyond Utopia" looks at the idea of 'megastructure' and argues its relation to tradition. Nyilas Agnes' argument is divided into three parts. She utilizes the first part, formal characteristics of Metabolism, and the second, design methods, to support the idea that 'city as living organism' is a metaphor for rethinking the idea of tradition.³ Both of these monographs rely heavily on philosophy and greater thoughts of the Metabolist movement while linking the featured architects. Kurokawa's designs are highlighted by both authors as they are significant to the Metabolist story.

With certain Metabolist structures that have been constructed, scholars have noted the importance that they hold for the movement and their symbolic presence. Christian Tagsold's article, "Modernity, Space and National Representation at the Tokyo Olympics 1964", focuses on

² William O. Gardner, *The Metabolist Imagination: Visions of the City in Postwar Japanese Architecture and Science Fiction* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2020), 2, 22.

³ Agnes Nyilas, *Beyond Utopia: Japanese Metabolism Architecture and the Birth of Mythopia* (New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2018), 186.

the 1964 Olympics and the scramble for Tokyo to showcase its emerging modern city. He establishes that while “developing infrastructure such as canalization and traffic was very important for Tokyo, symbolic revitalization of the city’s fabric was equally crucial.”⁴ Tange’s Yoyogi National Stadium is a staple of Metabolist influence in Tokyo while symbolizing postwar emergence for an international audience. It was at the height of modernity, but now acts as a memory of how modernity rejuvenated Tokyo.⁵ Florian Urban’s article, “Japanese ‘Occidentalism’ and the Emergence of Postmodern Architecture”, elaborates on the Metabolists and their role in postwar architecture in a broad scope. Finally, it was not a Western nation that was the face of a new modern movement. Urban adds that contemporary architecture was becoming a global phenomenon, and this “revised understanding of contemporary architecture in the 1960s and 1970s was significantly influenced by the Japanese Metabolists...the Metabolists posited an opposition between a dynamic Japanese culture and a stagnant West.”⁶ While Tagsold focuses on the clear symbolic nature of the 1964 Olympics, Urban notes the heavy influence of Metabolism on the global movement of modern architecture. Lin, Gardner, Nyilas, Tagsold, and Urban all expand on Metabolist ideologies and connect them to broader points such as science fiction, traditionalism, and utopia. These authors note Kurokawa’s importance through highlighting his works as he is not hidden in the Metabolist narrative

Kurokawa and the Philosophy of Metabolist Movement

⁴ Christian Tagsold, “Modernity, Space and National Representation at the Tokyo Olympics 1964,” *Urban History* 37, no. 2 (August 2010): 289–300, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963926810000362>.

⁵ Tagsold.

⁶ Florian Urban, “Japanese ‘Occidentalism’ and the Emergence of Postmodern Architecture on JSTOR,” *Journal of Architectural Education (1984-)*, 65, no. 2 (n.d.): 100.

Metabolism was not a movement of simply style, but was also a philosophical movement on urbanism. In these philosophies, Kurokawa implemented his own useful ideas of urban expansion and the future of it. These ideas were helpful additions to address the ongoing reconstruction of Tokyo. Ultimately, this explains the significant role of Kurokawa and the Metabolist ideas in Tokyo's postwar urban development.

Part of the Metabolist idea was that structures were to be 'living', which can represent and applied to a growing and healing Tokyo, as it was recovering from World War II. As the Metabolist architects established their group, they composed a manifesto that was their debut piece connecting many of their visions. The Metabolists use 'Metabolism' to indicate that they "believe design and technology should be a denotation of human society" and they state, "We are not going to accept metabolism as a natural historical process but try to encourage active metabolic development of our society through our proposals."⁷ As described by the founding architects, Metabolism has a biological meaning which can easily be applied to their designs and structures. A 'living' urban area is rather special for the Tokyo community. Metabolism can be associated with growing, especially during the late 1950s to the early 1970s, and this is exactly what Tokyo was doing. It was during this time that Tokyo was emerging as a postwar nation. The proposed meaning and background to the Metabolism movement, as described by its members, can be seen as coinciding with Tokyo's healing and growing process in the postwar years. Based on their manifesto, the Metabolist architects were certainly invested in the rebuilding of Tokyo, and their movement's philosophy supported this through ideas of modern urban expansion. Tokyo's new wave of architecture went hand in hand with the construction of Tokyo into a

⁷ Noboru Kawazoe et al., *Metabolism: The Proposals for New Urbanism* (Tokyo: Bijutsu Shūpansha, 2005), quoted in Zhongjie Lin, *Kenzo Tange and the Metabolist Movement: Urban Utopias of Modern Japan* (New York: Routledge, 2010).

modern city. Kurokawa on the other hand, mentions “I never understood my architecture as biologicistic or biological. Sure, both metabolism and symbiosis are biological terms, but in my architecture, it is more a matter of the whole principle of life underlying them.”⁸ Even though Kurokawa may have had some disagreements with other members of the movement, his philosophy deeply revolves around the idea of life which still is a fundamental part of Metabolism.

The Metabolists designed massive structures also known as ‘megastructures’ which were unlike any other existing structures in Tokyo. Kurokawa’s essay “Space City” is an example of bold designs fitting into urban areas. Each architect featured in the Metabolism manifesto, offered an essay containing their personal views of the movement through conceptual designs. Kurokawa’s was “Space City” which included ‘Neo-Tokyo Plan’, ‘Wall City’, ‘Agricultural City’, and ‘Mushroom-shaped house’. Megastructures influenced the proposed urban layouts and were a significant part of the styles which were utopic in the Metabolism Manifesto. Kurokawa’s ‘Neo-Tokyo Plan’, ‘Wall City’, and ‘Agricultural City’ designs are quite massive in size. The intention behind this, is to implement connecting infrastructure to shorten the distance between housing and work.⁹ Kurokawa states in his own words that “urban units must be incorporated into the city structure so that even though they are remote from the city center, they have the same environment as prevails in the city proper.”¹⁰ Kurokawa was redefining and redesigning urban layout to accommodate the evolving commute. ‘Agricultural City’ is a great example of this as we can see in the image of the plan that agriculture, which is work, is integrated with a

⁸ Kishō Kurokawa, *Kisho Kurokawa: metabolism and symbiosis = Metabolismus und Symbiosis* (Berlin: Jovis, 2005), 21.

⁹ Lin, *Kenzo Tange and the Metabolist Movement*.

¹⁰ Kishō Kurokawa, *Metabolism in Architecture* (London: Studio Vista, 1977), 69, https://archive.org/details/Metabolism_in_Architecture_by_Kisho_Kurokawa.

city like habitat.¹¹ He mentions the problems of Tokyo's rapid expansion which is expanded in the next paragraph. It is within these megastructure designs, we see Kurokawa's forward thinking that directly contributes to the development of Tokyo. Obviously, this was not just an architectural style of his, but also a genuine contribution to infrastructure.

Tokyo's ever-growing population during the postwar years inspired the Metabolists to come up with designs that could accommodate a large population. With economic successes, Tokyo was expanding in terms of population and urban development, which resulted in a need for a strengthening of infrastructure. This is exactly where the Metabolists come into play. Kisho Kurokawa composed some of his thoughts post-movement in his book *Metabolism in Architecture*. It is here that Kurokawa mentions the population projections and states that the "architects' job is not to propose ideal models for society, but to devise spatial equipment that the citizens themselves can operate."¹² There is a clear connection between Metabolism and population increase. As Kurokawa explains the origins and meanings behind Metabolism throughout his writing, it is evidently clear that the movement was based on a projected modern Tokyo. He explains that the existing conditions of Tokyo during the debut of the Metabolists were in dire shape. Conditions were deteriorating in other cities as well and new construction would commence without any acknowledgment of future visions. In addition, city planning was equally unsatisfactory.¹³ It was the Metabolists that put Tokyo on a track to becoming a modern city, and it was their architectural designs such as Kurokawa's "Space City" that helped develop the ideas.

¹¹ Kisho Kurokawa, "Agricultural City," accessed December 5, 2021, <https://jstor.org/stable/community.16518984>.

¹² Kurokawa, *Metabolism in Architecture*, 28.

¹³ Kurokawa, 43.

Metabolism is not simply one plan conjured by architects, but consists of several ideas and plans that together would develop the Metabolist vision of Tokyo. Tokyo was in the crosshairs of the Metabolists as the movement was to help the city become one of the most modern cities in the East. Noboru Kawazoe, a Metabolist architect, wrote an article regarding Tokyo, and what it would need to become ‘a city of the future’. Kawazoe, in addition to Kurokawa, brings forth the idea that Metabolism is associated with transforming the urban development of Tokyo in the postwar years. He adds that Tokyo’s new urban plan should not be simply planned out in one sitting but should be a gradual process while stating “it is a good thing for multiple utopias to arise; it is in the friction between an unlimited number of proposals that a concrete vision for progress will become richer and increasingly clear.”¹⁴ Metabolism is not simply one plan conjured by architects but consists of several ideas that together would develop the Metabolist vision of Tokyo. Kawazoe adds to Kurokawa’s idea which is “what brings together part and whole in the city and unites gigantic and human scales an ‘urban connector’” to which Kawazoe then adds that urban planning should be seen as a practical philosophy coming from asking how humanity should exist.¹⁵ Kawazoe’s ideas as to how a city develops into the future are not conventional or simple, but rather consist of several thought-provoking philosophies. His ideas are in line with Kurokawa’s outlook on the importance of city development and the idea of ‘urban connection’.

Kurokawa assisted in Kenzo Tange’s Plan of Tokyo, which was an ambitious urban development plan for Tokyo Bay and became part of the drive to modernize Tokyo. This urban development plan showcased the forward-thinking ideas of Tange, arguably the most famous

¹⁴ Kawazoe Noboru and Ignacio Adriasola, “The City of the Future (1960),” *Review of Japanese Culture and Society* 28 (2016): 154, <https://doi.org/10.1353/roj.2016.0031>.

¹⁵ Noboru and Adriasola, 160.

Metabolist architect, and it is still praised today. Tange's plan consisted of building across Tokyo Bay, coinciding with the city's ongoing expansion. Kisho Kurokawa created his own version of this plan titled "Neo-Tokyo Plan."¹⁶ Although the Plan of Tokyo Bay was never constructed, it represents Tange's utopian visions of Tokyo, which certainly sparked a further push to develop the city and region into a modern urban area. Still admired to this day, Tange's plans serve an important milestone in modern urban planning

Kurokawa's plan is not as well-known but serves as an indicator of his dedicated role in Tokyo's urban planning. Instead of utilizing the bay area, he rather uses the figure of a cross to extend the city's center. This cross would be an easy access for residents outside of the city to travel to the city center. This can be related to his design titled 'Wall City'. In both works there is a notion of easy access between housing and work. As mentioned previously, this idea by Kurokawa was a unique plan for Tokyo, as the city was rapidly expanding which resulted in longer commutes for residents.

Kenzo Tange's and Kurokawa's plan both display notions of 'megastructures'. Of course, not every design from an architecture movement will see construction, because some designs were simply conjured up to express the philosophies of a movement, as is the case with megastructures. Kurokawa's urban planning and ideas of a modern city is his way of addressing the much-needed help to transform Tokyo into a world class modern city.

¹⁶ Lin, *Kenzo Tange and the Metabolist Movement*, 28.

Physical Structures and Symbols

Kisho Kurokawa's Nakagin Capsule Tower along with Tange's Yoyogi National Stadium serve as important symbolic structures. Beyond contemporary styles, the physical structures of the Metabolists demonstrate their philosophies such as the Nakagin Tower and its relation to the Metabolist idea of 'living'. Metabolism's physical aspect of the movement contributes a critical part to postwar Tokyo as they symbolize a healing and emerging Tokyo.

Tokyo's long history of destruction was something on Kurokawa's mind. In addition, for the people of Tokyo suffering from the aftermath of the war, there was a damaged national identity. Japan's identity would prove to be essential as the people sought to recover from a troubling past. Kurokawa explains the origins of the Metabolist including Tokyo in the years directly after the Second World War and other destruction of Tokyo. Many buildings in Japan are not as old due to the heavy use of wood, and many historical buildings like shrines are not completely original compared to other historical landmarks such as the Acropolis.¹⁷ Kurokawa makes a clever point that "wood, the traditional building material, rots easily, the Japanese have never felt that the materials themselves have a sense of eternity."¹⁸ He also adds that it wasn't until the late 1950s, where modern architecture started taking place in Japan.¹⁹ As the war and destruction concluded, the Metabolists were left with a task of establishing a permanent identity. Linking with the philosophy of a 'living city', Kurokawa and the Metabolists certainly wanted to address postwar thoughts through means of designing structures that were essential to Tokyo's postwar emergence.

¹⁷ Kurokawa, *Metabolism in Architecture*.

¹⁸ Kurokawa, 33.

¹⁹ Kurokawa, 25.



Figure A.: Yoyogi National Stadium

Tange's Yoyogi National Stadium is widely seen as a staple of Metabolism with its unique design. Built for the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, Tange created an impressive design for a stadium that is still used today. It symbolized Tokyo's new path to becoming a modern city and the Olympics brought international attention to this. Along with other Metabolist structures, the Yoyogi National Stadium visibly stands out from its surroundings. Many architectural features of the stadium are not seen anywhere else in Tokyo, which exemplifies its modern design. Figure A is a photograph of the stadium from the 1960s, and it displays various aspects of the Metabolist style. At first glance, no one would ever believe that this would be a sports stadium. In the foreground is the small stadium that is part of the complex. It has a large mast in the center with the roof declining in a spiraling motion. The larger stadium in the background is the focus of the design with two masts and the roof draped between in almost a shape like a tent. Like other

examples of Metabolist architecture, we see the concrete color gray and its massive size. There are many flowing lines to the stadium.²⁰ Applying Metabolist philosophies to the Yoyogi National Stadium, Tange certainly created something that would grab the West's attention to show Tokyo's emergence as a modern city of the East. It can be argued that the massive size of the stadium gives megastructure appeal to it. Yoyogi National Stadium's symbolic stature of Tokyo's postwar emergence proved a great deal to the people and the international audience.

For the Metabolism movement, the 1964 Olympics and the 1970 World's Fair was an excellent opportunity to display its modern and futuristic structures as there was an international audience Tokyo's 1964 Olympics was not simply a sports event but was a platform for Tokyo to demonstrate their modern emergence. With this audience, there is obvious pressure to make Tokyo visually pleasing as possible. In addition, it was a time to showcase Tokyo's successes, as the economy prospered in just under two decades after complete and utter destruction. Tange designed the stadium knowing the exact purpose of the structure in such a large national event. Kurokawa mentions that the Yoyogi stadium is a Tange masterpiece and that it was during this time that Japan was prospering economically, and new art movements appeared that were not hindered by the "established orders."²¹ It was not only the Tokyo Olympics that brought this attention, as the 1970 Expo did the same thing. Located in Osaka, the World's fair was an event in which the Metabolists had a large influence as well. Several architects of the group, including Kisho Kurokawa, designed the Takara Beutilion, Theme Pavilion, and Toshiba IHI Pavilion for the event. With a combination of Metabolist architects, Expo '70 was able to showcase the contemporary styles of architecture with international attention. Both of these events stood as

²⁰ Kenzo Tange 1913-, "Tokyo: Olympic Halls General: Ext.: View," accessed December 5, 2021, <https://jstor.org/stable/community.13922664>.

²¹ Kurokawa, *Metabolism in Architecture*, 27.

platforms for the architects, and symbols of Tokyo's postwar prosperity. These two international events exemplify how much Metabolism was utilized in order to put forth the notion of Tokyo's and Japan's modern turn through the lens of architecture.




Figure B.: Construction of Nakagin Capsule Tower




Figure C: Capsule interior design

Kisho Kurokawa's Nakagin Capsule Tower and its peculiar design embodies a fundamental part of Metabolism. As described before, the Nakagin Capsule Tower is quite unique due to it being constructed of prefabricated capsules. The capsules had dimensions of 2.5 meters by 4 meters by 2.5 meters.²² Inside the capsule there is a small bathroom and bed, along with small amenities which can be seen in Figure C.²³ Kurokawa also mentions that the intention of the tower was "to provide single bedroom dwellings in the heart of Tokyo, studios for the use of businessmen living in distant suburbs of the city, or hotel space for businessmen."²⁴ This intention for businessmen also connects to the previously mentioned idea of Kurokawa to shorten the commute in Tokyo. He also notes that each capsule connected to a center shaft with bolts on one end, meaning that it could be removed without affecting other capsules"²⁵ Figure B

²² Kurokawa, 109.

²³ Kisho Kurokawa, "Nakagin Capsule Tower," accessed December 5, 2021, <https://jstor.org/stable/community.16512980>.

²⁴ Kurokawa, *Metabolism in Architecture*, 105.

²⁵ Kurokawa, 105.

is an image depicting the installation of a capsule which demonstrates the piece-by-piece construction.²⁶ Due to the prefabrication, construction of the building was shortened. This idea of replacing the capsules is what connects to the Metabolist idea of ‘living structure’. With a building being able to have parts replaced and moved it certainly alludes to something living and growing. Besides its peculiarity, it also embodied Kurokawa’s capsule idea, which is seen in a good amount of his early works. Mass production is one aspect of the capsule idea, as the capsules are prefabricated and produced in a factory-like setting while being sustainable.²⁷ Kurokawa visions of Metabolism and Tokyo’s future is translated into the tower.

Conclusion

What makes Kisho Kurokawa stand out from the rest of the Metabolists is his consistent close connection to philosophies in his architecture and being a writer as well. Kurokawa’s Nagakin Capsule Tower is arguably his most studied early work. Built in 1972, it was almost at the end of the Metabolism era, as the first essays debuted 12 years earlier. Kurokawa states that there was some disagreement between all Metabolist architects on certain ideals, especially on Tokyo’s new urban layout. He mentions this in his own book, since there were differences with the methods of addressing Tokyo’s urban problem. There were plans to publish another manifesto, but this resulted in being delays which eventually never came to be.²⁸ Kurokawa also states in his own book that during the late 1970s, the group was producing little to no work, although he was still keeping some broad ideas of the movement in his personal work.²⁹ In this sense, Kurokawa also makes himself stand out and proposes that he is still carrying the ideals

²⁶ Kisho Kurokawa, “Nakagin Capsule Tower,” accessed December 5, 2021, <https://jstor.org/stable/community.16518004>.

²⁷ Kurokawa, *Kisho Kurokawa*, 46.

²⁸ Kurokawa, *Metabolism in Architecture*, 43.

²⁹ Kurokawa, 7.

into his later works. These differences make him a critical architect to study as he has still kept close to the ideas of Metabolism well after the decline of the movement.

Tokyo has developed into one of the largest cities in the world while also being one of the most modern. Metabolism resulted in more than an architecture movement, but a symbol for a recovering and emerging modern Tokyo. Kisho Kurokawa, one of the most prominent architects of the group, provided his own views on Metabolism as it differed slightly among all Metabolist architects. It was Kurokawa who continued to have a successful writing and architecture career and still implemented Metabolist ideals throughout his later works deriving from his early days of the career. Metabolist structures still exist today and there are efforts to preserve such structures such as the Nakagin Tower, ultimately demonstrating how influential this movement was to the Tokyo identity.

The philosophies and existing structures of Kurokawa and the Metabolists fundamentally serve as a critical factor in Tokyo's postwar urban development. Philosophies such as 'city as living' and megastructures are prominent factors to the notion of Tokyo's future development as proposed by the movement. The idea of living structure represents Tokyo's healing and growth in the aftermath of destruction. As described by Metabolists, the city was the future of urban development. Kurokawa's *Space City* contains both philosophies. His designs of massive structures proposed to address Tokyo's rapid expansion, by shortening the worker's commute through designs. The other component to the argument is the existing structures and their symbolic nature. Metabolists changed global postwar architecture and the Nakagin Capsule Tower and Yoyogi National Stadium are highlights of this. Tokyo's Olympics in 1964 was a spotlight for an international audience to view the emergence of modern urban development. Both mentioned structures symbolize non-western modern architecture which was an unseen

development. Kurokawa's capsule tower also embodies 'living structure' as its unique design allows for prefabricated capsules to be replaced and renewed. Ideals, structures, and their critical representation fully embody Tokyo's postwar urban development through ways that have lasting effects.

Bibliography

- Gardner, William O. *The Metabolist Imagination: Visions of the City in Postwar Japanese Architecture and Science Fiction*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2020.
- Kurokawa, Kisho. "Agricultural City." Accessed December 5, 2021.
- Kurokawa, Kishō. *Kisho Kurokawa: metabolism and symbiosis = Metabolismus und Symbiosis*. Berlin: Jovis, 2005.
- Kurokawa, Kisho. *Metabolism in Architecture*. London: Studio Vista, 1977.
- Kurokawa, Kisho. "Nakagin Capsule Tower." Accessed December 5, 2021.
- Lin, Zhongjie. *Kenzo Tange and the Metabolist Movement: Urban Utopias of Modern Japan*. New York: Routledge, 2010.
- Noboru, Kawazoe, and Ignacio Adriasola. "The City of the Future (1960)." *Review of Japanese Culture and Society* 28 (2016): 152–68.
- Nyilas, Agnes. *Beyond Utopia: Japanese Metabolism Architecture and the Birth of Mythopia*. New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2018.
- Tagsold, Christian. "Modernity, Space and National Representation at the Tokyo Olympics 1964." *Urban History* 37, no. 2 (August 2010): 289–300.
- Tange, Kenzo, 1913-. "Tokyo: Olympic Halls General: Ext.: View." Accessed December 5, 2021.
- Urban, Florian. "Japanese 'Occidentalism' and the Emergence of Postmodern Architecture." *Journal of Architectural Education (1984-)*, 65, no. 2 (n.d.): 89–102.

Governmental Failure to Prepare American Culture for Vietnam

Michael Lok - University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

The Vietnam War is often remembered as a shameful chapter in American history. Marked in schools in history classes as an unpopular war among the American people with domestic protests moving against involvement in Vietnam, and the fact that despite being a leading global power, the US had failed to subjugate a small faraway Asian nation with a far inferior resourced military, all added to the shame. After the shock of the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, the US government pulled its forces out despite prior conceptions of the offensive's assured victory. Due to the US government's poor communication with the American public, the government failed to substantially bolster the American people's support for the war despite their attempts, and this especially contributed to the decrease of war hawk culture of belligerence following the Tet Offensive.

Following the Gulf of Tonkin incident where it was claimed that US destroyers were attacked by the North Vietnamese in August 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution as a result in that same month in order to "...promote the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia" allowing the president, "...to take all necessary steps... to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."¹ This opened the way for greater and more direct American military involvement in Vietnam in the following years to come. To get a general idea of the

¹"Transcript of Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964)," Our Documents, <https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=98&page=transcript>.

Vietnam War's popularity since this informal declaration of war that was the resolution, Gallup provides a chart recording American opinion on the war through three options: "yes it was a mistake", "no it was not" and "no opinion". In August 1965, it was reported that 24% of Americans were against the war, and 61% thought that yes, the war was the right decision. The next year, in November 1966, the numbers shifted, with 32% thinking the war was a mistake, with 51% still believing the war was not. In December 1967, the year before the Tet Offensive, 45% now thought Vietnam was a mistake, with the remaining 46% of the population thinking otherwise. To sum it up, from 1965-1967, beliefs Vietnam was erroneous rose 30% while sentiments believing otherwise sank 15%.² With regard to this overall downward trend in American confidence in the war over the years prior to the Tet Offensive, the US government then attempted to sway the public's outlook on the conflict.

In a congressional address five days after JFK's assassination in 1963, President Johnson stated the following of his ideas of what America was, and what his goals were for the country.

We have shown that we can also be a formidable foe to those who reject the path of peace and those who seek to impose upon us or our allies the yoke of tyranny. This Nation will keep its commitments from South Viet-Name to West Berlin...let all the world know and none misunderstand that I rededicate this Government to the unswerving support of the United Nations, to the honorable and determined execution of our commitments to our allies...³

² Lydia Saad, "Gallup Vault: Hawks vs. Doves on Vietnam." Gallup, May 24, 2016, <https://news.gallup.com/vault/191828/gallup-vault-hawks-doves-vietnam.aspx>.

³ Lyndon Johnson, "Lady Bird Johnson: LBJ Addresses Congress after President Kennedy's Assassination," PBS. Public Broadcasting Service, n.d. https://www.pbs.org/ladybird/epicenter/epicenter_doc_speech.html.

Presenting his beliefs and his foreign agenda for the United States, LBJ established that America was there to defend their ideals all around the globe. In South Vietnam, a half decade before the Tet Offensive, he further established that it was America's duty to support the South Vietnamese while maintaining a powerful influence in the Asian sphere. However, despite the confidence in his initial address, according to David Shipley in his *Public Relations Review*, Johnson shrouded Vietnam in secrecy for sixteen months after becoming president.⁴ In the beginning, he seldom talked of Vietnam, and the American public was largely ignorant of what was progressing on the other side of the world. This disconnect would create greater shock in the future as more truth slowly crept out to the public as the war ballooned in scale and ferocity.

In the following 1964 presidential election, LBJ was elected into office in a landslide with the expectation that he'd bring peace to Vietnam. His campaign had framed his opponent, Barry Goldwater, as a man who might escalate the US into nuclear war, with a famous LBJ campaign ad showing America being nuked, alluding to Goldwater's previous comments of proposing to tactically use nukes in Vietnam.⁵ Instead of peace, it was later in 1965 that the situation with South Vietnam worsened, with their capital in political chaos and deeply entrenched in corruption while losing to the North militarily. Consequently, Operation Rolling Thunder was executed, bombing the North Vietnamese, as well the first US combat troops being deploying in March, escalating US involvement.

With this turn of events, a new wave of anti-Vietnam sentiment rolled over. Escalation was not what the American people wanted, nor what they voted for when they elected Johnson. In response to the escalation, newspapers nationwide "called on the administration to rule out

⁴ David Stiles Shipley, "Sacrifice, Victimization, and Mismanagement of Issues: LBJ's Vietnam Crisis," *Public Relations Review* 18, no. 3 (1992): 275.

⁵ Michael Levy, "United States Presidential Election of 1964," *Encyclopædia Britannica*, inc. <https://www.britannica.com/event/United-States-presidential-election-of-1964>.

escalation and seek a negotiated exit from the war in early 1965, including the New York Times, Washington Post, St. Louis Post-Dispatch.”⁶ Serious major news organizations began to publish anti-war media against Johnson’s decisions. Not only were the newspapers speaking against Johnson now, “university students began to protest escalation through all-night teach-ins about the history of Vietnam and American involvement there, often billed as a forum for debate but skewed toward the anti-administration side. Yet precisely because such protests were vocal and one-sided, Johnson tended to ignore the opprobrium from the left.”⁷ Johnson, in response to the college protests and anti-war actions even said, “George, don’t pay any attention to what those little shits on the campuses do. The great beast is the reactionary elements in the country.”⁸ LBJ, despite all the criticism, and all his efforts to try and sweep Vietnam under the rug, still underestimated just how powerful and long-lasting anti-war public opinion could be, and its potential impact on his future foreign policy decisions.

However, the criticism began to reach a boiling point, and it became impossible to ignore. In April, 1965, LBJ gave his famous speech at John Hopkins University, “Peace Without Conquest.” It is here that it is the first time LBJ goes into depth talking about Vietnam.⁹ This speech was an opportunity for Johnson to clarify and strengthen the reason why America was in Vietnam, and why the people should continue to support the war. Specifically targeting the college demographic in this speech - who had proven especially rowdy in resisting Johnson’s pro-war agenda - LBJ comments on their concerns: “Vietnam is far away from this quiet campus. We have no territory there, nor do we seek any. The war is dirty and brutal and difficult. And some 400 young men, born into an America that is bursting with opportunity and promise,

⁶ Dror Yuravlivker, “‘Peace without Conquest’: Lyndon Johnson’s Speech of April 7, 1965,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 3 (2006): 465, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2006.02557.x>.

⁷ Yuravlivker, “Peace without Conquest,” 465.

⁸ Yuravlivker, “Peace without Conquest,” 465.

⁹ *PRX. Epilog: “I Shall Not Seek....”* Accessed May 3, 2021, <https://beta.prx.org/stories/269514>.

have ended their lives on Vietnam's steaming soil. Why must we take this painful road?"¹⁰

Subsequently, Johnson states that it is America's duty to support the South Vietnamese in their independence as presidents before him have done, and to not fulfill the pledge made to defend South Vietnam's independence would be a dishonor and an "unforgivable wrong." and "To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next." Johnson feared for the greater global reputation of America to back up its words substantially, and in an allusion to the famous Domino Theory, also eyed the present war as a barrier against future containment-style conflicts. Beyond just focusing on the combative aspect of the war and America's role in securing peace globally, Johnson also tossed in this offer to Vietnam, "...I would hope tonight that the Secretary-General of the United Nations could use the prestige of his great office...to initiate...a plan for cooperation in increased development. For our part, I will ask Congress to join in a billion-dollar American investment in this effort as soon as it is underway."¹¹ So within this speech, not only has Johnson emphasized the importance of staying and fighting in Vietnam as part of America's word to uphold former promises and prevent future wars by waging one in Vietnam as a stemming strategy, but also doing so in a more peaceful and non-militaristic way through offers of heavy economic investment.

This fresh approach by LBJ was made so that it both satiated somewhat the war hawks who wished for a greater military effort in Vietnam which the speech justified and backed, but it also helped in soothing the fears of those of the American people who were scared of escalation, whose fears of how to handle Vietnam were addressed through Johnson's proposed aid plan in joint with the UN. Approximately 60 million people in America listened to this speech, and with such a public effort by Johnson to try and appeal to the American people to back the Vietnam

¹⁰ "Peace Without Conquest," Teaching American History, Accessed May 3, 2021, <https://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/address-at-johns-hopkins-university-peace-without-conquest/>.

¹¹ Teaching American History, "Peace Without Conquest."

War and reestablish what it was America was fighting for, and what the goals were, with so many ears perked to listen to him, it was quite a successful speech. White House mail received afterward turned more positive reflecting the general people's approval of Johnson's reasoning, and newspapers all over the nation became more positive as well. For one instance in a lead editorial of the New York Times (of which this paper was usually a vocal critic of Johnson), "President Johnson last night projected an American policy on Vietnam in which the country can take pride," and from the *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, "Many newspapers published the full text of the address and added editorials praising Johnson's courage and reason in delivering a 'masterful presentation of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia' and included both the 'Sword and the Olive Branch,'" this alluding back to the John Hopkins speech that both satiated war hawks and those nervous of escalation.¹² Following LBJ's address, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reinstated funding for the war, \$115 million, which they had just revoked just before Johnson's speech. Eventually, though, North Vietnam rejected the propositions made by Johnson in the speech for economic development in Vietnam. The reactionary emotion to the speech passed, the war grinded on, and Americans were once again embroiled in how to properly deal with Vietnam, while Johnson kept up a pace of gradually escalating the war bit by bit. LBJ had gotten his positive support temporarily after his speech, but his attempt of selling peace, while advertising war, still had not solved the public's issue with Vietnam.

As the war rumbled on, the government still attempted to make best of their military efforts to the press. According to *Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962-1968*, MACV, or Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, created to assist the South Vietnamese, would, "...announce casualties by number once a week...but would describe losses for particular

¹² Yuravlivker, "Peace without Conquest," 465.

engagement only as light, moderate, or heavy.”¹³ However, it became more difficult to classify deaths in this way as lists of the dead increased in size, and since MAC used the three terms in relation to “total military force involved” the three terms were able to be used as whatever MAC wanted. In another instance of informational muddling, following an air raid conducted, the Department of Defense claimed that “...the raid had destroyed 2,500 pounds of enemy rice, a large communications center, and from 20 to 30 buildings,”¹⁴ but despite claims of the mission’s success, “...the attack had done little actual damage to the enemy, a fact readily apparent to any diligent reporter...reporters discounted all of those claims and concluded that the Johnson administration was trying to hide the failure of its raid behind another public relations ploy.”¹⁵ Even Cronkite, a CBS News anchor deemed the most trusted man in America at the time, “...charged that the Pentagon was ‘attempting to put the best possible light on what...appeared to be a mission that failed.’”¹⁶ The US government was attempting to constrict information that reporters could get their hands on, and the back and forth between government claims and that of reporters steadily decreased trust of both reporters, and as such, the public in government action in Vietnam due to the cloudy seeming nature of the military claimed “truths”. It’s hard to keep faith in a war effort when information of how it’s progressing is being constantly conflicted by what’s supposed to be reliable sources by both one's own government, and trustworthy news sources whose claims clash head on head.

Building further distrust, there was an interview with Adlai Stevenson, US Ambassador to the UN, who revealed that the US had during 1964 rejected North Vietnamese offers of

¹³ William M. Hammond, *Public Affairs: the Military and the Media, 1962-1968*, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, United States Army, 1988), 178.

¹⁴ Hammond, *Public Affairs*, 174

¹⁵ Hammond, *Public Affairs*, 174

¹⁶ Hammond, *Public Affairs*, 175

peace talks twice.¹⁷ Though the State Department tried to play it down, stating it was “on the basis of the total evidence available to us we did not believe...North Vietnam was prepared for serious peace talks,”¹⁸ of which this statement was proving reporters' beliefs that the US government was not being honest of the status of the war. In an attempt to lessen the constant negative press coverage, the usual MACV briefing team was replaced with officers that were friendly with the press. Later, captured enemy documents were declassified and released to the press to give info to reporters that, “...either revealed enemy failures or admitted by word or inference that the war was going poorly for the Communists.”¹⁹ Such evidence was released to the press to further bolster the war effort, at a pace the government had more control and comfort in dispensing, while satiating eager reporters.

Besides reporting in Vietnam, the government also moved to counter dissenting views at universities, which were frequent sites of mass domestic protests against the war. According to the *American Experience* from PBS, “Since the first wave of teach-ins hit campuses, the American government had been working to get its side of the story out at universities. For example, it supported the American Friends of Vietnam (AFV), a pro-administration group that held a rally in June 1965.”²⁰ According to a New York Times article covering the death of the AFV’s former chairman, Wesley L. Fishel, Fishel, “...sought to rally support for the United States government’s military buildup in Vietnam.”²¹ The AFV was originally created to help privately lobby and bolster American support for former South Vietnamese leader, Diem, and to promote him as a man committed to social and economic reform and someone who was

¹⁷ Hammond, *Public Affairs*, 215

¹⁸ Hammond, *Public Affairs*, 215

¹⁹ Hammond, *Public Affairs*, 235.

²⁰ “Protests and Backlash,” PBS. Public Broadcasting Service, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/two-days-in-october-student-antiwar-protests-and-backlash/>.

²¹ “Wesley L. Fishel, a Professor, Dies; Leading Advocate of Vietnam War,” *The New York Times*, April 15, 1977.

driven to defeat communist influence. However, following Diem's overthrow, the AFV then shifted its support to the new government of South Vietnam. As the Johnson administration attempted to change minds about the war, presidential aides created a program named, "Target: College Campuses", and this program according to, *LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War* would be, "...dispatching some of their 'best young troops' to speak at universities and bringing professors and student leaders to Washington for seminars. The President authorized the Democratic National Committee to mobilize through the Young Democrats a cadre of student leaders to speak out in defense of U.S. policy."²² In relation of this program with the AFV, "Administration officials helped raise private funds to support AFV activities and encouraged the group to conduct rallies to counter the teach-ins and release publications defending U.S. policy."²³ However despite all these attempts to sway public opinion in colleges, the protests showed no signs of stopping, and anti-war sentiment still continued to build, with the AFV in particular being unable to match the success or the numbers of their rival anti-war groups, proving the government's ineffectiveness to dispense pro-war sentiment among the American public.

When the Tet Offensive finally occurred, it was the final twist of the knife for the Johnson administration in conducting the war. The surprise attack shocked many Americans, who despite the contradictions between the press and official government statements, still thought the Viet Cong were not as major a threat as they had perceived to justify an offensive of such a large scale. After all, General Westmoreland, an American commander in Vietnam, was just comforting the American people that the enemy was only able to launch attacks of small types of ambushes around the further areas of South Vietnam. He had previously declared,

²² George C. Herring, *LBJ and Vietnam a Different Kind of War*, (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1996), 126.

²³ Hammond, *Public Affairs*, 126.

“With 1968, a new phase is now starting. We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view.”²⁴ Johnson stated, regarding the war on the USS Enterprise, that there would be, “not many more nights”²⁵ - and US military officials framed enemy fighting efficiency as declining and their morale sinking. Much of the press had still supported the basic war effort in Vietnam and as such, so did the American public, until Tet.

With Tet, the North Vietnamese had shifted tactics from guerilla, to conventional warfare. When they broke through the walls of the two-and-a-half-million-dollar US Embassy complex in Saigon, it was a shocking image for many Americans even though the Embassy itself was not taken. The Viet Cong in the bigger picture, were able to attack at once five cities, thirty-six provincial capitals, sixty-four district capitals, and fifty hamlets. Many Americans were taken off guard that this attack could even happen to this size.²⁶ The North Vietnamese had failed to meaningfully achieve most of their objectives, with many cities being retaken after initial capture as well, and the offensive failing to encourage rebellion among the South Vietnamese as had previously hoped. The US and RSV had about 700 casualties, while the North Vietnamese had about 10,000 dead, with many of their undercover agents being killed while taking part in the offensive, or driven out of their villages in the aftermath of the attack.²⁷ Despite the military strategic win for the US, the attack was a complete psychological victory for the North Vietnamese.

The attack was contrary to what US government officials were assuring the public, that the end was nearing, and the enemy was weakening, and America would come out on top. The news, and as a result, the public, would not share such a view. Mike Wallace, a CBS

²⁴ Hammond, *Public Affairs*, 140.

²⁵ Don Oberdorfer, “TET: Who Won?” Smithsonian Institution, November 1, 2004, <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/tet-who-won-99179501/>.

²⁶ Hammond, *Public Affairs*, 344.

²⁷ Hammond, *Public Affairs*, 349.

correspondent, stated that the offensive “demolished the myth” that the US and RSV’s military controlled South Vietnam.²⁸ According to Barry Zorthian, an American diplomat with Vietnam,

LBJ never seemed to feel the confidence of the American public. He wasn’t sure of his public posture, and therefore, he wasn’t sure he could call on the American public to take on a war, deliberately, and consciously...and suddenly you turn around and we’ve got half a million people out there, and more on the way...and 200,000 more troops, we were gonna hit 700,000, and that’s what I think Walter Cronkite reacted to...there was no end to it.²⁹

And what Zorthian alluded to regarding Cronkite was his report in February following Tet stating this, “It seems now more certain than ever that the bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a stalemate. It is increasingly clear to this reporter that the only rational way out then will be to negotiate, not as victors, but as an honorable people who lived up to their pledge to defend democracy...”³⁰ Eight weeks after Tet, Johnson announced he would not be seeking, nor accepting a nomination of his party to be president, due to the public backlash from Tet. By the time LBJ left with peace talks in Vietnam underway, he had about a 50% approval rating, and his successor, Richard Nixon, would run on the campaign promise to bring peace with honor while pursuing the goal of Vietnamization, slowly having the South Vietnamese pick up more and more military responsibility while the US withdrew.³¹ Gallup reports on Dec 12, 1967,

²⁸ Hammond, *Public Affairs*, 345.

²⁹ “S1 Ep 6 LBJ’s War - The Shock of Tet,” in *LBJ and the Great Society*, podcast, 24:19, <https://beta.prx.org/stories/269513>.

³⁰ *CBS News - Walter Cronkite’s Report from Vietnam - 1968-02-27*. YouTube, 2020. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Toy2wFBkmg>.

³¹ David Coleman, “LBJ’s Presidential Approval Ratings, 1963-1969,” Research, August 5, 2014, <https://historyinpieces.com/research/lbj-presidential-approval-ratings>.

pre-Tet Offensive, 45% of Americans believed Vietnam was a mistake. After the Offensive, and after LBJ rejected any notion of running for president, the number updated to 48% by April that same year, and by 1973 under Nixon, that number had risen to 60%.³² Regarding the AFV following Tet, under Nixon's administration, this organization's publication and ascendancy rates were decreasing, and the organization faced financial struggles and encountered an uninterested public unwilling to take interest in them.³³ The American public, especially college kids, were just not interested in perpetual war.

Perhaps the Vietnam War might've gone differently if LBJ's administration was more clear about the state of the war to the public. However, this was not the case. The US government was unable to tame anti-war sentiment and culture due to their own failures. At many turns, the government tried to shield the ears of the public from news of Vietnam. It misled the public about the war's progression, gave divided messages about how the government would resolve the war, and advertised Vietnam as a sure win before the outbreak of Tet, which the public perceived as anything but a success. LBJ attempted to downplay the situation in Vietnam initially as he kept a low profile on its status, later attempting to satiate the American public with military and diplomatic solutions, which failed, as he continually also failed to anticipate the power of a growing anti-war movement. When the problem of Vietnam grew too large to ignore, brought out by and large by the American public through their own concerns and protests, LBJ was forced to take a more public stance and attempt to shore up support while addressing the war in seriousness through his speech at John Hopkins. It temporarily boosted domestic support shortly in a reactionary sense but failed to bring about any substantial progress

³² Saad, "Hawks vs. Doves on Vietnam."

³³ Sandra Scanlon, *The pro-War Movement: Domestic Support for the Vietnam War and the Making of Modern American Conservatism*, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2013), 215.

in advancing a meaningful end to the conflict, and as such its effectiveness on the public was short, and lacked the might needed to instill lasting public confidence in staying in Vietnam. It had a divided message, selling both peace and war to the public, and the public too would be divided accordingly. The government did try to conceal the severity of the war, trying to counter college protests through organizations such as the aforementioned AFV, but this was largely ineffective as government-backed efforts could never compete in popularity with their college anti-war counterparts. As for reporters, the government attempted to satiate their desire for knowledge to an agreeable degree, but it was quickly discovered that journalist media would conflict greatly with official government accounts, helping to simmer suspicion of government deceit in both the press and public. The government often perpetuated the belief that the US was winning the war, and that the end was nearing. It had advertised these claims especially prior to the Tet Offensive, and the government's inability to properly get journalists to see the war from their point of view when the offensive did occur, as well as the government's failure to set up a seemingly truthful account of how the war was really going, backfired tremendously with Tet. The conflict revealed to the American public that in contrast to their original beliefs, the situation in Vietnam was much worse than what the government had tried to frame it as. As such, it led to a further decline in Vietnam War support after Tet and beyond 1968, despite the fact that the offensive was a smashing military victory for the US.

Bibliography

- CBS News - Walter Cronkite's Report from Vietnam - 1968-02-27. YouTube.* YouTube, 2020. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Toy2wFBkmg>.
- Coleman, David. "LBJ's Presidential Approval Ratings, 1963-1969." Research, August 5, 2014. <https://historyinpieces.com/research/lbj-presidential-approval-ratings>.
- Hammond, William M. *Public Affairs: the Military and the Media, 1962-1968*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, United States Army, 1988, 178.
- Herring, George C. *LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War*. Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1996, 126.
- Johnson, Lyndon. "Lady Bird Johnson: LBJ Addresses Congress after President Kennedy's Assassination." PBS. Public Broadcasting Service, n.d.
- Levy, Michael. "United States Presidential Election of 1964." Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, inc.
- Oberdorfer, Don. "TET: Who Won?" Smithsonian.com. Smithsonian Institution, November 1, 2004. <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/tet-who-won-99179501/>.
- "Peace Without Conquest." Teaching American History. Accessed May 3, 2021. <https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/address-at-johns-hopkins-university-peace-without-conquest/>
- "Protests and Backlash." PBS. Public Broadcasting Service.
- PRX. Epilog: "I Shall Not Seek...."* <https://beta.prx.org/stories/269514>
- S1 Ep 6 LBJ's War - The Shock of Tet.* PRX, n.d. <https://beta.prx.org/stories/269513>.
- Saad, Lydia. "Gallup Vault: Hawks vs. Doves on Vietnam." Gallup.com. Gallup, May 24, 2016.
- Scanlon, Sandra. *The pro-War Movement: Domestic Support for the Vietnam War and the Making of Modern American Conservatism*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2013, 215.
- Shipley, David Stiles. "Sacrifice, Victimization, and Mismanagement of Issues: LBJ's Vietnam Crisis." *Public Relations Review*, 1992.
- "Transcript of Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964)." Our Documents - Transcript of Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964).

“Wesley L. Fishel, a Professor, Dies; Leading Advocate of Vietnam War.” *The New York Times*, April 15, 1977.

Yuravlivker, Dror. “‘Peace without Conquest’: Lyndon Johnson's Speech of April 7, 1965.” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 3 (2006).

The Imperial Themes of Alexander Borodin's *Prince Igor*

Justin Wytmar- University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

Nineteenth-century Russia produced no shortage of opulent cultural masterpieces, and chief among them was Alexander Porfiryevich Borodin's stunning opera, *Prince Igor*. This medieval tale of a Russian prince's struggle against the encroaching Turkic hordes of the Polovtsy embodies all the most popular nationalistic and romantic aspects of the nineteenth-century Russian cultural output. However, analysis of the opera's themes shows the opera endorses not only nationalism, but imperialism. When the contemporary Russian invasion of Central Asia is considered, it is evident that *Prince Igor* serves as a justification for Russian Imperial expansion by developing themes of the Christian civilizing mission, Orientalism, and the "Great Man" theory.

The story of Borodin's opera begins with the real-life reign of Igor Svyatoslavich, the prince of the Kievan Rus city of Putivl, whose reign was dramatized in the twelfth century epic *The Song of Igor's Campaign*, a national epic on the scale of the *Chanson de Roland* or the *Nibelungenlied*. The poem chronicles Igor's legendary raid against the Cumans (referred to as the Polovtsy in the opera), which led to Igor's captivity, and his subsequent dramatic escape across the mighty Donets River to the lands of the Rus.

In 1869, the music critic and ardent nationalist Vladimir Stasov drafted a scenario based on the poem and presented it to Borodin, who had been longing to write an opera. According to the English musicologist Gerald Abraham, Stasov believed he had found a theme which "met all

the demands of Borodin's talent and artistic nature: broad epic motives, nationalism, variety of characters, passion, drama, [and] the oriental."¹

Soon after being presented with the scenario, Borodin immersed himself in the study of *The Song of Igor's Campaign* as well as the *Hypatian Codex* (on which the poem was based). However, progress on the opera soon slowed. In his *My Musical Life*, friend and fellow composer Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov wrote that the opera was being written by a man whose life was "rather queerly arranged."² Borodin was composing *Prince Igor* while serving as a professor of chemistry at the Imperial Medical Surgical Academy in St. Petersburg, and he spent much of his free time on charitable pursuits.³ Unsurprisingly, Borodin died before completing the opera, having worked on the composition for eighteen years.

Unwilling to let Borodin's masterpiece go to waste, Rimsky Korsakov and his student Alexander Glazunov "decided to finish, orchestrate and set in order all that had been left behind by A. P. [Borodin], as well as prepare it for publication."⁴ The pair finished the opera in less than a year, and on October 23, 1890, *Prince Igor* was premiered at the Mariinsky Theatre in St. Petersburg.

It is now relevant to mention the fact that most productions of *Prince Igor* follow the aforementioned events contained in the prologue with the second act of the opera as opposed to the first act. The opera is typically ordered this way in order to allow the setting of the opera to alternate between Putivl and the Polovtsian Camp in each act. This paper will address the

¹ Gerald Abraham, "The History of 'Prince Igor,'" *Music and Letters* XVI, no. 2 (April 1935): 85–95.

² Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov, *My Musical Life*, trans. Judah A. Joffe (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1923).

³ Among these charitable pursuits were establishing the first medical schools for women in Russia, and using his four room apartment to take care of myriad stray cats and vagrants.

⁴ Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov, *My Musical Life*, trans. Judah A. Joffe (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1923).

composition as performed: Prologue, Act 2, Act 1, Act 3, Act 4, as this is the order most nineteenth-century Russians would have watched and experienced the opera.

Borodin's opera opens outside the cathedral of Putivl with a rousing "slava" chorus which exalts the sun, the nation of Russia, and Prince Igor himself.⁵ Prince Igor is preparing to march against the Polovtsian Khans, but his war celebration is interrupted by a solar eclipse. The people of Putivl, regarding the astronomical phenomenon as a bad omen, encourage Igor to abandon his campaign. Despite the warnings, Igor rides on the Polovtsy and suffers a catastrophic defeat.

In the next act, Igor and his son Vladimir are prisoners in the Polovtsian camp. Igor laments his loss of honor as a result of his capture until he is approached by the Christian Polovtsy slave Ovlur, who offers to help Igor escape. Igor initially refuses because his code of honor disallows him from fleeing captivity. Igor is soon confronted by Khan Konchak, who summons Polovtsian slaves and soldiers to perform a series of lavish, exotic dances to celebrate his glory.

Simultaneously, Igor's brother-in-law Galitsky turns Putivl into a raucous party venue. Galitsky signals his desire to rule Putivl until he is interrupted by a group of women. The women beg Galitsky to return one of their friends, who has been kidnapped by Galitsky's drunken cohort. The victim is only released when Igor's wife Yaroslavna is informed of the crime and orders Galitsky to release the girl. Suddenly, the Boyars of the city appear and inform Yaroslavna that the Polovtsy under Khan Gzak, having destroyed Igor's army, are marching on the city. Galitsky and his followers emerge demanding that he be declared the new Prince of Putivl, but the argument is interrupted when the Polovtsy arrive and begin to sack the city.

⁵ "Slava Choruses (slava being the Russian word for glory) was a common musical trope in 19th Century Russian operas

After the Polovtsy return to their camp, they begin to celebrate the successful sack of the city. Igor's rage at the destruction of his city inspires him to accept Ovlur's offer. That night, Igor flees on horseback. The next morning, Yaroslavna and the subjects of Putivl celebrate their prince's return. The opera ends as Igor pledges to unite the Russian cities and strike back against the Khans.

Like many other operas and musical works created in the nineteenth century, *Prince Igor* is deeply nationalistic.⁶ However, through its development of the themes including the civilizing Christian narrative, Orientalism, and the "Great Man," we can see that *Prince Igor* enforces an imperialist narrative. Furthermore, the themes of imperialism embedded in the work become even more apparent once the contemporary Russian invasion of Central Asia is considered as political context for the opera's creation.

From the beginning of the opera, there is a dominant theme of the civilizing Christian mission. The curtain rises in the square in front of the Putivl cathedral, and Prince Igor enters the stage making the sign of the cross as he passes through the imposing church doors. During the dialogue that extends from the opening "Slava" chorus, Prince Igor declares to his subjects that "we go to battle for our faith!"⁷ When the forces of Khan Gzak besiege Putivl, the boyars reassure the princess Yaroslavna that the city is safe because, "our fortress is our faith in the lord."⁸ Then, as Ovlur, the notably Christian slave of the Polovtsy, convinces Igor to escape, he reminds Igor that by escaping, "you will save your native land, your faith."⁹ Clearly, the preservation of Christianity is important to the characters, and Prince Igor's declaration of intent

⁶ Examples of such contemporary works include: Glinka's *A Life for the Tsar*, Glinka's *Ruslan and Lyudmilla*, Mussorgsky's *Boris Godunov*, and Rimsky-Korsakov's *Kashchey the Deathless*

⁷ Alexander Borodin, *Prince Igor*, 1890

⁸ Ibid

⁹ Ibid

for his conquest indicates that he finds his faith to be worth spreading. But why is Igor so determined to not only protect his faith, but expand it?

These calls to religion are reflective of larger themes of imperialism within Russia and within general themes of nineteenth-century Imperialism. Much like the United States and the other Western colonial powers, Russia perceived itself as a great power with a “White Man’s burden” to bring civilization to their neighbors. Oxford University historian Alexander Morrison describes Russia’s motivations: “[The Russian conquest of Central Asia] was also seen as part of a wider civilizing mission, which saw Russia take her place among the other European colonial empires that dominated the nineteenth-century world; as a means of championing the spread of Orthodox Christianity in a region most of whose population were Muslims.”¹⁰ Borodin’s opera perfectly reflects this sentiment. Igor’s religious zeal reflects larger imperialist undertones.

To strengthen the civilizing narrative, the opera relies on another popular theme within musical works of the time, Orientalism, to “otherize” the Polovtsy. Like nationalism, Orientalism was a staple of nineteenth-century Russian musical works.¹¹ Russian Orientalism aimed to create a sense of exoticism and mystery about the people, cultures, and nations of the “Orient” (often defined by Russian opera as the Middle East, Caucasus, and Central and Eastern Asia) and to portray those peoples, cultures, and nations as an “other.” This “otherization” created a sense of distinction between the people of the Orient and the Russians. Furthermore, it led Russians to develop perceptions of the backwardness and inferiority of “Oriental” peoples.

The best example of *Prince Igor*’s orientalist leanings can be found at the end of the opera’s second act in a series of dances often referred to as the “Polovtsian Dances.” The staging of these dances often emphasizes the theme of Orientalism to hyperbolic proportions:

¹⁰ Alexander Morrison, *The Russian Conquest of Central Asia: A Study in Imperial Expansion 1814-1914*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021).

¹¹ For example, Rimsky-Korsakov’s *Scheherazade*, Balakirev’s *Islamey*, and Tchaikovsky’s *Iolanta*

scantly-clad maidens glide across the stage, soldiers leap and hoot war whoops in raucous circles, and choruses exalt the glory of the Khan in refrain after refrain. Some performances of the dances end with Khan Konchak rising from his throne to lasciviously lift one of the beautiful maidens up into his arms and then turn towards the audience and thrust her into the air as if she were a trophy.

While the “otherization” of the Polovtsy in their eponymous dances can stand alone as an orientalist theme with unique artistic motivations, it can also be seen as an implicit extension of imperialist themes. As if it weren’t bad enough that the Polovtsy are non-Christian, they are also raucous, misogynistic, and violent. The portrayal of the Polovtsy as morally inferior to the Russians serves to justify the civilizing narrative. In other words, the portrayal of the Polovtsy as backwards creates a justification for the Russians to dominate and civilize them.

There are different types of Orientalism to be considered. Since the Orientalist movement began in Revolutionary France, several tropes have emerged to characterize the people of the “Orient.” Among these tropes are the raucous, misogynistic, and violent depictions of hyper-aggressive Asian men that we see in *Prince Igor*. However, there are a number of other tropes to be discussed. In the nineteenth-century United States, orientalist narratives responding to the increase in Chinese labor featured a bumbling, passive, and submissive stereotype of the “Oriental” man. In Bret Harte’s 1871 poem “The Heathen Chinee,” he describes a card game with a Chinese man named Ah Sin, who bore a “pensive and childlike smile” and “did not understand” the simple rules of the card game.¹² The passive orientalist trope later developed into various forms: the peace-loving “oriental monk” Cheng Huan of D.W Griffith’s 1919 film *Broken Blossoms* who wanted to “spread the gentle message of the Buddha,” the submissive and smitten “geisha” Cio-Cio San of John Luther Long’s 1898 short story *Madame Butterfly*, and the

¹² Bret Harte, *The Heathen Chinee*, (Boston, James R. Osgood & Co, 1871).

bumbling ministers Ping, Pang and Pong from Puccini's 1924 *Turandot* all present less-than-savage Oriental stereotypes.¹³

The range of Orientalist portrayals exhibited from the mid-nineteenth to early twentieth centuries matters because it shows that Borodin's choice to portray the Polovtsy as savage was not simply reflective of the inherent nature of Orientalism. Prince Igor depicts the Polovtsy as raucous and violent because such a portrayal would make an invasion of Central Asia seem warranted. Whether intentional or an implicit extension of the opera, Borodin meant for the viewers of his opera to perceive Central Asians as violent and in need of civilization.

So if the Polovtsy need conquering, then who is to be the conqueror? Prince Igor certainly embodies many characteristics of Thomas Carlyle's "The Hero As King," which he describes as "Commander over Men; he to whose will our wills are to be subordinated, and loyally surrender themselves, and find their welfare in doing so, may be reckoned the most important of Great Men."¹⁴ Igor certainly is a commander of great fortitude and charisma. He compels his army by the mere force of his character to fight against the Polovtsy despite the bad omen of an eclipse, and his subjects celebrate his return to Putivl at the end of the opera.

However, Igor is unique among "great men" because he is perceived as great by both his allies and his enemies. During the opera, Igor is treated with the utmost respect by both his Russian subjects and his Turkic adversaries. The notion of Prince Igor's command of the respect of others is made clear by Khan Konchak's repeated mentions of the fact that he would rather be Igor's ally than his enemy. After hearing the news of Igor's escape, Konchak exclaims "Good for him! I did not admire him so much in vain: In Igor's place I would have done the same thing! Oh,

¹³ D.W. Griffith, *Broken Blossoms: Or the Yellow Man and the Girl*. (U.S.A.: D.W. Griffith, 1919).

¹⁴ Thomas Carlyle, *On Heroes, Hero-Worship and The Heroic In History*, (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1841).

we should not have been enemies, But faithful allies!”¹⁵ Such laudation certainly leaves the viewer with the impression that Igor is truly a great hero.

Additionally, Igor is not only admired but respected by both the Russians and the Central Asians. Yaroslavna and the Polovtsy both refer to Igor as the “falcon” throughout the opera. Following Igor’s escape, the frantic assembly of Khans laments that “the falcon has flown to his nest,” while Yaroslavna refers to the returning prince as “my bright falcon.”¹⁶ To be called “the falcon” is a sign of great respect and admiration. Russian folklore is filled with falcon iconography: the legendary firebird was often depicted as a falcon, depictions of falcons adorn Kievan coats of arms, and many Russian fairy tales contain princes trapped in the form of a falcon.

However, it is interesting to consider the humility and sense of honor embodied by Igor. Throughout the opera, Prince Igor often states his belief that the prowess of the Russian nation is more important than his own individual victories. Before launching his attack against the Polovtsy, Igor declares that “For Russia's glory, I would break my lance in the distant Polovtsian steppes!”¹⁷ This line (one of the few taken nearly exactly from the original *Song of Igor’s Campaign*) signifies that Igor demonstrates his virtue by serving the glory of his nation and working to expand its territory, clearly embracing dual themes of nationalism and imperialism.

While imprisoned, Igor stays dedicated to his country. He maintains that he must remain a captive in order to preserve his surviving honor. Yet he longs to free his country from the yoke of his enemy. In his signature aria, Igor laments that “The enemy is like a terrible beast. Russia moans in the grip of its mighty claws and lays the blame for this on me! Oh, give, give me freedom, I will succeed in atoning for my disgrace; I will save Russia from the enemy! No sleep,

¹⁵ Alexander Borodin, *Prince Igor*, 1890

¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ Ibid

no rest for my tormented soul! The night brings me no hope of escape.”¹⁸ By committing to save his country, Igor displays the obligation he feels to redeem his individual failure. The aria is doubly effective in further “otherizing” the Polovtsy by describing them as a “terrible beast” which is implied to be in need of civilization.

So what makes these themes so relevant to Borodin’s world? Why was there a need for an imperialist opera? Only one year before Stasov suggested the subject of Prince Igor, the Central Asian city of Samarkand was besieged by Russian forces under Konstantin Petrovich von Kaufmann. The siege signified the end of the Russian conquest of the Khanate of Bukhara, a significant Turkic power in the region. The siege was immediately romanticized and “produced many heroes of Russian arms,” several of whom were depicted on the orientalist canvases of Vasily Vereshchagin.¹⁹ Despite the fact that it is set several centuries in the past, *Prince Igor* nonetheless is one extension of the romanticization and justification of the war. The recent siege of Samarkand and subsequent fall of the Bukhara Khanate had a profound impact on the deeply patriotic Stasov, and inspired him to hone in on a theme of Central Asian conquest for Borodin’s operatic ambitions.

The choice of subject of *Prince Igor* is important because it reflects the need for a justification of Russian Imperialism. The Russian state needed to legitimize its imperial ambitions, and it frequently did so through the nationalistic and Orientalist tropes found in the opera house. *Prince Igor* is one example of such legitimization. Borodin’s opera portrays the Turkic Polovtsy as barbarians in need of civilization, because Russia had just conquered the Turkic Bukharans. The opera depicts Igor as a “Great Man” so the Russian audiences can see themselves as virtuous in their imperialist activities.

¹⁸ Ibid

¹⁹ Alexander Morrison, *The Russian Conquest of Central Asia: A Study in Imperial Expansion 1814-1914*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021).

Borodin's opera is a grandiose and deeply layered composition, which like many of its contemporary works is steeped in themes of nationalism, Christianity, and Orientalism. However, we see from Igor's dedication to the state, and the portrayal of the Polovtsy as a horde in need of civilization, that imperialistic themes made a significant impact on the opera. Consideration of the opera's political context makes such a notion even more evident. *Prince Igor* serves as a patriotic, bombastic, musical justification of Russian imperial expansion, and demonstrates a narrative of Russian cultural and moral supremacy.

Revisionism and Revanchism: An Evaluation of Smolensk and Putin's Motives

Camryn Reschke - University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

Amidst longtime regional conflict and dispute over Ukrainian territory— fervidly sought after by the Russian Federation— the President of the latter, Vladimir Putin, has made evident his beliefs regarding the supposed fraternal union of the two nations. In his address, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” Putin posits an argument widely held by many nationalists that assumes an unchanging fixed history and identity shared by the nations of Russia and Ukraine. Though they are two separate entities, he cites the medieval predecessor to the Russian and Ukrainian states, Rus’, as proof of their shared history and nationhood. In what he calls the “gathering of Russian lands” by the Grand Prince Vasili III, this assertion of unity persists.¹ Though, upon further examination of one instance of this aforementioned “gathering,” it becomes clear that this revisionist attempt at prescribing a unified identity bears little resemblance to the actual perception of the land at the time, as shown by the document “A Charter Granted to the Townspeople of Smolensk by Prince Vasili III of Moscow on 10 July 1514.” The prince does not behold the lands of Smolensk, a besieged city, as a land of Russians, nor is there any assertion of a unified and primordially tied identity as the motivation for its capture. Instead, what is shown in this charter is the establishment of a relationship between a Prince and his newly conquered subjects.

The question of ownership or right to land, be it a town or a formal state, is one from which many conflicts have arisen. The town of Smolensk is no different— though its reference

¹ Vladimir Putin. “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians.” Presidential Executive Office (July 2021). <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/by-date/12.07.2021>

by Vladimir Putin appears invalid when put into a more factual context, one not being utilized for nationalistic gains. The city of Smolensk had been under Lithuanian control, but its importance to Moscow lay more in the resources it offered. In the charter that was produced following the city's capture, the Prince of Moscow assures the people of Smolensk that the siege will not be accompanied by forceful pillaging. Instead, it implies a reorganization of leadership and a recognition of the previous state of the city. The Prince maintains that the differences in the Rus'-controlled Smolensk will be minimal, and the people "[ruled] in all things as they were ruled by Grand Prince Vytautas and their other Sovereigns, King Alexander and Sigismund, according to their established charters."² While Putin claims that the Prince and other rulers of Rus' "cast off the foreign yoke," it is evident through this charter that much of the conditions of prior rule were allowed to remain.³ What is offered by the Prince appears fair to the previous lifestyles of the people of Smolensk, with only minor changes regarding livestock resources.⁴ The language utilized is similar to that of any other diplomatic document, rather than a prideful proclamation of unity and freedom for the people of Smolensk by the Prince.

Although the word "patrimony" is used frequently in this charter, there is no argument set forth by the Prince for national unity or a shared history. Instead, what the document suggests in the context of Smolensk's history of control is the reclamation of land, not of a Russian people. Though Smolensk and Moscow appear to be comprised of Eastern Orthodox believers, little else would seem to imply a sense of shared culture and nationality.⁵ Despite this, Putin still stresses the unity of the two lands through the ties provided by the Orthodox faith, though two lands of

² Prince Vasillii III of Moscow "A Charter Granted to the Townspeople of Smolensk by Prince Vasillii III of Moscow on 10 July 1514." Translated by Dr. John Randolph. p.1

³ Vladimir Putin. "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians." Presidential Executive Office (July 2021). <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/by-date/12.07.2021>

⁴ Prince Vasillii III of Moscow "A Charter Granted to the Townspeople of Smolensk by Prince Vasillii III of Moscow on 10 July 1514." Translated by Dr. John Randolph. p. 2-3

⁵ Prince Vasillii III of Moscow "A Charter Granted to the Townspeople of Smolensk by Prince Vasillii III of Moscow on 10 July 1514." Translated by Dr. John Randolph. p.1

the same church have rarely been considered to be united as a whole historically.⁶ This over-exaggeration of a shared nationality, often utilized by Putin in his examination of the region's history, furthers the erroneous argument that Smolensk was made up of Russians, rather than subjects under a king. The relationship between a ruler and those he rules is far from that of the loyalty a citizen of a state may feel towards his leader in the present. To ascribe a modern sense of political relationships to the city of Smolensk or the greater Kingdom of Rus' becomes an attempt at revisionism. There is no evidence within this document that supports Putin's claim, nor the greater idea of a shared, fixed national identity between Russians and Ukrainians. Therefore, it remains evident that what occurred during the siege of Smolensk was not a "gathering of Russian lands," but the simple conquering of a city and its people.

In an attempt to modify history to fit his nationalistic and moderately irredentist aims, Vladimir Putin has misrepresented the manner in which the Kingdom of Rus' expanded in the 15th and 16th centuries. Though he presents a history of the "reunification" of lands comprised of Russians, examination of a charter from this time reflects little of the motivations he claims were present in the hearts and minds of the Moscow Princes.⁷ In the "Charter Granted to the Townspeople of Smolensk by Prince Vasili III of Moscow on 10 July 1514," there is no argument for national unity, nor is there evidence of the revanchist aims Putin himself has projected onto the past rulers, thus exposing his own manipulation and ignorance of history.

⁶ Vladimir Putin. "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians." Presidential Executive Office (July 2021). <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/by-date/12.07.2021>

⁷ Idid.